Idealism

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True.

While I am a materialist, idealism versus materialism is a question I think will never be completely answered.

Both sides make a kind of sense, in their own way.

^^^^^

I agree totally. For myself, I am not a materialist. Each of the world-views are logically coherent; that does not mean that one cannot make a good case against adopting one. Materialism is very good, in that we assure ourselves of the intelligibility of the universe, the cost is that we have, in my view, a strong defeater for the reliability of our own faculties. As such I like materialism and Falsificationism, as epistemologies of science but find them lacking when applied internally. Idealism, solipsism etc are very difficult to reconcile with science, there is no reason to think the outside world is any more logical or coherent than our own internal thoughts and as such we have less grounds for thinking the universe is intelligible. Constructivism is essentially idealism + post-modernism and as such has few benefits at all. For myself I hold to a sort of Theistic Coherentism; where the basic axioms you reason from reinforce one another but you accept that none can really be proven but you also more-or-less accept that God has made you and the universe intelligible (this is a Judeo/Christian assertion) and that therefor you expect to be able to understand the universe and you expect your cognitive functions to be more or less reliable.


[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Bd37W31dxw&feature=g-all-u&context=G20537e6FAAAAAAAACAA[/youtube]
I will leave it to the physicist turned theologian John Polkinghorne to describe, in rough terms, theistic epistemology.

By saying the universe could be unintelligible, do you mean the view point of not being able to understand the universe, or that it was not intelligently designed?

While I don't believe in intelligent design, I do believe that humans could eventually understand the universe, if our species lasts long enough.

Hi abacacus,

I'm more focused on prejudices involving epilepsy and autism, and the notions of "responsiveness" with "impaired consciousness". Otherwise, the radical Skinnerian Behaviourist vantage that "consciousness" is not a valid and objective scientific concept, is best entertained in pursuing the Scientific Method as applied to Human Behaviour, and it works best in philosophy too.

Daily activities are impacted, like driving and eye-contact, and very adverse prejudices are practiced against individuals with neurological impairments, including those of epilepsy and autism. "Consciousness As A Neurological Concept In Epileptology: a critical review" by P. Gloor (Epilepsia. 1986;27 Suppl 2:S14-26), notes the major practical problem from categorizing such impairments with needless conceptual weights:

Abstract at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/3720710
"This essay explores the usefulness of the concept of consciousness in epileptology and concludes that it does not further the understanding of seizure mechanisms and brain function. The reasons for this are both theoretical and empirical. Consciousness cannot be adequately defined. This may explain why attempts at accounting for it in neurobiological terms have failed. Epistemological and scientific arguments are reviewed which suggest why a satisfactory explanation of consciousness is not now and may never be possible. There are, however, aspects of conscious experience such as perception, cognition, memory, affect, and voluntary motility that are open to neurobiological research. Careful observations of epileptic seizures with "loss of consciousness" often reveal that only some components of consciousness are impaired. "Loss of consciousness" during a seizure, often presenting as unresponsiveness, may be due to aphasia, inability to perform voluntary movements, ictal or postictal amnesia (sometimes with preservation of memory during the ictus itself), or to diversion of attention by a hallucinated experience. A plea is made to observe accurately and interact with the patient during an attack in order to distinguish between these various behavioral disturbances masquerading as 'loss of consciousness.'"

"Brain Damage" makes using the phrase "distributed neuronal matrix" for "holographic" more revealing (this article and many of its references are cited in scores of books that use the buzzword "holographic"), "Experiential Phenomena of Temporal Lobe Epilepsy" by Pierre Gloor (1989), (Brain (1990), 113, 1673-1694), and on the Full Text PDF download: pages 1686-1691 (Mona Lisa for Liberals, the other guy for conservatives): http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content ... 3.abstract

I don't much like the concept of "consciousness" (I prefer "self-induced autoclitic(?)" Skinner version), but others use "wild & wide" concepts of consciousness (consciousness during sleep (unconsciousness consciousness)???): "How To Study Consciousness Scientifically" by John R. Searle (1998), (Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (1998) 353, 1935-1942)
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/article ... 854266.pdf

Here's a big list: http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/met ... essBib.pdf

Then, it is often held that a rock has a "consciousness", with the cyclical buzz-fad of Panpsychism:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism

Tadzio

What I mean by intelligibility is that the universe is understandable; both from our perspective (our ability to understand it) and from the perspective of the universe itself (it's own understandability).

The idea that consciousness/subjective experience/mind is a 'function' of matter does make sense to me. Yes, I can't see how there can be human consciousness without a material brain, and whatever other biological objects and processes might be involved, first of all being in place.

The point where I still find myself believing in some kind of idealism is on the question of how something like consciousness can come about from matter if it was not already possible that it would come about, and also on the question of how matter can get started on itself.

On the latter question, one could ask, 'how could mind get started on itself?' and this runs into the same difficulty of answering how matter could get started. However, I tend to find it more believable that mind is ontologically prior to matter, because we think of matter as stuff without intention so there seems to be nothing in matter that would have allowed it to get started in the first place. We think of mind, on the other hand, as in some way capable of intitiating things or having intentions to do things, even if that only be having thoughts. So, for me, mind seems at least closer to being at the origin of things thn does matter.

On the former point, I tend to believe that the possibility for mind to arise from matter or as a function of matter implies that something under which mind could be subsumed must have been in place in order for this possibility to exist. This is a difficult point for me to articulate, but I just can't see how mind can arise out of a matter conceived of as something that is in itself without mind. If you want to say that matter had the potential for mind to arise as a function of it, which with "scientific hindssight" appears to be the case, then, for me, I think you are defining matter as something more than just physical stuff, basically as something which already has potential for mind in it. And so this potential and possibiliity and scope for mind that is within matter just brings us back to the start of the question of how to explain that.

I think language and thinking is a problem in this debate because we run up against its limits. The way out is to stop thinking and talking about it. But when I do reflect on it, I tend towards the primacy of mind.

Then it is the problem of the disciple. They are ignorant of other fields of philosophy.


Because the disciple says so? Do you have any source saying exactly how our mind works is relevant to epistemology.


Are you saying even a computer built by god cannot acquire any knowledge?


That is precisely your problem. You are bundling my position with presuppositions that are 'generally accepted'. You are just making a strawman.


How is a 'conscious' being different?


What do you mean by 'Subjective experience entails a certain degree of time'? When does one subjective experience ends and another start? I am just asking how do you separate subjective experience and memory. The rest of your response is just irrelevant rant.


This proves you don't know eliminative materialism.
Eliminative materialism does NOT reject reasoning. It is NOT absolute skepticism (it is NOT skeptical of science). Please stop criticizing a position you don't know.

We don't see quantum field either. So our idea of subjective experience may well be just as wrong as our idea of the position of an electron.

It's a very interesting debate, that's for sure.

And I can relate with running out of language as well, I'm trying to set my ideas in to words, but it is quite difficult.

Not really, most fields of philosophy draw from world-view studies. Epistemology of science is powerful, simply because it recognizes it's own limitations.



I just cited empiricism; the entire field is based on the idea that sensory input is the limit or primary method of knowledge. It is generally accepted and is available in most dictionaries: Empiricism (Philosophy), "The doctrine that all knowledge is derived from sense experience". Since empiricism is a major view within epistemology; it clearly is relevant. Further, eliminativism, is a discussion within empiricism.



It might be able to, it would depend. If it were designed by God so as to acquire knowledge, then it would obviously have a proper function and could treat some of it's inputs as being reliable and justified.



My criticisms of your position are generally accepted. I am not using the generally accepted view of your position; I have directly quoted you and given you good reasons for thinking each of my points makes sense.



In generally, most epidemiological positions are not different. The Münchhausen Trilemma is a criticism that works against all epistemological positions. Some endeavor to ignore it and some work to escape it through developing proper function.



When I say that it entails a certain degree of time, I am saying that all subjective experience exists in time. As such memory must be taken to be a part of subjective experience. It is a separate question when discussing it's reliability because it is a time sensitive faculty but reasoning as a whole must be taken to involve a level of time. Further, the rest of my response was not just an irrelevant rant; it was a statement that even an expression of skepticism entails a degree of time. An expression of skepticism is just as dependent on faculty and memory as a statement affirming reliability.




I did not claim that eliminative materialism rejects reason, rather I claimed that it provides a defeater for thinking that you are capable of reason. I argued that it is self refuting and I gave good reasons for thinking that this is the case (like that it engages in special pleading, that it does not reason its way out of the brain a vat and so cannot have much to say of an objective world, that it as empirically valid as other ideas but that it is not as powerful et al); reasons you have so far not responded to, rather you have simply preferred to misinterpret what I have said, equivocate and respond in what appears to be great haste.

Nonsense. This thread is about theory of mind. Epistemology is irrelevant.


My bold. It says sensory input. Equivocating sensory input with subjective experience is just sloppy.


Where did I say subjective experience is the only method of knowledge?


Which part of subjective experience is not memory?


Eliminative materialism is NOT skepticism so your strawman is irrelevant.


You just defeated yourself.

You admit it is possible for a computer to be capable of reason, without the mysterious subjective experience. Eliminative materialism does NOT necessarily entail naturalism - that our brain is natural does not imply everything else must be natural. Your 'defeater' holds no water.




Here we have a perfect example of self-defeating.
If the mental fiction does not have ontological value, neither does 'the question 'who is making the objection''. In other words no 'question' exists, all that exist is just vibration of air molecules or electromagnetic emission.

You are incorrect that epistemology is irrelevant. When idealism discusses the mind, it is specifically referred to as epistemological idealism ( http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/top ... 2/idealism ).



Not it is not. Hume was a radical subjectivist. Empiricism, as a general theory of mind makes little distinction between the two. It is eliminativism that attempts to separate them out in its radical attempt to stamp out subjective experience. It seems that you have given up disputing my general points and have now resorted to sniping and you are a terrible shot.



You didn't, nor did I say that you did. Rather, I pointed out how your attempt to deny the importance of the primacy of the subjective experience in epistemology refutes your attempt to produce an epistemology. I am not verballing your position, rather, you are not really reading mine.



I just said that our experience of subjective existence entails memory but that they are separate subjects.



It is not general skepticism, it is reductionist position of the mind. It fails due to the objection commonly made against skeptical positions.






There is no disproof here. A computer could be capable of reason, if it was the product of proper function. What we are discussing here however, is can you think you are capable of reasoning on eliminative materialism and based on what I have argued previously, the answer is no. I did not argue that it rejects or that it was incapable of reason, I specifically spelled it out for you; 'I did not claim that eliminative materialism rejects reason; so citing reason does nothing to disprove what I am saying. Further, Naturalism is a non-sequitur with regards to this issue.



Again, we have another clear cut situation of you not actually reading what I am saying. Saying the brain in the vat is a 'mental fiction' does not reason your way out of it. Saying that all we have 'is just vibration of air molecules or electromagnetic emission' does not prove that there is any of those things. From an epistemological point of view, you need to find some way of endorsing the primary experience we all have of the universe; the subjective, saying that this does not exist refutes the effort. For you to accept that eliminative materialism is true, you still have accept that you yourself are accepting a belief and hence you are refuting eliminative materialism's claim that there is no mind to believe anything. Even if you remove the person who accepts or denies the proposition; eliminative materialism is still incompatible with any propositional model of epistemology. At present, Boghossian has shown that there is a major lacking in the work of eliminative materialism; it remains incoherent and undeveloped. Even two of it's primary supports Devitt and Rey both agree that it is implausable (Devitt, M. (1990). Transcendentalism About Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71, & Devitt, M. & Rey, G. (1991). Transcending Transcendentalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72).

Every time your point is shot down and you have nothing to reply, you shout SNIPING. Fail

Quoting Hume is just silly. Clearly Hume cannot conceive modern neuroscience or computers and therefore cannot begin to understand the distinction. You are 200 years behind.

Eliminative materialism treats sensory input and subjective experience differently. Equivocating them and then criticize eliminative materialism is just begging the question.


Given you insist to equivocate sensory input and subjective experience, do you really have any position to be read?


But you don't know how to separate them. So that is no different from saying there magical and non-magical electrons that are indistinguishable.


More Baseless assertion.


So anything without subjective experience is not capable of reasoning, but a computer without subjective experience is capable of reasoning. Really what is the thing missing?


I said no 'question' exists, all that exist is just vibration of air molecules or electromagnetic emission, you ignore my key point of NO QUESTION and say I cannot prove the existence of vibration of air molecules or electromagnetic emission. And you throw in 'brain in the vat' which is never mentioned anywhere. Really you are just losing and desperately LA LA LA.


The same error again. Eliminative materialism does NOT claim there is nothing to 'accept belief'. There are sensory inputs and belief forming is a physical process in the brain. Asserting there must be some mystical thing called subjective experience to be endorsed is just repeating the same baseless assertion.


Have you really read Boghossian's paper? Do you really understand the underlying debate on mental LANGUAGE? Since mental fictionalism provides a very good solution, evidentally you are just parroting The Stanford Encyclopedia.

I guess I'm equally an idealist and a materialist. I think they're two sides of the same coin. I'm open to the idea, though, that all the laws of nature have been set or dreamed up by the habitations of a collective mind matrix that our consciousness, in its current manifestation, emerged from.

I think what we perceive as matter, is really our own egos (a kind of condensation or warping of universal mind) contrasted against everything else. Its all really the same stuff though, whether you wanna call it mind or matter. The only real difference between the two, that I can tell, is there's a perturbation in specific vectors of space-time (that we call human consciousness) that creates a heterogeny between the contrast of the individual human observer and everything else.

I do hold the view that the essence of the universe is more directly related to what we perceive with our senses, than something "out there".

Last edited by JNathanK on 06 Feb 2012, 8:05 pm, edited 3 times in total.

Philosophical "Idealism" isn't the belief in high minded ideals. That's the lay understanding of the term, but what the poster is addressing is more fundamental. The argument among philosophers has been materialism vs, idealism, all the way back to Plato and Aristotle, as well as Hagel and Marx in more recent times. There's materialism, which supposes that matter is the primary domain of reality and that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon of it. Then there's Idealism, which supposes that matter is an illusion created out of mind.

I take more of a Taoist interpretation in that one can't exist without the contrast of the other, at least in the forms were familiar with. That's really what we only know too, is what were familiar with from our perspective, and that's the interfacing between what we perceive to be our "minds" and what we perceive to be "matter". I think both emerged dialectically from some homogenous form, sort of like how soil is, more or less homogenous, but its separated into different, molecular components by a seed to build a plant. It might be that some homogenous pool of infinite potential was filtered and sorted out to construct this cosmos of difference and contrast that we find ourselves in now.

Also, mind (in the philosophical tradition of the term) isn't so much the physical, material brain. Its the stage that perceptual awareness takes place on within those fleshly labyrinths of firing, physical electrons.