Why I don't think there are "Xinjiang atrocities"?

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SkinnedWolf
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30 Jul 2022, 10:48 pm

Damn. I collected more sources. It's seriously out of bounds for me.
I adjust my view. This is atrocity. It has no hope of solving the problem at all.

But this is a train that cannot be turned back. Ethnic conflicts have formed an increasingly inextricable knot under the wrong policies since 1990.
Once stopped, things in 2009-2014 will happen in a more terrifying form. And finance may not support these contents for too long.


I will continue to post translated materials.


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cyberdad
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31 Jul 2022, 2:10 am

SkinnedWolf wrote:
CCP claims there is "10". BBC claims there is "100".

The anti-CCP chinese community active in the external network believes that there are "30-70".
Some people believe that in order to curb local problems, appear for some reason, "50" is needed, which will not be tolerated by "civilized society". But this is not "atrocities/genocide".


Why not let the rest of the world decide for themselves. A sign of a healthy society is one that allows the press to freely publish what is happening. It is only countries that commit actual atrocities who want to hide the extent of their crimes by banning free press, restricting foreign journalists and controlling what is published in government run broadcasters/publications.



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31 Jul 2022, 10:58 pm

cyberdad wrote:
SkinnedWolf wrote:
CCP claims there is "10". BBC claims there is "100".

The anti-CCP chinese community active in the external network believes that there are "30-70".
Some people believe that in order to curb local problems, appear for some reason, "50" is needed, which will not be tolerated by "civilized society". But this is not "atrocities/genocide".


Why not let the rest of the world decide for themselves. A sign of a healthy society is one that allows the press to freely publish what is happening. It is only countries that commit actual atrocities who want to hide the extent of their crimes by banning free press, restricting foreign journalists and controlling what is published in government run broadcasters/publications.

Yeah. Information transparency is absolutely beneficial.

I'm just explaining the motivation and the logic that runs here. It doesn't mean that I think this is in line with my wishes.


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SkinnedWolf
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31 Jul 2022, 11:57 pm

From the "internal network". Again, no link.
Judging from the style of writing, this guy seems to be Han Chinese

Quote:
You haven't had a hard time, so you think a lot of things are bad. I'll extract a story from the story of the old people of the Corps who experienced the war of resistance against Japan and came to Xinjiang to build after liberation

Of course, even if you can't understand it

Questioner: when was the most difficult day?

Old man: from 1940 to 43, the Japanese took barbed wire and fences to block the important road forks, leaving a small gap to make two running dogs stand guard. There was a checkpoint within a few steps on the road. The running dogs standing guard at these checkpoints were generally scoundrels from all villages. They would make trouble for the common people if they ate the Japanese food and salaries. Even if you lie at home, they can find you some trouble. He'll have to find something to let you dismantle it, saying he's afraid there's a tunnel here. It's really impossible to do business and grow land. Days are just suffering.
It's not just us ordinary people. Even those who have opened big businesses in the city cannot continue. The most hateful thing is the Japanese devils. They won't let you close your shop, claiming that this is to maintain market prosperity.

Questioner: why didn't you think of leaving or going out to work?

Old man: how to leave? My family and house are all here.
Moreover, the Japanese devils moved villages in various villages, sent people from several villages together to build a model village of public security, and then set up a fort to keep a few Japanese devils and puppet troops staring.
And if you go out to work, you have to be checked for a good citizen's certificate and searched. If you want to go far, you have to have a Japanese pass.
It will be troublesome for the Japanese or running dogs to find out that there is no Model Citizenship Document or pass.
A young man from a neighboring village was interrogated by the Japanese when he went to the county seat. He was arrested after only explaining two sentences.
They said that he was an ideological prisoner with anti Japanese ideology, needed to enter the concentration camp, worked for a long time every day, and occasionally was beaten. Finally, the family tried their best to pick that guy up through the running dog.

(Note: The part about access, looks like a more cumbersome version of how the rest of China is dealing with the outbreak. "Model Citizenship Document" is a common metaphor for measures such as health codes that are popular throughout China.
Although there may be other motives here, merging multiple villages into new towns with better infrastructure is a common means of poverty alleviation in China.)

Questioner: didn't you think about resistance at that time?

Old man: I think so, but I dare not. You don't know who will tell on in the village.
If you just swear at home and let people hear you, it is possible that the next day the Japanese will come to the door with the running dog. So when a family is all around, it's really not dare.

Questioner: will life be easier in 43 years?

(Note: at the end of 2021, the top leader of Xinjiang replaced by Ma Xingrui from Chen Quanguo. The former pays attention to public security, while the latter pays attention to economy.)

Old man: No.
In 1943, some old Japanese devils changed some new Japanese devils from nowhere. The inspection is looser than before, and the market is more active. They dare not arrest people casually any more.
They also do f*****g "goodwill", but in the final analysis, is it not the Japanese?
You can't say that the Japanese devils with loose management are good Japanese devils.

Questioner: I can't figure out why these lackeys want to work for the Japanese? Is it because the Japanese pay food and salaries?

Old man: Of course.
But the food and salaries of the Japanese are not very good. It's relatively well to pay once every three to five months.
At that time, many people were ignorant and stupid. The Japanese have a lot of bad thoughts in their hearts. They cajole and cheat. They say that they can follow us, pay money and land, and even can be officials.
After cheating you, it's hard to leave. Do you think you can quit writing a resignation like now?
If you don't die after being caught, you have to peel off the skin.
But these lackeys deserve it. The Japanese also treat these running dogs as beasts. They let them guard their posts for three days and can't doze off. If the Japanese come down to check and find you dozing off, they will slap you in the face.

(Note: this seems to describe government employees who travel to Xinjiang from other regions.
”If you don't die after being caught, you have to peel off the skin“ is an idiom, which means that there are many losses, not literally.
From other sources I have seen, the work content of the lackeys here seems to be highly metaphorical.)

Questioner: when would life begin to be better?

Old man: that must be after liberation.
The Japanese and KMT have left nothing in my home. Having learned the skill of driving tractors and followed the country to Xinjiang for construction, your generation has such a good life. You don't have to suffer what we suffered before.
Think about what life these old people had in those days, so you should be satisfied with the good life in Xinjiang now.

(Note: I'm not sure if this paragraph has any practical significance. It seems to be to make the story complete to avoid censorship.)


Conclusion: since 2017, they have a completely different operation mode from other regions in China, and have a special censorship mechanism, so that residents in other regions and tourists usually don't notice. (Although there are different policies, the implementation of policies in Xinjiang looks like that in eastern China 20 years ago - quite terrible.)
All this looks like an upgraded version of China's response to covid. This is probably the experience formed in Xinjiang before COVID.


Clearer sentences from this community:
Quote:
The city where my hometown is located borders Xinjiang. Let's say, in the years before I graduated from high school, I didn't meet Uighurs in my city.

But in recent years, there have been many Uighurs in the city who have opened stores and settled down, selling Nang, mutton catering, cakes and stones. I've seen a lot.

Once, curious, I chatted with that guy who sold Nang. His general meaning is that it's too depressing to stay there. So he went to live elsewhere.


Quote:
Have you ever seen farmers br forcing to plant trees during the slack season?
Have you ever seen unemployed people at home who want to rest but be force to train skills?
The policies are all good intentions, but the ones who implement them don't have to consider what ordinary people think.

Note: Prohibition of unemployment is a means of policing mentioned in other sources.

Quote:
Indeed, many things are mandatory. It's not that I can't do it. But it's uncomfortable to be forced to do it.


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SkinnedWolf
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01 Aug 2022, 8:21 pm

Content that has been deleted on the internal network.
In August 2020, Urumqi in COVID.
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/653719.html

Quote:
The non disclosure of epidemic information is not transparent. As early as July 10, there were rumors among the people in Urumqi that there were confirmed cases in Tianshan District, and the canteens of some units suspended hall food. Some communities tightened control, resulting in the inability to swipe ID cards to enter.
On the morning of July 15, it was still reported that there were no cases in Xinjiang. After the notification from Zhejiang, it was said that a confirmed case had been found in Tianshan District in the afternoon, so it was blockaded all over Xinjiang with a shock of more than 1.6 million square kilometers.
Risk level prevention and control cannot be accurate to streets and communities, but only to the municipal level and urban zoning level. After the national nucleic acid test, low-risk cities without cases were still closed for more than 30 days, residents could not go downstairs, and the social economy was destroyed and stagnated.
...
The formalism and bureaucracy of grass-roots units are serious. During the closure period, supermarkets, markets, pharmacies and other businesses related to people's livelihood were closed, hindering the transportation of materials...
The masses have difficulties in seeking medical treatment, and the formalist style of community is serious, so there is a failure to call an ambulance. The community has the ability to have empty cars and people but not send them to the emergency department. The epidemic prevention style is vain, with formalistic behaviors such as waking residents to take medicine and recording videos in the middle of the night, volunteers sleeping in the corridor, and pasting adhesive tape seals on Residents' doors. Some tourists stayed in the hotel for more than 20 days under the clear policy of leaving Xinjiang.

Further suppression of freedom of speech. Some people pointed out on social media that people's livelihood issues such as rising prices, wonderful management, and inability to seek medical treatment, and then received a call from community personnel in the jurisdiction to delete the post. They also used threats and other means to prevent residents from publishing the real situation to the Internet. After the residents couldn't get through the call for help, they posted a post on the microblog to clarify the problem, but they could quickly receive a call from the society or relevant departments to solve the problem and request to delete the post, telling them to prevent the so-called "negative energy" from spreading on the Internet.

Quote:
There is no news in Xinjiang today

Under the blockade, pregnant woman who could not go to the hospital didn't become news

Child who eat plastic toys by mistake and can't go to the hospital didn't become news

Community distribution of traditional Chinese medicine to force people to take it didn't become news

The one who jumped from a building with mental illness didn't become news

The inability to buy vegetables and daily necessities, even toilet paper, didn't become news

Large tracts of fruit rotted in the fields, and the anxious farmers didn't become news

The old man who went downstairs without permission and was handcuffed by the community workers next to the stairs didn't become news

An infected person appeared in a city, but the whole provincial lockdown didn't become news

Cadres who have fallen at the grass-roots level didn't become news

But there are also some things that have become news

How long the day is in Xinjiang has become news

The beauty of Xinjiang has become news

But those living people who seek help in social media

Still not become news


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SkinnedWolf
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01 Aug 2022, 8:53 pm

Shache, July 28, 2014
Radio Free Asia: Xinjiang Shache 7.28 incident, the local people say the death toll is very different from the official version Chinese language.

Quote:
In addition to the official version, people also have different opinions on the number of deaths and injuries in the "July 28" violent attack in Shache County, Kashgar, Xinjiang. According to a local Han Chinese who told the station on Tuesday, the authorities concealed not only the death toll of military police and civilians, but also the death toll of thugs. In the three-day conflict from the 28th to the 31st, more than 1000 people were killed on both sides.

Little is known about the heavy casualties caused by the violence in Shache County, Xinjiang, on July 28, when the Chinese authorities completely blocked and controlled the local news. On Sunday (August 3), the official Xinhua news agency quoted Xinjiang authorities as saying that terrorist groups had organized and premeditated actions, resulting in 37 deaths and 13 injuries of innocent people in Shache County, and 31 vehicles were smashed and burned; The police killed 59 thugs and arrested 215 people.

However, an unnamed Han businessman in Kashgar told the radio station on Tuesday (August 5) that the actual number of deaths and injuries is far more than the official announcement. The military and police clashed with foreign armed personnel and local violent elements, The death toll on both sides exceeded 1000: "it is because many East Turkestan elements, this organization not only has bombs but also guns. They can throw (explosives) wherever they want, and slash people with machetes raised. (violent elements) some are (local) Xinjiang people, and some are overseas. Because there are five border crossings around us leading to Pakistan, our business is also greatly affected".

Reporter: I heard that the armed police entered the village and killed once?

Answer: not only killing, our government still has the means.

Reporter: it is said that 3000 people were killed some time ago, not so many.

Answer: there are no 3000 people. Our people and thugs add up, and there are thousands of people who died in vain.
...
At present, there are various versions of the death toll in the incident on the Internet The local Han businesswoman told reporters that due to the blockade of the news, her understanding of the exact situation was limited, but it was certainly not the number published by the government: "there are network problems here, sometimes there are, sometimes there are no, now (mobile phone) can't even send text messages, let alone wechat. Our side is like Iraq.".

Reporter: did they (Uighurs) die hundreds of people?

Answer: more than that. (uncertain tone)

Reporter: the government reported 59 people.

Answer: they will not report all of them. If (death) exceeds a certain number, according to international regulations, International (United Nations peacekeeping force) peace police will come in.

The woman said that China does not need international intervention, but in the three days at the end of last month, the local conflict was fierce: "we do not need peace police. The combined number of all troops in Kashgar region has accounted for the majority of the total number of troops in Xinjiang. We have many troops here. A few days ago, the whole city was under martial law, and cars were not allowed to go on the streets and roads were closed. It was three days on the 29th, 30th and 31st".

WIKI
Quote:
On August 2, the media in Chinese Mainland reported the violence in Shache County, Xinjiang on July 28: 37 people were killed and 59 thugs were killed in the case. However, some organizations claimed that the death toll was actually higher. Rebiya Kadeer claimed that there were at least 2000 people, but it could not be confirmed.


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SkinnedWolf
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03 Aug 2022, 6:09 am

Why did "development" and "enlightened" fail to solve the Xinjiang problem?
The Xinjiang issue seems to fall into a certain cycle: ethnic exchanges and boosting the economy are long-term strategies, but they will bring friction and conflict; Strong stability maintenance is easy to form a situation of "apartheid" and strengthen national consciousness.

Ten years ago, on September 14, 2009, 56 "pillars of national unity" stood overnight in Tiananmen Square. As an important landscape for the 60th anniversary celebration of the Republic, each column is 13.6 meters high and weighs about 26 tons. It is said to be able to resist the force 11 strong wind without falling. They are neatly arranged on the East and west sides of the square, and each column is printed with men and women in costumes singing and dancing. The columns of "China Red" are complemented by golden ends, forming a great contrast with the buildings with a gray background such as the monument and the great hall. Even in the square where authoritarian aesthetics is at its peak, the scepter like "column of unity" can still show its grandeur and luxury, like a special will and determination.

According to the official caliber, the 56 ethnic solidarity pillars imply the "equality, unity and harmony" of 56 ethnic groups, as well as the right of 56 ethnic groups to jointly take charge of the country and jointly build democratic politics. However, even so, neither the tuanjiezhu nor the "national unity and progress commendation conference" held by the State Council on the eve of national day can hide the growing anxiety and confusion of policy makers, scholars, and even the general public about national issues.

On March 14th, 2008, violent clashes broke out in Lhasa against monks, civilians and military police, and soon triggered large-scale riots and casualties. Later, during the Olympic torch relay in various countries, protests by Tibetans and their sympathizers extended the conflict to all parts of the world and the Internet. The unprecedented nationalism of Chinese netizens was ignited, which was repeatedly strengthened in the subsequent "boycott of Carrefour" (protesting French President Nicolas Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama), the Wenchuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympics, the Diaoyu Islands Dispute and other events. At the same time, violent political protests continued in Tibetan areas.

A more worrying situation occurred in Xinjiang. At the moment when the "pillar of national unity" stands tall, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region thousands of miles away is still in the process of being cut off from the network. Since July 5, 2009, some mobile phones and network signals in Xinjiang have been restricted. From July 8 to May 14, 2010, Internet communication has been completely cut off in the name of national security in this land of 1.6 million square kilometers and more than 20 million residents. In addition, since 2009, a series of incidents related to "violence and terrorism" have continued throughout Xinjiang, and spilled out of Xinjiang one after another. Sensitive issues such as "counter-terrorism" and nationality are constantly stimulating people's nerves. With the refugee crisis in Europe and a series of "anti Muslim" remarks after trump was elected president of the United States, Muslims and Uighurs have also been "extreme" to a considerable extent in the noise and abuse of the Chinese Internet, and ethnic relations have become increasingly tense and antagonistic.

n the past two years, "study classes", "training centers", "re education camps", or "concentration camps" and "prisons" commonly used by foreign media, have gradually entered people's vision, from less to more, and continue to accumulate. In social media, human rights institutions, international organizations, governments and parliaments of many countries, Xinjiang authorities have been constantly criticized and criticized. "The detention / disappearance of millions of Uighurs" has almost become the most frequent relevant topic in Xinjiang's international media reports. The pressure of public opinion also forced the Chinese government to explain many times, and even invited the BBC and other media to shoot and interview on the spot. Whether invited or filmed secretly, the BBC and vice news reports overcame various difficulties, allowing the public, mainly western readers, to see the cameras, barbed wire, plainclothes police, security checkpoints with guns, face recognition systems, local Uighur people who are hesitant, timid and hesitant to speak, arbitrary staff who prevent interviews, and local Han people (such as taxi drivers) who encounter each other, And the Uighur victims or their families who fled abroad, and so on.

However, it is regrettable that although most of these reports can show the current situation of "re education camps" to a considerable extent, and even the overall humanitarian crisis in Xinjiang, they have not been able to go deep into the local area to understand the complex social fabric before and after the "75 incident" due to the restrictions of expression or interview, Nor has it attempted to extend and discuss the Xinjiang issue and the plight of China's overall ethnic relations on a larger historical scale.

These reports are satisfied with the establishment of a simple, black-and-white binary opposition structure of "CCP (and Han) vs. oppressed Uighurs", and thus express criticism of the high-pressure policy of authoritarian countries, as well as vigilance and fear of the police state and large-scale monitoring. They present a kind of Hollywood movie style, no background, simple evil. This narrative may be able to echo the conflict between the right-wing conservative forces and Islam or multiculturalism common in western society after 9 / 11, but it is difficult to help people clarify the complex factors of totalitarianism, nationalism, racism, religious and ethnic conflicts in the "Xinjiang issue".

The Xinjiang issue seems to have fallen into a special political dilemma: when maintaining stability has become the top priority and the state machine uses violent means to achieve strong control, although stability and apparent harmony can be maintained in the short term, in addition to the extremely high cost of maintaining stability, high-pressure policies often reduce the mobility of Uighurs, and even form a situation of "racial segregation" between Uighurs and Han people, At the same time, Uighurs' national consciousness will also be continuously strengthened under pressure. To pursue the long-term goal of building a "Chinese nation" community is like seeking fish from a tree. When the security problem is relatively relaxed, although it can break the isolation between Uyghur and Han to a certain extent (which is almost the only way to build a national community in the long term), in the short term, there will inevitably be a lot of friction and conflicts in the Uyghur Chinese exchanges and economic competition under the current pattern, and these conflicts will be kidnapped by the national problem very naturally due to the historical disadvantages. At the same time, the sense of deprivation brought by the inequality of social and economic status to the Uighurs, together with the previously repressed political resentment, is easy to break out in such a period of relatively loose regulation, resulting in a great impact on the local political order and the state's anxiety about separatist forces, thus triggering a retaliatory return of a new round of high-pressure policies.

Before the "75 incident": the development dilemma of Uygur Society
No historical event is a water without predestination or a tree without roots. The "75 incident" did not appear overnight.

The early days when Wang Lequan took charge of Xinjiang (1995 – 2010) were not peaceful. According to scholars' statistics, there were 158 anti-government violence or organized protests with paper sources between 1949 and 2005. Although most of them were only dozens of people, there were many incidents involving more than 1000 people in the 1990s, when anti-government or nationalist protests were the most frequent. Other scholars' statistics show that 213 ethnic related violence incidents occurred in Xinjiang between 1990 and 2005.

The most serious situation was in 1997. On February 5 of that year, Yining, an important town in Northern Xinjiang, caused serious riots due to protests. Uighurs protested and even shouted slogans such as "expelling Han people" and "building an Islamic kingdom". Finally, 7 people were killed and 64 seriously injured in the riots. Subsequently, on February 25th, 1997, on the day of the national memorial meeting for Deng Xiaoping, a series of bus bombings occurred in Urumqi, killing 9 people and seriously injuring 28. In official terms, this series of violent incidents is regarded as an important symbol of the severe situation of the "anti secession struggle", and these violent incidents are linked to the upheaval in Eastern Europe, the Kosovo war and other overseas issues.

However, it must be understood that after Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992, although lagging behind, Xinjiang was still coerced into the wave of a comprehensive market economy. Yining City, as an important border port in Northern Xinjiang, and the secularization and marketization of commodity economy have caused a great impact on the old social order and religious tradition. For example, affected by injecting drugs, Yining has become one of the most important epidemic areas of AIDS in China. In 2014, a total of 7911 people were reported to be infected with HIV in Yining, accounting for more than 1% of the total population, of which 84.5% were infected by Uighurs. In his article "Xinjiang at the crossroads", the media man Huang ZhangJin described the situation in Yining at that time: a wealthy class rose in Uygur society due to border trade and other factors, and drug abuse, alcoholism, gambling, mistresses and other phenomena were rampant, while the religious conservative forces that fought against it also rose at the same time, attracting a large number of believers who were dissatisfied with reality and worried about the decline of traditional beliefs, "When people quit drugs, alcohol and gambling, they were also captured by their extremist ideas.".

(Note: this explains why "sudden cessation of smoking and alcohol" is suspected of religious extremism.
Here I only analyze why the policy appears, which does not mean that I support the policy, the same below.)

From 1996 to 1997, it became the peak of Xinjiang's "anti secession struggle" before the Seventh Five Year Plan. Accordingly, the authorities have also severely combated the security risks of explosion, murder, arson, and even armed rebellion. For example, Yining once cracked down on a number of violent gangs and underground weapons manufacturing sites on the eve of July 1, 1997, and seized 152 guns, more than 6000 bullets, and 67 explosive devices.

The relatively strict period of strong control did not last long. After the wave of violence from 1996 to 1997 relatively subsided, the central government of China has launched the western development strategy since 2000. Xinjiang as a whole, similar to other parts of the country, has once again entered a relatively loose period of "making a lot of money quietly". The state seems to be trying to "withdraw" from part of social life and let the market assume more resource allocation functions. In the historical torrent of economic development as the center and money oriented, the "ethnic contradictions" appear to be hidden on the surface.

At the same time, not only in Xinjiang, but also on the national political stage, "ethnic minorities" no longer seem to be an important holder, but gradually become ritual symbols used to decorate the prosperous times during festivals and the two sessions. A huge picture in the National Museum's "road to rejuvenation" theme exhibition seems to perfectly illustrate this point: on Chang'an Street, the majestic people's Liberation Army is marching through Tian'anmen Square; On the nearby side, the square with the sign of "taking the new road to industrialization with Chinese characteristics" is the hazy Han people wearing yellow workers' hats; On the other side, there are young men and women of all ethnic groups in colorful national costumes, spinning and dancing. The Army defends the regime, the Han people are responsible for building the country, and ethnic minorities only need to sing and dance.

Compared with later, there were few restrictions on population flow in Xinjiang at this time, and it was relatively easy to migrate within Xinjiang or to other regions. Of course, Uyghur people who go out often encounter difficulties at airports and hotels, and small frictions and conflicts continue. In addition, the network restrictions on the Xinjiang issue, ethnic relations, and even ethnic policy disputes are far from as strict as they were later. The "Uighur online" website founded by Ilham toxti, a professor of the Central University for nationalities, often gathers a large number of young people discussing controversial topics in the forum. Some young Uighur and Han intellectuals are keen to participate in "minority Chinese education", and high-quality discussion articles often appear, and the border that these remarks can reach is unimaginable on today's Chinese Internet.

However, this "relatively loose" environment does not mean that Uighurs have no complaints. On the contrary, on the one hand, most of the resources and cash brought by the western development have poured into northern Xinjiang, where industrialization is relatively developed and oil and gas resources are more concentrated, and these places are mainly inhabited by Han people; On the other hand, the agricultural area in southern Xinjiang, where Uighurs are more concentrated, has stagnated for a long time. With the rapid increase of population, the economic gap with the Han people in Northern Xinjiang is widening. The study found that in 2003, the per capita income of Karamay, an important oil town in Northern Xinjiang, was about 50000 yuan, while that of Kashgar and Hotan were 3182 yuan and 2121 yuan, respectively, with a gap of almost 20 times. Another study in 2012 found that the per capita income of Shihezi (92% of the Han population) was 43000 yuan, and that of Kashgar (90.2% of the Uyghur population) was 7085 yuan.

According to the national census data, Uyghur is the only ethnic group with a large population in the country, while the proportion of agricultural population is still increasing after 2000.

From 2000 to 2010, the proportion of Uygur agricultural population increased from 80.35% to 82.74%. At the same time, the proportion of industrial workers in the population fell from 6.15% in 1990 to 4.55% in 2010. From the late 1990s to 2010, China as a whole is experiencing a rapid and widespread wave of industrialization and urbanization. This reverse trend of change in Uighur is extremely unusual. In connection with the high fertility rate in southern Xinjiang and the arable land and water resources that are difficult to significantly improve, the increase in the proportion of agricultural population means that the population carrying the same land increases, and a large number of young people are likely to be in a state of invisible unemployment.

(note: this explains why government provided a large number of factory jobs, whether forced or not, and family planning, have become a thing.)

In fact, the performance of Uighur society is worrying in almost all development related indexes such as education, health care and industrial transformation. For example, when people are still immersed in the myth of Xinjiang's pre-modern "natural" life, green, pollution-free, prolific and long-lived elderly, the cold census figures show that in 2000, the infant mortality rate of Han nationality in Xinjiang was 13.1 per 1000, while the infant mortality rate of Uygur nationality was as high as 101.7 per 1000; At the same time, the average life expectancy of Han people in Xinjiang is 73.34 years old, while that of Uighurs is only 63 years old, which is as much as 10 years less.

It can be said that on the eve of the Seventh Five Year Plan, under the impact of the market economy, the old traditional social customs and order gradually collapsed, the gap in the level of development between nations gradually widened, and friction and contradictions, large and small, were constantly accumulating. At the same time, Uighur society has also experienced unprecedented difficulties. The gap between the rich and the poor has intensified, and the game between religious conservative forces and secular intellectuals has become increasingly fierce. Resentment is gathering among a large number of unemployed and poor young people. The powder keg is already there.

"Enemy occupied areas", "most isolated", "Xinjiang class"

On June 26th, 2009, in Shaoguan City, Guangdong Province, thousands of kilometers away from Xinjiang, a fight among workers in a toy factory soon turned into ethnic conflict. Under the circumstances of the financial crisis and the "labor shortage" in the southeast coast, the factory collectively employed about 800 Uygur migrant workers from Kashgar. Organizing farmers in southern Xinjiang to work in the southeast coastal areas to alleviate the pressure on people and land is an economic means that China has been using for many years. Hundreds of people, mostly Uighurs, were injured in the large-scale fighting among workers in Shaoguan. Two Uygur workers were beaten to death. Finally, 400 police officers including the armed police were dispatched to control the situation.

Bloody photos and videos during the fight were soon posted on the Internet or sent back to Xinjiang via mobile MMS. Uighur young people soon became angry. When people took to the streets in the evening of July 5, everything got out of control. The powder keg burst. Official statistics say 197 people were killed and more than 1700 injured in the incident. But almost everyone you can meet in Xinjiang will tell you when talking about it that this number is too small, "absolutely more than".

After this disaster, fear is deeply rooted in the heart of almost every Urumqi person. No matter how well hidden, it will flow out inadvertently. The ethnic distribution of Urumqi is generally bounded by the south gate, and the shayibak district and Shuimogou District in the north are dominated by Han residents. Further north, Uighurs can hardly be seen in the new urban area and the development zone; Tianshan District in the south is the only place with Uygur residents as the main body, and the famous Erdaoqiao and international bazaar are all here. Dawan, the hardest hit area of the "75 incident", is also here. After the 75 incident, people began to lose confidence in each other in places where they used to live together. Many people in a hurry decided to move to places where "their own people" accounted for the majority. Some people even choose to "change houses" with others and move immediately because they have no time to complete the transfer procedures. Over the past few years, the situation similar to apartheid has become increasingly serious, and the Uygur and Han settlements are almost completely divided. Privately, some Han people even call Tianshan District "enemy occupied area" half jokingly.

The fear of Han people can be imagined. It was not too much to describe the streets of Urumqi that night as hell on earth. Needless to say, most of those killed were unrelated Han passers-by, small vendors, bus and taxi drivers and passengers. Bloody pictures and rumors of various cruel stories have caused deep psychological scars among the generations who grew up in peacetime. Almost every meal, drinking and chatting of pure Han people, after twists and turns, the topic will always talk about the "75 incident". Almost everyone can tell the experience of the murder or near murder of their relatives, friends and colleagues. Everyone can remember and have lingering palpitations about the "incident of that day".

The fear of Uighurs can also be imagined. After the chaos of the night of the "75 incident", the state machine quickly ran at high speed and rumbled. A large number of related and unrelated Uighur young people were arrested and imprisoned. A staff member of the judicial organ told the author privately that except for those who obviously participated in the crime, they were immediately punished. For many of the remaining young people, what they did was not to identify whether they were really involved in the violence that night, but to interrogate them over and over again in order to find other clues of the "three forces" from them. Such a trial may last for several years. In the end, there are really no clues to dig, so they have to release these people. But soon, after the large-scale implementation of the "re education camp" policy in 2017, these people were often forced to enter the camp for learning because of their "criminal record" in prison, and lost their freedom again. After all, the purpose of "re education" is to "put those who are not at ease in a safe place". Some Uighurs' fear of the country is obvious. Some people even sincerely believe that the cable TV set-top box at home has the function of monitoring.

The trust and exchanges between Uyghur and Han are also rapidly approaching freezing point. Many of the Uyghur and Han colleagues who used to have a good relationship in their units seemed to feel very embarrassed after the "75 incident". They were alienated from each other and almost stopped talking. Some Han people who have lived in Urumqi for decades said that they would never go to Erdaoqiao again in their lifetime. Some Uighurs will also complain privately that the state-controlled media and even the Internet have repeatedly broadcast and talked about the atrocities of the "75 incident", but people do not know the "77 incident" and "93 incident" - on July 7 and September 3, 2009, large-scale Han demonstrations took place in Urumqi. They asked the government to protect the safety of Han people, and some people asked "Wang Lequan to step down"; Many people armed with sticks and other "weapons" retaliated by chasing and beating Uighurs on the street, causing a considerable degree of death and injury, and some Uighur shops were destroyed.

Outside Xinjiang, ethnic antagonism on the Internet is also escalating. Especially after the terrorist attack on Kunming railway station in March 2014, Uighurs want to go out of Xinjiang, and their troubles in airports, railway stations, hotels and other places have increased significantly again. Even in Xinjiang, in the process of strengthening social control, a large number of Uighur floating population were "cleaned up" for various reasons, requiring them to return to their places of origin - which often means rural areas in southern Xinjiang. After losing the freedom to go out to work, their economic situation may face further deterioration. In other words, whether in Urumqi, within Xinjiang, or across the country, Uighurs are returning and gathering to their places of origin, and the trend of apartheid has been strengthened again and again. According to the research of relevant scholars, if the mainland "Xinjiang class" students promoted by the Ministry of education are excluded, Uyghur is almost the only ethnic group in China with a large population that has reduced mobility and concentrated in autonomous regions, and Uyghur has become the "most isolated ethnic group in China, and even the world".

Under the background of increasing isolation between Uygur and Han, the "Xinjiang class" policy of encouraging exchanges and integration is worth exploring. Around the beginning of 2000, the Ministry of Education launched the "inland Xinjiang class" project, which enrolled a large number of Xinjiang students to participate in high school education in large cities mainly in the southeast coastal areas (some areas later expanded to junior high schools). By 2015, the "Xinjiang class" had been extended to 93 schools in 45 cities in the mainland, with about 34000 students studying and 43000 students having graduated, the vast majority of whom are Uighurs, and about 80% of the students are from southern Xinjiang. In addition to helping Xinjiang cultivate a new generation of intellectual elites and supplementing educational resources in the territory, the significance of carrying out such a large-scale boarding education in the mainland's high-level education areas naturally includes allowing a large number of young people to live and study in the mainland for a long time (one-year preparatory course, three-year high school, and the vast majority of them will also stay in the mainland to enter the University), so that they can skillfully use Chinese, Have an in-depth understanding of the mainstream culture of the mainland, build a cross-ethnic social network and personal friendship in the process of communicating with students, and finally strengthen their recognition and loyalty to the Communist Party of China, the country and the Chinese nation.

Therefore, during school, students will receive a variety of political education in addition to the normal courses. Patriotism and national unity are the top priorities, including the requirement to watch the news broadcast every night. The principal of a school said in an interview that for students in Xinjiang class, ideological education has the highest priority, followed by safety education, and finally their cultural classes; "The government has spent so much money to subsidize these students. They should be grateful to the party.".

However, the research of many Chinese and foreign scholars shows that although the students in Xinjiang class have achieved good academic results, the efforts to integrate Uighur students into the Chinese national community and the goals of patriotism and national unity are far from being achieved: the students in Xinjiang class ostensibly abide by the school rules and regulations (no beard, headscarf, no religious activities, etc.), However, some of them can still find ways to maintain and even strengthen their Uyghur national identity and Muslim religious identity in private - they insist on speaking Uyghur during private meals and gatherings, and discuss the Koran after the lights out in the dormitory. Some studies even found that the negative stereotypes between Uyghur and Han students strengthened each other during the Xinjiang class. The isolation of school buildings (managed by special Xinjiang class dormitories), the separate "patriotism education" and "anti-terrorism education" for Uighur students, as well as the various frictions and conflicts between these young people and the school and the surrounding society, and the self-education within Uighur students are all possible reasons.

Although the South Xinjiang migrant workers who organized the Xinjiang ban and Shaoguan toy factory look very different, they all have the will and efforts of the state behind them, that is, they hope to systematically strengthen the exchanges and integration between Uighurs and Han people in the mainland through the use of national resources. Unfortunately, facts have proved that such socio-economic means will have little effect until the deep political opposition can not be resolved.

From "flexible governance of Xinjiang" to "thunder means"

The high-level decision makers were obviously shocked by the tragedy of the "75 incident". In addition to Hu Jintao's quick visit to Xinjiang and inspection of the troops stationed in Xinjiang, since November 2009, Liu Yunshan, head of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee, Ma Kai, state councilor, and Du Qinglin, head of the United Front Work Department, have also led teams to Xinjiang in batches to conduct research in various fields such as publicity and education, social economy, ethnic and religious issues. In April, 2010, Zhang Chunxian, then Secretary of the Hunan provincial Party committee, entered Xinjiang and Wang Lequan was dismissed.

Zhang Chunxian bears the typical marks of "enlightened faction" and "intellectual officials". He came from a civilian family, worked as a technician and engineer, and served as the Minister of transportation before the age of 50. When he was in charge of Hunan, he had many people-friendly measures. He was once dubbed "the most open provincial Party Secretary" by Hong Kong media, and was one of the domestic political stars at that time.

Shouldering the public's expectations, the new official insisted on the full restoration of Internet services in Xinjiang less than a month after taking office, and even told reporters at the two sessions that passive stability maintenance measures such as "shutting down the network" were "probably not fundamental"; He opened his microblog and went to the night market to drink beer and eat barbecue on the anniversary of the "75 incident"; At the end of Ramadan, Secretary Zhang wore a Uyghur flower hat to have a Eid al Fitr dinner with religious figures and delivered a speech to wish Muslims a happy Eid al Fitr. He also said that "Islam is a religion that advocates peace and unity". After that, he also quoted a Koran scripture - this open and enlightened attitude is not only unheard of in previous times, but I'm afraid it will not happen in the foreseeable future.

Many policies or formulations in Zhang Chunxian's era are refreshing: for example, preparing to establish Kashgar Special Economic Zone, developing "modern culture", and negotiating the translation and introduction of film and television works from Turkey. Most importantly, on many occasions, he revealed the signal of changing the high-pressure policy after the "75 incident", and said that poverty is the soil of terrorism and extreme ideas, and ethnic contradictions should be resolved by improving people's livelihood and developing the economy. Most intellectuals and the media are positive about this idea, and some even use optimistic descriptions such as "from stability maintenance to reform" to describe the changes of the times before and after.

However, Xinjiang has been plagued by decades of abuses, complex contradictions, and the construction of various systems is overlapping. The implementation of any new deal requires extremely high political skills. For example, how to deal with the growing Wahhabi sect with fundamentalism and conservatism in southern Xinjiang is a difficult problem.

Constrained by China's overall macro political environment, the religious development in Xinjiang has experienced a process from decline to recovery since the 1950s. In 1949, the number of mosques in Xinjiang was about 29500; After the "democratic reform", "socialist transformation" and other political movements, before the cultural revolution, the number of mosques fell to 14100; During the cultural revolution, most mosques failed to escape the vigorous "breaking the four old" and other movements. By the late 1970s, there were only 2930 mosques in Xinjiang. However, in the 1980s, when politics briefly withdrew from social life, mosques were rebuilt on a large scale. By the 1990s, there were more than 20000 mosques in Xinjiang, and the number has been relatively stable since then. According to the China Islamic Association, by 2014, the number of mosques in Xinjiang was 24500, accounting for about 63% of the country.

Religious issues, especially the issue of Islam, have always been one of the most sensitive pain points and difficulties in the social governance of China's border areas. What is particularly troublesome for policymakers is that with the relaxation of the overall social atmosphere, Wahhabi sect (popularly known as "new religion") has grown rapidly and began to show a posture of competing with the traditional "old religion".

In 2014, turwenjiang, a scholar at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, published a survey note on the ideological trend of fundamentalism in southern Xinjiang, pointing out that "the spread and influence of Islamic fundamentalism among Uighurs are heating up rapidly". Through publications, audiotapes, CDs, mobile storage media and the Internet, this ideological trend has been widely spread among Uighur farmers and traders, "there is a great trend to become mainstream social values in southern Xinjiang". Although the government has used various methods to intervene, such as banning the growth of beard and the wearing of masked gowns, turwenjiang still found that the overall social style has changed greatly from threeorfour years ago: in the Uygur society, which traditionally likes drinking to cheer up, it is extremely difficult to find a restaurant selling alcohol at this time - it is said that only three restaurants in quanhotan dare to sell alcohol, and the shops opened by Uygurs do not sell alcohol. On the streets of Hotan City, "masked women account for at least 10%.

In addition to the aforementioned factors similar to the 1997 Yining incident, the collapse of the overall development of Uighur society, the political pressure after the "75 incident", and people's disappointment with the "old religion" have all led to the rapid rise of the "new religion". New religion advocates a simple life similar to that of Puritans, and opposes complex rituals and extravagance, which makes many poor Uygur farmers naturally attractive.

At the same time, in the hearts of many people, a large number of religious leaders in the "old religion" have been alienated from them because they are too close to the government and tied too tightly. Many imams of mosques will be asked to explain the party's policies in the worship ceremony, such as family planning and national unity; When there are contradictions between society and the state, religious leaders are often asked by the government to do the "ideological work" of the people, which also makes ordinary people feel that the "old religion" is divorced from ordinary people. According to a village cadre in southern Xinjiang, when there was a land acquisition conflict between the government and the villagers and the leaders of the "old religion" asked the villagers to compromise when they did their work, some "new religion" young people who returned from abroad took people directly to stop the bulldozer, claiming that "we should be pressed over before demolition". The resolute attitude of the "new religion" young people, as well as the scenes in which they denounced the "old believers" and asked them to "learn from them", and the "old believers" did not dare to respond, captured the local people at one stroke.

At this time, if the government forcefully suppressed "new religion", it will inevitably cause public dissatisfaction and trigger a new round of conflict. However, if left unchecked, not only the "old religions" who have always maintained a cooperative attitude with the government will be dissatisfied, but the conservative and fundamentalist thoughts of "new religion" will inevitably greatly challenge the authority of the local government, impact the old social order, and even some religious people will spread extremist ideas and trigger violence.

But at this time, the most headache for Zhang Chunxian may be the direct turbulence caused by the violent terrorist incident. From Tocqueville to Huntington, a large number of political scientists are warning that when reform or revolution comes and the old order begins to loosen and collapse, it is precisely the moment when the risk of social unrest increases significantly. After Zhang Chunxian took office, violent terrorist attacks and extreme events across Xinjiang seemed to enter a blowout like high incidence period. Aksu, Hotan, Kashgar, Pishan, Yecheng, Bachu, Shanshan and Shache are blooming everywhere. The targets of the mob attacks include the symbols of state institutions such as police stations, township governments, tax offices and border defense forces, as well as civilians in the farmers' market. Some even tried to hijack the plane of Tianjin airlines from Hotan to Urumqi. People in Xinjiang were almost "bombed" to almost numb.

Worse, the problem of "terrorist activities" has spilled over Xinjiang: on October 28, 2013, a Uighur drove a jeep into the footpath of Chang'an Street, crushed tourists and pedestrians, and caught fire at the Jinshui bridge in front of the Tiananmen tower. Although the number of 5 deaths (including 3 in the car) and 39 injuries was not particularly huge, due to the particularity of the attack site, a large number of Chinese and foreign media reported that behind the burning vehicles were the portrait of Mao Zedong on the Tiananmen Gate Tower and the plaque "long live the great unity of the people of the world", which triggered an unimaginable impact. After the incident, lieutenant general Peng Yong, commander of the Xinjiang Military Region and Deputy Secretary of the Party committee of the autonomous region, was dismissed. According to Hong Kong media reports, the leaders of the autonomous region have also been "severely criticized" by the Central Committee. Soon after, on March 1, 2014, Kunming railway station was attacked by five Xinjiang terrorists with knives and weapons. Blood and flesh flew in the crowded waiting hall, causing a total of 31 deaths and 40 serious injuries. When talking about this violent terrorist incident during the two sessions, Zhang Chunxian choked and said, "I was alone in the house, quietly considering this matter. Why on earth did these people lose all conscience?"

At this time, whether official or private, people's patience with Zhang Chunxian's "reform" has reached the edge of exhaustion, and the idea of "flexible governance of Xinjiang" has begun to be widely questioned. After Zhang left office, a Han friend expressed great dissatisfaction with Zhang when chatting with the author, "he even cried when there was a terrorist activity! Crying is useless, coward!"

In fact, after the outbreak of violent and terrorist incidents, and the "New Deal" has been widely questioned, Zhang Chunxian has deliberately reversed the external image of "flexible governance of Xinjiang". He began to emphasize that "flexibility" refers to the "Bodhisattva heart" of the poor people, and that "thunder means" must be used against violent terrorists.

However, the worst terrorist attack may have occurred in April 2014, shortly after the terrorist attack in Kunming. From the 27th, Xi visited Xinjiang with Yu Zhengsheng, chairman of the Chinese people's Political Consultative Conference, fan Changlong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Wang Huning, Li Zhanshu, Wang Zhengwei and other dignitaries. However, on the afternoon of April 30, when Xi and his party had just left Xinjiang and even the inspection speech was broadcast on television, an explosion occurred in Urumqi, killing 3 people and injuring 79. Although the casualties were not particularly heavy, the explosion was like a demonstration, with a clear implication of provocation. Less than a month later, another explosion occurred in the morning market of Gongyuan North Street in Urumqi, killing 43 people and injuring 94. Since then, Urumqi was forced to close all outdoor night markets and morning markets to prevent similar cases from happening again.

After these two explosions, everyone knew that the time left for "flexible governance of Xinjiang" was probably running out.

In fact, after the 18th CPC National Congress, with the change of China's overall political atmosphere, the strategy of governing Xinjiang has been constantly changing from "soft" to "rigid". At the 2014 anti terrorism pledge conference, the wording was more severe than ever, saying that "we should use a zero tolerance attitude and an iron wrist to crack down on violent terrorist activities with a heavy fist and a fierce hand, and use the momentum of thunder". After that, they also stressed that we should "take the initiative to light the sword, take the initiative to attack, and attack in an all-round way" in dealing with terrorist activities. Later, the well-known "study class" measures have actually been launched at the same time, and the control over the villages in southern Xinjiang has been significantly strengthened. There have been measures such as the villagers gathering to raise the national flag every week, asking the village committee cadres to approve the road strips when going out, but no matter the scale or intensity, they are far from being compared with today.

"Visit, benefit, gather", "make relatives" and "study classes"

If Zhang Chunxian can get more firm support and persist in promoting the strategy of "seeking stability with people's livelihood", it is unknown how the result will be in the long run. After all, from 2010 to 2015, Xinjiang delivered a brilliant economic report card with an average annual GDP growth of 11.1%. However, history cannot be assumed. In August 2016, the new party secretary Chen Quanguo came to Xinjiang from Tibet. The iron fist means and the "study class" policy soon became famous all over the world, and the idea of "flexible governance of Xinjiang" left the scene.

The author has very limited knowledge of the "study class" or "re education camp" where Secretary Chen was appointed. In addition, James Millward's article has been introduced in detail, so I won't repeat it here.

Many people use the word "earth shaking" when talking about the changes in Xinjiang in the past two to three years. Besides, according to the 2016 and 2017 Statistical Bulletins issued by Urumqi municipal government, the registered residence population of Urumqi fell from 2.679 million to 2.226 million within one year. Most obviously, Tianshan District has carried out a large-scale "shanty town transformation", and hundreds of thousands of Uighurs with Hukou in southern Xinjiang have been driven back to their places of origin. Even walking along the former crowded consulate lane and grand bazaar, it is easy to find that people have become much rarer than before. Even by conservative estimates, the city's population has decreased by 20 – 25% within a year. It is also estimated that if the (non registered residence) permanent population reduction is included, the population of Urumqi may have decreased by more than 1million in a year.

Since 2014, the content of cadres' grassroots work with the full name of "visiting the people, benefiting the people and gathering the hearts of the people" has been greatly adjusted. "Visit, benefit, gather" continues, but maintaining stability has become a top priority.

Xinjiang has also launched the "twinning" activity of "national unity and family affinity" in Xinjiang since October 2016. In short, all public officials (including government agencies, Party committees, public institutions, colleges and universities, and even primary and secondary school teachers) should be deployed to "pair up". Han comrades should form "relatives" with ethnic minority comrades (mainly Uighurs) in pairs. Units in Urumqi can "make relatives" nearby, but units in the autonomous region often have to "make relatives" with poor households in rural southern Xinjiang. Han comrades are required to visit their "relatives" every two months, stay at their "relatives' homes for a week each time, and must" eat, live and work together ". Many people joke that they are more diligent to see "relatives" than their parents.

"Daily resistance" within the system is also everywhere. Twinning people often pose. When sweeping the floor with a broom and cutting vegetables with a kitchen knife, they quickly ask their teammates to take photos and send them back to wechat group as evidence of "working together". There are also people in Urumqi who can't resist their request to "visit relatives every day", so they have to come up with some ways to cope with it: take more clothes to change for photos at a time, and at the same time, ask "relatives" to change clothes from time to time, take a group photo together, and return to the unit in several times. Before leaving, I have to specially tell my relatives, "if the unit calls to check at home, you must say I came!"

Many young people of marriage and childbearing age in public institutions simply resigned in order to avoid the task of the village task force. Of course, not everyone's resignation will be approved, especially for those who have a considerable level, they must consider "political influence".
These people often resigned unsuccessfully, but were demoted as "ideological problems", delaying their future in vain. More importantly, those who dare to resign can only be Han party members and cadres; If Uighur comrades dare to resign, they will most likely be forced to "learn" - this is a typical "national mood", and maybe even, they will be characterized as "two faced people".
Therefore, some Uighur comrades chose a more absurd form of daily resistance: they began to drink frequently. First, if they drank too much, they would be "out of sight and out of mind". More importantly, smoking and drinking are typical "depolarization", which is an effective form of self-protection. A friend told the author that a Uighur neighbor in his family was forced to "re educate". When the unit leader came forward to bail out people, he used this set of words - "she is a woman, smoking and drinking, and often eats at our Han family. How can there be religious extremism? This is misunderstood."

Compared with a few years ago, the identity gap between Han and Uygur seems to be more undisguised. In the past, various security inspection sites, at least in name, were not "targeted at a certain ethnic group", claiming to inspect all "suspicious" and "key groups". Now, however, almost all security checkpoints, including police officers who set up checkpoints on the road to block cars, basically release Han people directly, while Uighurs need to swipe their ID cards and search carefully. From passers-by to security personnel, it seems that they have been completely used to such differential treatment, and no longer feel that there is anything wrong. The most basic "political correctness" does not need to exist. A Uyghur working in a public institution told the author that the director of the Han nationality Department directly said to everyone at the meeting, "you Uyghur people should be glad that you live in a good era. In the old society, you will be buried alive."

A large number of Uighur intellectuals were arrested. Posts discussing Xinjiang issues will be deleted immediately, or even cancelled. Xinjiang's policies and current situation are not allowed to be discussed. After all, in February 2019, the media has spread the news that "there has been no violence and fear in two years, and the iron fist rule of Xinjiang has been affirmed by the central leadership", and even there has been a saying that Xinjiang will export its experience of maintaining stability.

But to be fair, even without speech restrictions, it is increasingly difficult to have a calm discussion on relevant topics on the Chinese Internet. Support and opposition to China and Uighur Society (including Islam) are increasingly polarized. When chatting with the author, a Han cadre in the system praised the current policy. He said that in addition to the obvious improvement of street security and the improvement of his sense of security, more importantly, he felt "the glory of the main nation" for the first time. He believes that Xinjiang people are witnessing "a great era". At the same time, overseas, many people often use "Nazi concentration camps" and "genocide" to describe the current situation in Xinjiang. If they do not agree, they are often criticized as "CCP lackeys".

The 56 "pillars of national unity" erected in Tiananmen Square ten years ago once claimed to stand here forever. However, after the 60th birthday celebration of the Republic, when other scenery and flowers in the square were removed, the 56 columns were particularly abrupt and grotesque. Just two months later, on the night of December 2, 2009, the pillars of national unity were quietly withdrawn, as if they had never appeared.

(Note: the original Chinese text used here is 结亲. The English direct translation will translate it as "marriage", which may be the reason why some statements claim that Uyghur women are forced to marry Han men. But in fact, this is the abbreviation of "making relatives".)

Compared with the autonomous region units that often travel thousands of kilometers to and from southern Xinjiang to see "relatives", the staff working in Urumqi municipal units are relatively relaxed. After all, most of their relatives are near Urumqi. However, whenever a sensitive date like "75" comes, the unit will require them to visit their relatives' homes every day and report their thoughts. After all, Uygur relatives in southern Xinjiang are mostly poor households, while Uygur relatives in Urumqi are mostly from people who's family have entered "study classes".


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Last edited by SkinnedWolf on 03 Aug 2022, 10:25 am, edited 1 time in total.

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03 Aug 2022, 6:40 am

Xinjiang Deadlock: what is the crux of the Xinjiang problem? Can we get out of trouble?

On September 11, 2019, the US Senate passed the "Uighur human rights policy act of 2019". On December 3, the house of Representatives passed a more detailed version, requiring the U.S. executive department to regularly submit reports to Congress on Xinjiang Uygur re education camps and other violations of human rights in China, sanction officials who violate Uygur human rights, restrict their visas to the United States, and freeze their properties in the United States; Restrict the export of equipment that may be used to monitor and restrict personal and Internet freedom to China, and impose sanctions on relevant Chinese enterprises involved in the control of Xinjiang. The full name of this act is Uighur intervention and global humanitarian unified response act. It will not take effect until the Senate votes again and the president signs it. However, as lawmakers from both parties almost unanimously support the bill, it is only a matter of time before it takes effect.

China showed an unprecedented fierce response. Not only did Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying express "strong indignation", but also the National People's Congress of China, the National Political Consultative Conference, the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, the state anti terrorism office, the people's Congress of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the China Islamic Association, the China human rights development foundation Many units, such as the China Human Rights Research Association, came forward one after another, condemning the United States for "gross interference in China's internal affairs" and for "double standards" on human rights and counter-terrorism issues. Reuters quoted experts as saying that the Chinese government reacted more strongly to the Uighur human rights policy act than to the Hong Kong human rights and Democracy Act, which would directly sanction Chinese officials, enterprises and public security departments.

Various views on the Xinjiang issue

In the following week, China's official global television network broadcast two English documentaries about violence and terrorism in Xinjiang, accusing the East Turkestan independence movement of being behind the terrorist events in China. The Information Office of the State Council held a press conference on December 9 and invited the chairman of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, xuekelaiti zaker, to Beijing to announce to the reporters that all the students of vocational skills education and training schools in Xinjiang have completed their studies. Many people believe that this is obviously under the pressure of the US bill, but at the same time, they also believe that it is unlikely to really close the re education camp.

Judging from the comments of various parties, many people in Europe and the United States believe that the so-called "vocational skills education and training school" in Xinjiang is actually a concentration camp without freedom, holding millions or more Uighurs and imposing compulsory political indoctrination on them; At the same time, Xinjiang recruited many Han cadres and policemen from the mainland, moved into Uighur communities and families, restricted the use of Uighur language, forced changes in dietary traditions, and closed or demolished many mosques. Some commentators said that these measures combined have constituted "genocide".

However, China's perception is quite opposite. Not only the official media claim, but also many people believe that various measures of Xinjiang's anti-terrorism and depolarization ideas are necessary and effective. In previous years, there have been several shocking violent terrorist attacks, including the car crash into people and explosion and burning at jinshuiqiao, Tiananmen Square, Beijing on October 28, 2013, several Uighurs slashing and killing at Kunming railway station on March 1, 2014, and many violent attacks on the government and public security police in Xinjiang. In contrast, over the past three years, there have been no "violent terrorist incidents" in Xinjiang and even in China. Chinese state media claimed that the number of tourists to Xinjiang has increased significantly due to the improvement of public security conditions.

In short, on the Xinjiang issue, there have been theories of human rights violations, genocide, internal affairs, counter-terrorism, and so on. This article does not intend to refute these different statements, but wants to try to explore the deeper factors of the Xinjiang problem. The author believes that the crux of the Xinjiang problem is the result of the long-term accumulation of errors in ethnic and religious policies. In order to correct the previous policy errors, the new era adopted the way of the cultural revolution, which resulted in a greater crisis and has fallen into a dilemma. No matter how much external pressure is, there can be no directional adjustment in the short term, unless there is a major change in the domestic top authority.

Mistakes in Ethnic Policy

After the establishment of CPC in the mainland, CPC accepted the Soviet system completely and adopted the principles and policies of national definition and autonomy led and implemented by Stalin. In the 1950s, CPC carried out large-scale "national identification" activities and identified 55 ethnic minorities. Five provincial autonomous regions including Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Tibet were successively established, and in the following decades, autonomous regions at all levels were gradually established. According to the white paper of the Chinese government, there are currently 30 prefecture level autonomous prefectures, 120 autonomous counties, 1173 ethnic townships, and even some ethnic villages in all provinces of Chinese Mainland.

However, in an autonomous region named after a minority, in fact, the minority often does not account for the majority of the population in the region. For example, the Mongolian population in Inner Mongolia is less than 18%, the Hui population in Ningxia is only 1/3, the Zhuang population in Guangxi is 32%, the Uygur population in Xinjiang is 47%, and only the Tibetan population in Tibet is 90%. However, China followed Stalin's line of national governance, delimited land as a boundary, and formed a multi-level regional ethnic autonomy system.

In terms of bureaucratic system, the so-called regional autonomy has no real name, because officials are appointed and promoted by superiors, and are not elected by citizens in autonomous regions. However, in terms of enrollment, promotion, employment, childbirth and so on, members of ethnic minorities generally enjoy preferential treatment, similar to the affirmative action affirmative action policy of the United States; In terms of finance, taxation and investment, ethnic autonomous areas enjoy preferential policies; In terms of social and cultural systems, many ethnic religious and cultural fields have been built under the "name of ethnic culture", and some autonomous regions have enacted halal food laws and regulations; More importantly, autonomous regions named after a certain ethnic minority must be equipped with a higher proportion of Party and government officials from ethnic minorities.

As a result, the ethnic regional policy cultivated some ethnic political, economic and cultural elites. As the vested interests of this system, they formed a tangled network system within the system, tried their best to maintain this Stalin line, and tried to strive for more and better implementation of preferential policies. Such preferential policies have caused obvious unfairness to the Han nationality and other ethnic minorities in the region, caused more and more disgust and complaints, and added many ethnic contradictions.

What is more serious is that in the border areas of regional ethnic autonomy, although autonomy has a name but no substance, it virtually strengthens the sense of identity and belonging of its major ethnic minorities and the natural sense of ownership of the autonomous region. Once the centrifugal force increases due to international or domestic reasons, the possibility of territorial division will become greater and greater. The final result of Stalin's policy of regional national autonomy was the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the separatist movement facing Russia. The Communist Party of China has raised the territorial integrity to the height of "life and death". If any autonomous region of ethnic minorities achieves independence, it means the loss of the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China and the collapse of the party state. Therefore, the CPC has been forcefully suppressing the separatist movement.

At the same time, CPC relies on the discourse system and political system of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Zedong in terms of ideological legitimacy. Therefore, although Stalin's ethnic policy line is a huge burden, it can't be thrown away unless it openly abandons this ideology and system. Therefore, this crux can be said to be a deadlock.

Mistakes in religious policies

The ideological basis of CPC's religious policy is atheism, and it has never given up the ultimate goal of eliminating religion, which is clearly stated in many documents of the CPC Central Committee. However, due to the lack of the ability to immediately eliminate religion, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, which had a large number of believers, were allowed to exist in the 1950s. But at the same time, the Chinese Communist Party expelled foreign missionaries and severed the international ties between Catholicism and Christianity in the name of "opposing imperialism"; Confiscated the real estate of Buddhism, Taoism and Islam in the name of "opposing feudalism"; Led the establishment of "patriotic" religious associations, through which various religions are supervised and controlled. We will crack down on traditional folk beliefs in the name of opposing feudal superstition, and ruthlessly suppress the "reactionary sect" in traditional folk religions. After the beginning of the cultural revolution, all religious sites were closed through the red guards, and all religious activities were banned throughout the country.

However, the extreme measures to eliminate religion during the Cultural Revolution completely failed, and religion spread and developed underground. After the cultural revolution, official documents recognized that the number of religious believers has not decreased, and the number of believers of some religions has even increased. After the beginning of reform and opening up in the late 1970s, the Communist Party of China recognized that religion is mass, long-term, complex, national and international, so it adjusted its religious policy and allowed the five major religions to restore religious sites, organizations, activities and international contacts. As a result, the five major religions have been revived and even developed rapidly.

Chinese officials believe that 10 of the 55 ethnic minorities have Islam as their tradition. Many officials and scholars in the system often emphasize that all these ethnic groups are religious. During the cultural revolution, although some places had extreme policies, such as forcing the Hui nationality to raise pigs, religious taboos were preserved in the name of "national cultural customs". As soon as the religious policy was adjusted, the mosque recovered the fastest and the most. With the expansion of the ethnic regional system, and in order to attract overseas investment and international trade, the Communist Party of China has built new mosques in many ethnic autonomous regions, many of which have introduced Arab architectural styles.

Although there is a shortage of religious places in other major religions, the proportion of mosques to the population of 10 ethnic minorities is relatively high. The number of religious places officially approved by other major religions is still much less than that before 1949, but the number of mosques may have exceeded that in 1949. For example, according to the 2004 economic census data of the National Bureau of statistics of China, there are nearly 10000 mosques in Kashgar, Xinjiang. This is impossible outside national autonomous regions or in other religions. Although the administrative department of religious affairs in China does not encourage the increase of religious sites, the administrative department of Ethnic Affairs has greater power, and often approves the restoration and construction of mosques in the name of national culture. The phenomenon of building mosques with financial subsidies is quite common throughout the country.

On the other hand, in ethnic autonomous regions, other religions are suppressed by the party and government departments. In order to maintain the stability of community and ethnic relations, foreign missionaries were expelled, and Christians among Uighurs were not only excluded by their families and ethnic groups, but also suppressed by the government. A Christian preacher named alimujiang imiti was arrested in 2007 and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment by the Kashgar intermediate court in 2009.

The differential treatment of different religions, the suppression of the spread of Christianity among the Hui and Uygur ethnic groups, and the attack on the conversion of minority individuals to other religions have actually strengthened the concept of "the integration of nationality and religion", which runs counter to the development direction of modernization. Because in modern society, everyone has the freedom to choose and change religion, so national identity and religious identity are gradually separated.

The differential treatment of different religions, the suppression of the spread of Christianity among the Hui and Uyghur, and the attack on the conversion of minority individuals to other religions have actually strengthened the concept of "ethnic and religious integration", which runs counter to the development direction of modernization. Because in modern society, everyone has the freedom to choose and change religion, ethnic identity and religious identity are gradually separated.

For example, for thousands of years, Jews and Judaism have been almost inseparable. But now, more and more Jews no longer believe in Judaism, or convert to other religions, or give up all religions, and there are also people of other ethnic groups who convert to Judaism. For another example, Zoroastrianism originally opposed any individual to change their religious affiliation, but in modern society, cross-ethnic intermarriage led to the fact that Zoroastrianism had to adjust its doctrines to allow people of other ethnic groups to convert, and was unable to prevent some ethnic groups from converting to other religions. The separation of religions and ethnic groups in other religions and ethnic groups is more common.

The modern government should neither force nor stop the reform of individual citizens. If CPC really implements the principle of freedom of religious belief in the constitution, it should try its best to protect citizens' freedom to choose any religion, religious belief and practice.

The way of Cultural Revolution in the new era

In order to quell the dissatisfaction of ethnic minorities, during the period of reform and opening up, CPC made efforts to develop the economy on the one hand, and on the other hand, made every effort to improve the preferential treatment of ethnic elite. However, materialistic solutions ignore human dignity and basic rights, and it is impossible to appease the dissatisfaction of ethnic minorities. Errors in ethnic policies and religious policies have been intertwined for decades, and finally led to the intensification of contradictions, especially the self Immolation protests of Tibetans and the violent terrorist attacks of Uighurs.

Xi in response to ethnic contradictions in the new era, he picked up all kinds of ways during the cultural revolution, not only suppressed any protests, but also used the registered residence system to lock in Xinjiang residents and restrict their freedom of migration and travel; Put suspected people in re education camps, force them to learn Chinese, law, skills and eliminate extreme ideas. Some political, cultural and economic elites have also become such suspects. This way of transforming ideas is obviously the way of the cultural revolution. At that time, people were asked to "fight against selfish thoughts without hesitation". Now they want to get rid of extreme thoughts. However, practice and history have proved that the way of the Cultural Revolution failed.

Peter Berg, a religious sociologist, said that the modernization of Islam has so far lacked successful experience. In modern times, different Christian sects in Europe had religious wars for many years. It was not until after the peace treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that the modern nation-state appeared that the relationship between Christian sects gradually moved towards peace. It was not until the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution in 1791 that the relationship between religious sects and between religion and non religion in western countries tended to be peaceful. Many regions with Muslim majority population have been oppressed by European colonialism. Facing the challenges of modernization and secularization, Islamic fundamentalism has emerged. Some of them are ideologically extreme and resort to violent terrorist attacks to resist the West and secularization.

Terrorism is a universal phenomenon in the world today. How to avoid Muslims turning to radicalization because of fundamentalist Islamic belief is a worldwide problem. So far, there are no good, effective and generally accepted measures. Some practices of European and American governments have always been questioned and criticized by many experts and people. Because in any case, it is against the principle of modern rule of law that the suspect should be convicted by a notarized and objective court if he is convicted only by his extreme thought or tendency. Therefore, it is inevitable that Xinjiang re education camp, as a way of Cultural Revolution, will arouse widespread condemnation in the international community.

The re education camp in Xinjiang holds not only Uighur Muslims, but also people of other nationalities and religions. Moreover, the control measures in Xinjiang adopt high technology. Through artificial intelligence technologies such as face recognition, speech recognition, gait recognition, mobile phone positioning, Internet retrieval, everyone may be placed under real-time monitoring, without privacy. Such monitoring has spread to other provinces and even overseas. Moreover, China has repeatedly implemented the overseas arrest of dissidents. For such totalitarian rule, many people feel panic, and everyone is in danger. What is more terrifying is that once other countries follow China's totalitarian way of social control, it will become an unprecedented disaster for all mankind. People in countries and regions ruled by law have reacted strongly to this, not only for China, but also for their own society. The recent protests in Hong Kong are proof of this.

In short, the crux of the Xinjiang problem is institutional. The possibility of getting out of the dilemma under the existing institutional framework basically does not exist. If the ethnic and religious policies do not make fundamental institutional changes, it is impossible to resolve ethnic contradictions. In order to maintain the stability of the current surface, we have paid a disastrous humanitarian price.


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03 Aug 2022, 10:51 am

cyberdad wrote:
Why not let the rest of the world decide for themselves.

The question is: what makes the decision happen? What impact will it have?
Is it goodwill or benefit that drives a regime to make external decisions?

If the policy is completely wrong (although the CCP itself does not think so), it may cause various reactions, but it is unlikely to get a report on how to solve the problem correctly and be accepted with trust.

But if the policy is correct in the long run, but "human rights violations", the United States will
Option A. Provide support in good faith or do no more interference.
Option B. Sanctions on "human rights violations" force the right policy changes, making the local situation worse to weaken China.
Known:The United States does not care about the Chinese or Muslims. The United States is unlikely to have selfless enthusiasm for Chinese Muslims.

Therefore, transparency to foreign information is not good for CCP, whatever it actually does. Under special circumstances, it is not good for Chinese people and human rights, too.
So no matter what the CCP is doing, they have no reason to be transparent information to foreign. And they happen to often be able to block information.


Or, will transparent information be fairly evaluated?
We know what happened in Hong Kong and how it was distorted by both the CCP and the West.


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03 Aug 2022, 2:39 pm

Some fact check about the media.

Quote:
1. The original “evidence” of 1 million Uyghurs being sent to concentration camps original stems from US propaganda outlets:
https://thegrayzone.com/2019/12/21/china-detaining-millions-uyghurs-problems-claims-us-ngo-researcher/

2. The Keriya Aitika Mosque that was claimed in 2018 to be demolished is actually still there. They were merely renovating, albeit most buildings surrounding the mosque was replaced with newer/bigger ones as Xinjiang is developing incredibly fast.
https://medium.com/@sunfeiyang/the-case-of-the-keriya-aitika-mosque-efa29e456339

3. The often used picture of Uyghurs dressed uniformly lined up sitting in a re-education camp actually comes from an early 2017 picture of regular prisoners in Xinjiang listening to a public speech in a regular jail. It wasn't just prisoners who listened to the speech.
https://web.archive.org/web/20180820154817/https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1564669932542581&wfr=spider&for=pc%20(scroll%20down%20to%20the%20middle%20to%20see%20the%20picture).

4. The video of a supposed Uyghur being beaten for having a copy of a Quaran, was actually an Indonesian police beating a pickpocket. The police was discharged afterwards.
https://factcheck.afp.com/no-not-video-chinese-soldier-beating-uighur-muslim-having-copy-koran

5. Some pictures of Uyghurs in Chinese detention camps, including that of a crying child, are pictures edited from protests, people rescued from human trafficking, and Uyghurs protesting outside in 2009 as a result of a riot that killed 156 people.
https://factcheck.afp.com/these-photos-show-protests-istanbul-and-xinjiang-and-migrant-shelter-thailand

6. Claim of a Chinese police officer strangling an Uyghur woman caught praying is actually a video of the police officer restraining a violent drunk woman in 2018.
https://factcheck.afp.com/video-shows-police-officer-pinning-down-drunk-chinese-woman-his-knee-hotel-shenzhen

7. Picture of “forced labor” of Uyghurs, first published by Forbes, originally came from a factory in 2010 Brazil. Forbes later changed the picture without announcing their error.
https://i.redd.it/20mzu89zo1d51.jpg

8. Picture of an “Uyghur” with his eyes/mouth/ears sewn shut, is actually a picture of Abas Amini protesting the UK’s treatment of asylum seekers in 2003
https://i.redd.it/9zixb3ukmad51.png%20http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/nottinghamshire/2941780.stm

9. Rushan Abbas, who claimed that her sister/friends are locked in Chinese concentration camps, is actually a participator of Guantanamo Bay in 2003 with CIA ties, which has verifiable human rights violations against Muslim prisoners. When confronted she claimed she was only a translator, but also justified Guantanamo Bay.
https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/e9ad4n/i_am_rushan_abbas_uyghur_activist_and_survivor_of/

10. Much of BBC’s visit to an Uyghur re-education center have words mistranslated or taken out of context by BBC in order to fit a certain narrative. Nevertheless, BBC did make a second unannounced “surprise” visit late at night, only to see Uyghurs leaving the center, supposedly for the weekend.
https://medium.com/@sunfeiyang/breaking-down-the-bbcs-visit-to-hotan-xinjiang-e284934a7aab

11. Sayragul Sauytbay first claimed that she did not see any violence, only hunger and that they never had any meat. However, later her story changed, claiming that they were forced to eat pork. She also added a new story that she saw police raping prisoners in public, and anyone who showed facial expressions or couldn’t watch was taken away and disappeared.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/amp/world/article-everyone-was-silent-endlessly-mute-former-chinese-re-education/
https://www.haaretz.com/amp/world-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-a-million-people-are-jailed-at-china-s-gulags-i-escaped-here-s-what-goes-on-inside-1.7994216

12. Adrian Zenz claimed that according to the 2015 and 2019’s Health and Hygiene Statistical Yearbook, 80% of all new UIDs in China were performed in Xinjiang. A check of the source (pg 228) shows that it’s actually 8.7%, not 80%. UIDs are also reversible and is the preferred method for most people in Xinjiang, while more extreme, non-reversible methods for birth control are relatively more preferred in other areas of China (most notably Henan).
https://web.archive.org/web/20200712091001/https://s2.51cto.com/oss/201912/05/1822362d5f7ccc8ff5d87ecdba23e64c.pdf

13. A spokesperson from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) confirmed in a statement to The Grayzone that the allegation of Chinese “camps” was not made by the United Nations, but rather by a member of an independent committee that does not speak for the UN as a whole.
https://thegrayzone.com/2018/08/23/un-did-not-report-china-internment-camps-uighur-muslims/

Nevertheless, for 10: "Re education camp" / "vocational skills education school" seems to be divided into different levels. This seems to represent only the mildest ones.

And about eating pork:
A Uighur I know publicly claimed on the intranet that Islamic food was still available in Xinjiang, but cancelled the logo. This confused them.
When I asked him privately whether he had ever been forced to eat pork (he had not entered any re education camps and did not live in Xinjiang most of the time), he said that he had experienced it in a city in Xinjiang.


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06 Aug 2022, 4:27 am

I had a private conversation on the Internet with a Uighur living in Northern Xinjiang. (He can speak Uyghur and his IP address is located in Xinjiang.)


Neither he nor the Uighurs he knows have ever been to the "study class".

He regretted that Uyghur was no longer taught in the school. But he believes that this is because this is the scum of their ethnic group who tampered with Uyghur textbooks before.
He believes that the Uyghur language may disappear within two generations. He knew it was an irreversible trend, but he thought it would be better if it was a natural process.

He denied that "the use of Uyghur language in public places is prohibited" and stressed to me that "it is totally different to encourage the use of Mandarin and prohibit the use of Uyghur language".

He has never heard of "forcing Uighurs to eat pork", because, quote"the state is to resolve conflicts, not to create conflicts".
I said another Uighur who he knew claimed to have experienced it in a city in Xinjiang. He was surprised and said that maybe it was because that guy was a registered Imam. Because most of the young Uighurs are not very religious to Islam, that guy is a special example.

He thinks World Uyghur Congress is a scum among Uighurs. There were conflicts between ethnic minorities and Han people in the past, but they were not fierce. It is World Uyghur Congress that is trying to intensify contradictions and use their targets to harm the entire Uighur people. He hoped that the state would sanction them.

Every ethnic group in Xinjiang avoided talking about the 75 incident, and he was not a witness, so he did not know the complete truth. He can't use VPN (Uighurs living outside Xinjiang can), so he asked me about the 75 incident on the external network. After reading, he felt sorry for such a tragedy and hoped that such a thing would not happen again.
The materials I sent him did not lead him to enter the "study class".

He believes that the current control in Xinjiang is due to, quote, "Those scum disappointed the party and the country."

I asked him how he thought that "those Uighurs who are locked up cannot be locked up for a lifetime". He was very worried and hoped that the scum among the Uighurs would not undermine the hard won peace.


However, it is worth noting that the area of Xinjiang is quite large. Residents in Northern Xinjiang may not know the situation in southern Xinjiang.


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06 Aug 2022, 6:16 am

Description of a Xinjiang Han in the external network. Another Chinese said that the people he knew who worked in Xinjiang described exactly the same thing.

Quote:
1. I remember two years ago when I went home on holiday, I was forced to go to the community to raise the flag at 8 a.m. in the winter. This shocked me. If I don't go, they will call me to warn me. In the end, I can't stand it and I have to compromise with those fools.
2. The police often spot check your ID card in the street and subway station, and sometimes scan your mobile phone with police equipment.
3. Security check is required everywhere. Two years ago, when I entered my own community, the security check was stricter than taking the train. They check their ID cards, community passes, and cars.
4. Silly epidemic policies and rigid grass-roots management (this should be the same across the country, so I won't elaborate), but there should be more strange things happening in Xinjiang.
5. Uyghur is not allowed to be spoken in basic public places. In the school, a teacher used Uyghur to communicate with Uyghur Students. I haven't seen her in school since then. The wechat group is the same. A Uyghur in our community group sent a paragraph of Uyghur speech (possibly due to a mistake), and the community personnel immediately called her to ask for the withdrawal of this message. It is normal to require that Uygurs not wear headscarves and not grow beards.

Someone asked: does Xinjiang have any chance to use Uyghur?
Quote:
Of course, there are still some. My friends said that there was no problem before, but it was not possible on such sensitive occasions as schools and community wechat groups. Of course, this is only our community and our school. It is a small place. Urumqi should be better.


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08 Aug 2022, 9:42 am

About hijab.

At present, the policy that can be determined is that black and white and the types that cover the face are prohibited. Older women have the right of immunity.
But those silk colored ones can still be found in social media.
The above is only within Xinjiang. Muslims in other regions still allow these costumes.

1)Hu Yaobang, former CPC leader, mistakenly invited Saudi Arabia to gain influence in China's Islamic Affairs in the 1980s.
2)Ilham Tohti, a Uighur intellectual accused of separatism and sentenced to life imprisonment. In his works describing the Uyghur in the 21st century, he complained that some areas are no longer like the Uyghur society, but like the Middle East.
3)Women of other Turkic Muslim ethnic groups in Central Asia possess a variety of headscarves. The presence of black and white headscarves is not common. It is also common not to wear a headscarf. Although this may be related to the history of being part of the Soviet Union.
4)Uyghur is a diverse group. This includes different subpopulations; At least from the stereotype transmitted by the PRC since the last century, the traditional clothing of Uyghur women is colorful small hats and light gauze headscarves; A discriminatory term used by the Han people for Uyghur people is "leather hat".

It is hard to determine whether the abolition of white and black hijabs is "cultural genocide" / "elimination of identity".
At least for some Uighurs, this is not their traditional culture, but a suspicious foreign pollution.
However, it cannot be ruled out that it may indeed be a traditional headdress in some subgroups.

But from the perspective of motive, the authorities are trying to "correct the past mistakes in religious affairs", at least that part they think.
Terrorism and ethnic violence are indeed linked to "non-traditional religions".


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08 Aug 2022, 4:52 pm

cyberdad wrote:
China's claim about stamping out terrorism is really not much more justified than Russia's invasion of Chechinya.


They seem to be at least as valid as the sorts of claims that were widespread throughout many western nations after 9/11.

Terrorist violence occurred, government responded, innocent people and marginally adjacent people are also caught up in the response.

How to properly address Wahhabist (or other forms of) terrorism when there's a population group with a higher than average degree of sympathy is always a balancing act and how widespread the issue is just as much of a consideration as how severe any particular action is.

There's kind of an inherent problem when states try to deal with 'honour cultures' though, being heavy handed encourages more resistance, but not engaging equals tolerating unlawful actions. It also creates a dynamic where people who don't sympathize with the violence still might refuse to cooperate with the state's actions against their neighbours.


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11 Aug 2022, 6:34 am

A valuable discussion. The wording of one of the members may be discriminatory, but he seems to be one of the few people who have had in-depth knowledge of the past situation in southern Xinjiang.
(apart from the wording, he does not no sympathize with those innocent Uighurs who are involved in it. I read his post in the English community. He also actively opposes tankie who thinks that "nothing bad has happened in Xinjiang." His actual proposition is that the CCP wrongly allowed the extreme Uighurs in the past, and now some ordinary Uighurs have also paid the price.)

Quote:
OP: Let me retell the stories of Xinjiang told me by some friends in Xinjiang

The name, location and all the details that can be identified have been blurred. But the core of the story remains unchanged.

The story comes from my Xinjiang friends who live in Hebei and work in Beijing. There are men and women, Uyghur and Han. I have a good relationship with these people, so I believe their stories.

Story 1: sound the sword

This is the most horrible, so I wrote it first. The "sound the sword" is to declare war on the so-called "two faced people", so the specific implementation is that a group of people sit in the conference room and "admit their mistakes" first.
These "mistakes" include Party members getting married and inviting imams to preside over them, Party members going to mosques to worship, civil servants and overseas relatives contacting, etc. anyway, there are many kinds, so we all try our best to remember them. Here, as long as you take the initiative to admit, there will be no problem; But if you hide it, or if you really don't remember it, but someone else in the meeting room remembers it for you, you are doomed. Go to the "vocational skills training school" to write BS review in a few days. However, if it is not a serious event, you will not be expelled. Basically, it will be released after a few days of writing a BS review. All the confession documents of "sound the sword" are encrypted and can not be found on the Internet.

Story 2: Kadeer's former followers

This boy, let's call him "Memetjan". During his high school years, he was a radical Eastern Turkistani who wanted to establish an Eastern Turkistani Islamic State and was a passionate follower of Rebiya and the World Uighur Congress. When Memetjan's father learned of his son's political ideology, he reacted violently, educated him, and then relied on his connections to place him in the system. The son actually also changed, a proper 180-degree turn. Then also joined the Communist Party, and later also merited for reporting real-terrorists.

Story 3: A Policeman

This policeman is a relative of a friend of mine. He is a Uyghur, communist, alcoholic, domestic abuser and affairs. The son was beaten in his childhood until he was paralyzed everytime he saw his father. Jokes and fights between friends will make him tremble, so we usually pay attention to this.
Therefore, after graduating from University, this brother went to work in Beijing without hesitation. After earning some money, he took his mother over, because his father beat her every day. His father continued to work as a policeman in Xinjiang. When he was drunk, he would call and say that he missed his wife and children.

Story 4: another policeman

This police officer was a Han police officer whom a relative of a friend of mine met when calling the police.
A friend's relative's house was stolen, but this relative is Uyghur, and he is older. Although his business is good, his Mandarin is poor.
After calling the police, the local police didn't act for a long time, and then the eldest brother petitioned the superior police station.
The policeman of the superior police station directly gave him a note with a name and two numbers on it. After the money arrived, there was still no reply to the case. My friend's relatives gave up completely.

Story 5: Uygur poverty alleviation cadres

Many people know that the government sends Han cadres to the homes of Uygur civilians, but the government also sends Uygur cadres to the homes of Han civilians. This Uygur poverty alleviation cadre was sent to a Han poor household to help them get out of poverty. However, the Han people in this family are really lazy, so lazy that the cadres jump and scold "some people are poor for f*****g reasons". This family is also at the bottom of the ordinary people. The Uyghur cadres said that there was nothing I could do, but the leaders still asked the cadres to stick to it for the sake of KPI. Later, it was not settled. It was useless for the Uyghur cadres to stay at his home for six days a week to do ideological work.

Story 6: the Koran in the ward

A friend's Uygur elder was hospitalized. There were Han and Kazak in the same ward. Uyghur elders are not allowed to recite the Koran, but Kazakh patients can. Salah on time five times a day. The Uygur elder said it was very unfair.

Story 7: Muslim veteran party member

This party member is the grandfather of a friend of mine, nearly 80 years old, a devout Muslim and a loyal party member + Mao fan. Salah is still five times a day and fasts on time every year (no water or food is allowed during Ramadan); However, they never miss the activities of grass-roots party organizations and wear the party emblem and Mao Zedong's badge every day. This veteran party member believes that all those caught in the "vocational skills training school" have not been punished enough and "more discipline should be given".

Story 8: whose Xinjiang?

As we all know, about 44% of Uygurs and 42% of Han people in Xinjiang.
However, when western media or party media mention Xinjiang, they always talk about Uighurs. Just like Han people do not exist in Xinjiang. Therefore, several Han people in Xinjiang privately said that their sense of belonging to Xinjiang was getting lower and lower.
But their Uygur friends firmly believe that these Han people in Xinjiang are from Xinjiang, and they play well with each other.

Story 9: cross ethnic marriage and bonus

One of my Uighur girl friends seemed to be interested in me, and then said to me every day, "do you know that Han and Uighur can get bonuses from the government when they get married?". Then I would roll my eyes and say, "I am Manchu", and then she would tell me, "I know you are Manchu, but your ID card says Han".
She knew that some Uighur boys married Han girls from other places, and then really got the bonus. Although my friend is very good-looking and cooks well, I still think I don't like her enough, so I have been refusing her pursuit.

Story 10: a Uighur girl who immigrated to southern China

There was a Uyghur girl in Xinjiang who was originally a civil servant. Later, she was crazily pursued by a boss in the South and then married. Later, she went home to visit her relatives and came to Beijing to meet her cousins. She told us that "the Uyghur people live so freely in other places!" When she was in Xinjiang, she always needed to write ideological reports and so on. After she married and moved to the south, she basically became a little rich woman. She usually went to the gym, went shopping, socialized with her husband, and played with her children. No one from the government bothered her.

Story 11: tobacco, wine and pork

Most of my Uighur friends resolutely do not eat pork, but they do not mind smoking and drinking. Although neither smoking nor alcohol is supposed to be halal.
There are few people in their families who don't drink. Many middle-aged Uighur men drink too much, and many of them start to quit drinking only after the doctor refuses to let them drink.
However, few people quit smoking. It is extremely difficult for men and women to quit smoking.
The few who eat pork are convinced by another Uighur friend. "You drink, you smoke, date. If you really believe in Islam, you would have gone to hell long ago. Pork is insignificant compared with this. Pork is so delicious, you can try it."

Discussion A
Quote:
It was said that many Uyghur Han intermarriages failed due to the pressure of the Uyghur parents. What kind of Uyghur family would support intermarriage?

Quote:
OP: The families I know do not care at all. Especially the family of the girl who chased me, they only hope their children have a happy life.

To make a digression, I don't eat pork or drink because I keep fit. The Uighur girl who chased me and her best friend privately roast that I was "too halal". Somehow, I heard about it.

Quote:
Let me tell you this, many Uyghur parents do not agree with Uyghur Han intermarriage because they are afraid that their relatives and friends will gossip behind their backs. If Uyghur and Han marry in the mainland and do not return to Xinjiang, they generally will not oppose it.

Discussion B
Quote:
The Uyghurs are really being victimized by the East Turkistanis

Quote:
OP: My current view is that the East Turkistan is the first bad, the CCP is the second bad, and the western media that make up the story is the third bad. They are not good things. They harm the Uighurs in all directions.

Quote:
Without East Turkistan, there would be no such thing as this? Maybe because I am Han, I am one-sided.

Quote:
OP: So I say that the East Turkistan terrorists are the worst.

The East Turkistan terrorist attacks hurt innocent people, so the government needs to fight terrorism.
The government's anti-terrorism means is to expand the scope of attack by idiots, so the western media can exaggerate at will.

Quote:
Have Uyghur enterprises or ordinary Uyghur workers been directly affected by this wave of sanctions against Xinjiang products?

Quote:
the Han Xinjiangnese: In the past, leather hats did not work at all. Now the whole southern Xinjiang is stepping up poverty alleviation. Have you seen the "love between mountains and the sea"? That is, that is, those who force mainland enterprises to open factories in Xinjiang and hire leather hats.
In the past, leather hat migrant workers made trouble in the mainland, so mainland factories did not like to recruit them, but they were also forced to recruit them.
Generally speaking, the CCP routine is basically like this, and the final enhanced version of "love between mountain and sea" looks like this.
Therefore, there are no products and enterprises, so there is no harm. Most people in Xinjiang haven't heard of it, nor has it affected them.

Note: "love between mountain and sea": a publicity documentary, which introduces a developed coastal province supporting the poor Hui Autonomous Province in the northwest. Now the Hui Autonomous Region gives preferential treatment to tourists from that province.
"Leather hat": a (discriminatory) term used by some local people for Uighurs.
Quote:
OP: First of all, I don't like your use of the word "leather hat". I also oppose your overt and covert discrimination.

But as far as I know, the fact is just as you said. Although I won't say it in a discriminatory way.
Even my Uighur friends in Northern Xinjiang can't stand the extreme religious elements in southern Xinjiang.
The CCP's poverty alleviation has indeed forced some people to leave the village, but the wages of these people have indeed increased many times.
In those poor villages, these people do nothing but have children and read the Koran. I don't know where their money came from. Many children in southern Xinjiang do not even have their ID cards registered, let alone go to school.

Quote:
the Han Xinjiangnese: The essence is that Islam is too stupid. The leather hats in southern Xinjiang are brainwashed by Islam to think that they will go to hell if they work for the Han people.

Millions of poor households do nothing. The production and Construction Corps had to recruit people from the mainland to pick cotton.

Discussion C:
Quote:
Did your friend ever say that the terrorism and Islamic generalization in Xinjiang were really serious?

Quote:
OP: Uygur women like to wear silk stockings no matter how old they are, and Uygur traditional costumes are colorful.
Saudi Arabia previously exported Wahhabi sect in Xinjiang.
Many people in Xinjiang are also disgusted with those. But in some villages, people began to wear burqa.
My friends are very "glad" that the CCP suppressed Wahhabi in this matter. After all, my friends smoke, drink, date and don't observe Ramadan...

Discussion D:
Quote:
This kind of story should really be recorded and should not be suppressed. In the future, maybe someone can make a film that can win an Oscar.

It seems that the plot is similar to the Cultural Revolution...This is a very test of human nature.

Quote:
the Han Xinjiangnese: The real story is ten times worse than this one. After the "75 incident", the whole family of the earliest cadres who went to southern Xinjiang was killed and burned by leather hats.
There are also vicious cases such as the bombing of police training and the removal of police stations. In fact, the situation in southern Xinjiang has been completely out of control. The religious police have more authority than the CCP police.

He evaded the important and whitewashed the peace, as if there were no major events in Xinjiang.

Discussion E:
Quote:
another Han Xinjiangnese: You still need to ask others?
I am Han in Xinjiang. I have lived in Urumqi, Wusu and southern Xinjiang. I immigrated to the United States and am currently studying PhD.
If you ask a person from Xinjiang, the Han people will certainly praise the CCP. The vast majority of Uighurs are somewhat dissatisfied (but far from being very dissatisfied), mainly focusing on religious customs. However, they generally think that the current life is better than before.
A few Uighurs (estimated to be a quarter) are very dissatisfied, but there is nothing they can do. Those who have emigrated become dissidents, while those who have not emigrated just study and work.

The leftists of this sub have been greatly influenced by the leftists in the United States. They really believe the nonsense of safeguarding religious freedom. When they talk about anti-terrorism in Xinjiang every day (it's no problem to say that brainwashing is a part of the eradication of anti-terrorism, which is the case all over the world), they look like they are suffering from great hatred.

If CCP does not completely wipe out Islam in Xinjiang, Xinjiang will be the next Afghanistan.
The Uyghur people formed their own system and practiced sharia law in villages in southern Xinjiang. Children do not accept compulsory education, do not learn technology and knowledge. They learn to worship Allah from their parents in the village when they are young. Then they grow up without learning anything. They watch Turkish videos every day to prepare for Jihad and go to the streets to kill innocent people (not only the Han people, but also the Uighurs and Kazaks on the road).
They block the police, pour gasoline and set fire to the police station. They are completely out of step with the moderate Uyghur, Kazakh and other people who have almost been integrated into Xinjiang society.
These are not accidents at all. They happen every day and every hour. This is not a BS media report, but my relatives are in these places. It is precisely for this reason that we were originally dealing with some scientific research in southern Xinjiang, but later we could not stand it and withdrew directly to Urumqi.

In fact, the idea of CCP's camp is very good and suitable for France.
Look at what happened in France last year. Islamic immigrants cut off the heads of their children's teachers for religious reasons
When only one person died, there was a great disturbance. Why not look at Xinjiang?
Why not look at how many civilian policemen of the same nature as Sheriff and how many innocent people walking on the street were stabbed and burned?

We all know how stupid the western media are. How come there are still people who have a tune with these people on the issue of Xinjiang?
The current teachings of Islam are anti-human and anti-modern.
Since you don't want to integrate, you can only be forced to integrate.
Let me be frank. If the CCP opens the Xinjiang donation line, I will donate the living expenses for one semester to the Communist Party to fight against evil terrorist forces.

To be honest, we are ordinary people. I don't care about and don't care how much the emperor Xi spends every day. After all, in the United States, I also think that my votes are f*****g useless. I hate both Biden and trump.
But what I care about is that at least I don't have to worry about being stabbed to death because of my appearance when I walk on the street, and I don't have to worry about being locked and poured with gasoline to burn to death when I find a job. No matter how much money the CCP embezzled, at least it saved my family's right to life. I praise them for this.

Quote:
What you said is very similar to my Han classmate who lived in Bayingolin and experienced the 75 incident.

Quote:
They are all children. The mainstream of this sub is very well protected urban children under the age of 25 or even under the age of 20 who have been living in the bubble. They may not even touch the dark side of the society you mentioned.


_________________
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SkinnedWolf
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12 Aug 2022, 4:57 am

Before this issue became hysterical, the BBC Chinese reported. The content of the report is consistent with the information I currently have. This is also said to be the most serious period.
3/30/2017 Xinjiang strengthened control and banned masked burqa and "abnormal beard"

Quote:
China's Xinjiang authorities will implement the "de radicalization" regulations from April 1; Among them, wearing a masked robe and "abnormal beard" are all extreme manifestations.
...
According to the regulations of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on de radicalization, the prohibited behaviors include "exaggerating religious fanaticism by using abnormal beards and names", "forcing others to wear masked burqa and extreme signs" and "rejecting and rejecting public products and services such as radio and television".

In recent years, there have been many riots in Xinjiang, causing hundreds of deaths.

The Beijing authorities accused the riots of being caused by Islamic militants and separatists, but some human rights organizations claimed that the root cause of the riots was the repressive policies implemented by the Chinese authorities in the local area.

According to this "regulation", the management personnel and staff of public places "shall dissuade those who wear hooded robes and extreme signs from entering public places or taking public transport, and report to the public security organs in a timely manner."

The regulation also prohibits "extending the concept of halal to other fields other than halal food, and excluding and interfering in the secular life of others in the name of not halal".

The regulations prohibit "marriage or divorce by religious means without performing legal procedures", and require parents to "educate their children to respect science, pursue civilization, maintain national unity, and resist and oppose extremism".

The Chinese authorities have previously imposed a ban on "extremist acts" in some parts of Xinjiang, including the prohibition of wearing veils and growing beards in public places. This latest "regulation" extends the ban to the entire Xinjiang region.

After a period of calm in Xinjiang, violent incidents have increased in the past few months, prompting the authorities to increase security on a large scale.

Note: the "name" here is more likely to be interpreted as a verb in Chinese. I have heard that it is forbidden to call a newborn a variant of "Muhammad". I can't understand the intention of doing so.
Regarding the prohibition of excluding public services such as television: In the past, extreme Muslims believed that the RMB was not payable and should not be used, and television was used to monitor people.

3/1/2017 The Islamic state threatens to wipe out China. How big is the threat
Quote:
According to an organization tracking jihadists, the "Islamic state" militants composed of Uighurs from China vowed to return to their hometown and let China "bleed like a river". This is the first time that the "Islamic state" has threatened Chinese targets.

This 30 minute video was sent by an "Islamic state" branch in western Iraq. It shows the lives of Chinese terrorists in the Middle East.

The video also shows that a Uighur militant first threatened China and then executed a person who was said to be an informer.


3/23/2017 Xinjiang - China's "anti-terrorism front line"?
Quote:
Chinese authorities are worried that Jihad signals from Syria and Iraq will infiltrate Xinjiang. The reporter went to southern Xinjiang to listen to what the Han and Uygur people said.
...
It doesn't look like a battlefield. But last month, on the street here, three young Uygur men attacked the Han people with knives. The police arrived within 60 seconds and killed the attacker, but five people have been hacked to death by the attacker.

There are X-ray machines in every government office, restaurant and shop, and people have to be searched. There are police stations in almost every block, and armed patrols patrol the streets. Large notices warned people to hand over knives, binoculars and boxing gloves.
...
But in the past 10 years, an invisible front has become more and more solid. For a long time, there have been Uighurs who do not want to belong to China and do not like the Han immigrants here. But now, some of them go to Iraq and Syria to fight, using Jihad language. China is worried that they will come back to make blood.
...
A Han told me that there were much more terrorist attacks than the government admitted. He has been in Xinjiang for 20 years.
...
He attributed the differences between the two communities to the gap between Buddhist culture and Muslim culture. He gave a plain account of another attack. Three young Uighur men rushed into the mahjong parlor and indiscriminately chopped down the gamblers inside.
...
Several Uighurs told us that religious repression is suffocating and political preaching is counterproductive. But these people say that resistance is futile, and the only sensible choice is to reconcile themselves to their situation.


2/22/2017 China's new anti-terrorism policy in Xinjiang: mandatory installation of position system
Quote:
The authorities of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in Western China have ordered all vehicles in some areas to install satellite positioning systems as part of a new anti-terrorism and stability maintenance measure.

The government hopes to put an end to the occasional violent attacks in the provincial administrative region, which are blamed on Islamic militants.

A police statement said that cars are usually the main means of transport used by terrorists.


6/7/2016 Xinjiang Yili collects DNA blood samples from Chinese passport applicants
Quote:
On the eve of the Muslim fasting month, news from ILI, Xinjiang, said that Xinjiang requires residents applying for entry and exit documents such as Chinese passports and Hong Kong and Macao passes to collect DNA and blood samples at the same time, otherwise it will not be accepted.
...
The report did not explain whether the new measures of Ili were targeted at citizens of individual ethnic groups.
...
In July last year, Human Rights Watch, an organization headquartered in New York, the United States, reported that China had delayed the issuance of passports to ethnic minority citizens in Xinjiang, Tibet and other regions, and some applicants had even been refused applications without reason. The group questioned Beijing's efforts to prevent Uighurs and Tibetans from leaving the country to participate in Religious Studies and pilgrimages by restricting the issuance of passports.

Earlier, a Uighur holding a Chinese passport was arrested in the bombings in Bangkok, Thailand. Analysts said that there are signs that Uighurs are more actively participating in the global "Jihad" movement.


_________________
With the help of translation software.

Cover your eyes, if you like. It will serve no purpose.

You might expect to be able to crush them in your hand, into wolf-bone fragments.
Dance with me, funeralxempire. Into night's circle we fly, until the fire enjoys us.