The following extract from my book, Post-Positivism and Post-Relativism, is copyrighted by me. Respectful comments are welcomed:
The British school of critical realism (Roy Bhaskar, 1944-2014; Hindī, राम रॉय भास्कर, Rāma Rôya Bhāskara and many others), also known as Bhaskarian critical realism, began with basic critical realism (sometimes referred to as original critical realism or first-wave critical realism). Bhaskarʼs work was completed with the philosophy of metaReality. Like critical social theory, critical realism focuses upon emancipation from domination. However, whereas critical realists assume the objective existence of a reality (called “ontology”), apart from consciousness or actual events, many critical theorists do not make that assumption.
Both Bhaskarian critical realism and critical social theory can be classified as types of neo-Marxism. However, in critical realism, oppression is an aspect of demireality (disunity in difference). On the other hand, oppressive ideologies—racism, sexism / misogyny, classism, ableism / disablism, heterosexism / heteronormativity / homophobia, ethnicism, anti-Islamicism / Islamophobia / anti-Muslimism, antisemitism / anti-Judaism, sizeism, heightism, lookism, sanism / neurotypicalism / neurelitism, cissexism / cisnormativity / transantagonism, ageism, and so forth—are interpretive and instrumental (or actual). They refer to human knowledge about demireality and to systems of domination. Consequently, attacking or refuting the ideologies, as in many varieties of critical social theory (including the Frankfurt School), will likely do little to eliminate the demireality.
This extensively sourced publication focuses, primarily, on Bhaskarian critical realism, including the writerʼs own Dialectical metaRealism™. However, various approaches which resemble Bhaskarian critical realism in one or more aspects, along with numerous non-Bhaskarian formulations of critical realism (such as theological critical realism in its many expressions, Roman Catholic critical realism, Sorokinian integralism, epistemological critical realism, critical aesthetic realism, metacritical realism, radical critical realism, and realistic epistemological monism), will be introduced in subsequent chapters of the work. These other critical realisms are historically incongruent with Bhaskarʼs philosophy. Notwithstanding any direct relationships, Bhaskarian and some other types of critical realism do converge in certain areas.
From a Bhaskarian critical realist perspective, ontological explorations must be accompanied by an epistemic humility. Critical realism, contra naïve realism, presumes the relativity of human perception. Indeed, considerations of naïve realism or direct realism will, generally speaking, be rather unfavorable in this book. To the naïve realist, the Real domain of generative mechanisms is directly discernable to the empirical observer. There is no mediation by the Actual domain, the plane of events and non-events. When carried over into textual interpretation (hermeneutics), the propositions of naïve realism become unfathomable. Two people reading the same paragraphs are assumed, in effect, to be reading the mind of the writer. Although this untenable perspective is sometimes referred to as commonsense realism, the alleged association with common sense is itself a dialectical contradiction.
Naïve realism may first be illustrated by religious literalism. Included within this category are: the assorted forms of Christian fundamentalism, the Turkish–Islamic creationism of Adnan Oktar using the pen name Harun Yahya , and Haredi Judaism (Hebrew, יַהֲדוּת חֲרֵדִים, Yạhăḏūṯ Ḥărēḏiym). A second case is found in the hyper-empiricist scientism. For instance, the New Atheism, with its unnuanced and antagonistic reification of the word “religion,” is represented, in part, by: Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel C. Dennett, Bill Maher, Lawrence M. Krauss, Kyle Kulinski, Ibn Warraq (Arabic, اِبْن وَرَّاق, ʾIbn Warrāq, “son of papermaker”), Ayaan Hirsi Ali (Arabic, أَيَان هِيرْسِيّ عَلِيّ, ꞋAyān Hīrsiyy ʿAliyy), Paul Zachary “P. Z.” Myers, Jennifer Michael Hecht, Matt Dillahunty, Michael Shermer, David Silverman, and the late Christopher Hitchens.
Quote:
Haredim (“Fearful” in the meaning “God-fearing” in Hebrew): Name of those Jewish fundamentalists who refuse modern innovations. Haredi is the singular form and is also an adverb.
[Israel Shahak with an introduction by Norton Mezvinsky. Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. Second edition. London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press. 2004. Page xxiii.]
Quote:
Israeli religious Jews are divided into two distinctly different groups. The members of the religiously more extreme group are called Haredim. (The singular word is Haredi or Hared.) The members of the religiously more moderate group are called religious-national Jews. The religious-national Jews are sometimes called “knitted skullcaps” because of their head covering. Haredim usually wear black skullcaps that are never knitted, or hats. The religious-national Jews otherwise usually dress in the more usual Israeli fashion, while the Haredim almost always wear black clothes.
[Israel Shahak with an introduction by Norton Mezvinsky. Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. Second edition. London and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press. 2004. Page 7.]
A qualification is in order regarding that otherwise helpful and succinct definition of the Haredi movement in the first quotation. The loaded term “fundamentalism” should be utilized cautiously and precisely. It has only been adopted as a self-designation within a particular segment of authentically American neo-Protestantism. Moreover, since no religious movements within Islam, Judaism, or, for that matter, any non-Christian faiths have ever officially referred to themselves as “fundamentalists,” scholars would seemingly be well-advised, as a matter of accuracy and respect, to avoid the common decontextualized application to adherents of different belief systems. Regrettably, the academic literature on the subject has been sorely inconsistent.
This project has been a labor of love. I fabricated an idiosyncratic hybrid of critical social theory and Sorokinian integralism, a “critical integralism” labeled Structural Dialectics, prior to an initial embrace of Bhaskarian critical realism around 2003. Roughly a year later, as a consequence of my personal disenchantment and alientation associated with an emotionally and verbally abusive naïve religious realist, I abandoned critical realism and became a new critical theorist, a post-Marxist, a nominalist, and a strong social constructionist. Upon this personal amalgam, I conferred the appellation, Structurization Theory, not to be confused with Anthony Giddensʼ structuration theory.
Although I deeply respect the beautiful religion of Islam, I have never been a Muslim. My parents were typically secular New York City Jews who never joined a synagogue, and, as might be expected, this native New Yorker does not follow Judaism either. Fortunately, through my academic interest in Sufism (Arabic, تَصَوُّف, Taṣawwuf)—a set of Islamic paths (Arabic, طُرُق الإِسْلَامِيَّة, ṭuruq ʾal-ꞌIslāmiyyaẗ) which involve various mystical practices (including meditation)—I developed an eclectic methodology for phenomenological reflection called Heartfulness Inquiry™. By engaging in a series of internal conversations, over a three-day Labor Day weekend in the U.S. (September 3rd–5th, 2011), I recognized the cause and the gravity of my mistake and returned to critical realism and the philosophy of metaReality.
12 Jan 2016, 7:10 pm
