I have a question for only Christian aspies

Page 5 of 7 [ 102 posts ]  Go to page Previous  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7  Next

DentArthurDent
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 26 Jul 2008
Age: 59
Gender: Male
Posts: 3,884
Location: Victoria, Australia

02 Apr 2010, 10:58 pm

AngelRho wrote:


That sounds like a very hypocritical statement to me. Are non-believers really such questioning seekers of truth? If so, why do so many attack Christians and their beliefs? If you are of a mind so inclined to questioning, then you necessarily must inquire into at least the possibility that in what and in whom Christians believe might be true.

You'll notice that my last statement directly references logical thinking. Your statement is reflective of a closed mind (and what the Bible refers to as the "hardened heart"). No reasonably logical person can rightfully say that they know absolutely for certain that there is no God. Something else, not logic and reason, has made up your mind for you.



So I presume that you accept the possibility of the existence of faeries, and of Russell's Tea Pot.

I actually agree with you, it is fallacious to state that god does not exist beyond all probability, but what is the probability of his existence. With every single event of increased scientific knowledge the probability gets smaller and smaller. To my knowledge there has not been one single instance of scientific discovery that reverses this trend.

To once again quite Richard Dawkins "I am agnostic about God in the same way as I am agnostic about the Tooth Faerie"


_________________
"I'd take the awe of understanding over the awe of ignorance anyday"
Douglas Adams

"Religion is the impotence of the human mind to deal with occurrences it cannot understand" Karl Marx


Master_Pedant
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 14 Mar 2009
Age: 33
Gender: Male
Posts: 4,903

02 Apr 2010, 11:05 pm

DentArthurDent wrote:
AngelRho wrote:


That sounds like a very hypocritical statement to me. Are non-believers really such questioning seekers of truth? If so, why do so many attack Christians and their beliefs? If you are of a mind so inclined to questioning, then you necessarily must inquire into at least the possibility that in what and in whom Christians believe might be true.

You'll notice that my last statement directly references logical thinking. Your statement is reflective of a closed mind (and what the Bible refers to as the "hardened heart"). No reasonably logical person can rightfully say that they know absolutely for certain that there is no God. Something else, not logic and reason, has made up your mind for you.



So I presume that you accept the possibility of the existence of faeries, and of Russell's Tea Pot.

I actually agree with you, it is fallacious to state that god does not exist beyond all probability, but what is the probability of his existence. With every single event of increased scientific knowledge the probability gets smaller and smaller. To my knowledge there has not been one single instance of scientific discovery that reverses this trend.

To once again quite Richard Dawkins "I am agnostic about God in the same way as I am agnostic about the Tooth Faerie"


I disagree. While we can only use the Principle of Parsimony against the weakest and most deistic verisons of faith (hence God isn't logically impossible so much as physically improbable), the concept of an omnibenevolent, omnipresent, omnipotence, and omniscient God has been demonstrated as a logically incoherent idea and hence we can throw it in the scrap of logically impossible ideas like square circles.

Strong theism and the strongest versions of Christianity, in short, are incoherent. I'm not sure how essential the omnibenevolent, omnipresent, etc. definition of God is for Christians (or even if most know of it), but its an impossible idea.



Awesomelyglorious
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 17 Dec 2005
Gender: Male
Posts: 13,157
Location: Omnipresent

02 Apr 2010, 11:23 pm

Master_Pedant wrote:
I disagree. While we can only use the Principle of Parsimony against the weakest and most deistic verisons of faith (hence God isn't logically impossible so much as physically improbable), the concept of an omnibenevolent, omnipresent, omnipotence, and omniscient God has been demonstrated as a logically incoherent idea and hence we can throw it in the scrap of logically impossible ideas like square circles.

Strong theism and the strongest versions of Christianity, in short, are incoherent. I'm not sure how essential the omnibenevolent, omnipresent, etc. definition of God is for Christians (or even if most know of it), but its an impossible idea.

Yeah, I don't really buy into the disproof of omni-God that much.

I mean, most people who are theists only mean by the omnis that God can do all logically possible things. This kind of makes efforts to refute this into a strawman anyway I think. Additionally, even if the actual meaning of the omni-God were refuted, all this means is that theists have to retreat back to the maxi-God who has the maximum capability logically possible. I mean, not even the ontological arguments require omni-Gods and the rest of the theistic proofs don't either, so what's the point?



Master_Pedant
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 14 Mar 2009
Age: 33
Gender: Male
Posts: 4,903

02 Apr 2010, 11:28 pm

Awesomelyglorious wrote:
Master_Pedant wrote:
I disagree. While we can only use the Principle of Parsimony against the weakest and most deistic verisons of faith (hence God isn't logically impossible so much as physically improbable), the concept of an omnibenevolent, omnipresent, omnipotence, and omniscient God has been demonstrated as a logically incoherent idea and hence we can throw it in the scrap of logically impossible ideas like square circles.

Strong theism and the strongest versions of Christianity, in short, are incoherent. I'm not sure how essential the omnibenevolent, omnipresent, etc. definition of God is for Christians (or even if most know of it), but its an impossible idea.

Yeah, I don't really buy into the disproof of omni-God that much.

I mean, most people who are theists only mean by the omnis that God can do all logically possible things. This kind of makes efforts to refute this into a strawman anyway I think. Additionally, even if the actual meaning of the omni-God were refuted, all this means is that theists have to retreat back to the maxi-God who has the maximum capability logically possible. I mean, not even the ontological arguments require omni-Gods and the rest of the theistic proofs don't either, so what's the point?


I still think probabilistic, inductive, and abductive arguments against God (when coupled with a coherentist - web of belief - epistemology) pretty much neutralize most reasons for believing in God and even provide some reasons against. I'd say I'm more of a 6.65/7 when it comes to disbelief in God (I'm 6.90/7 certain that my cereal won't suddenly turn into acid, to give you a relevant point of reference).



Awesomelyglorious
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 17 Dec 2005
Gender: Male
Posts: 13,157
Location: Omnipresent

02 Apr 2010, 11:33 pm

Master_Pedant wrote:
I still think probabilistic, inductive, and abductive arguments against God (when coupled with a coherentist - web of belief - epistemology) pretty much neutralize most reasons for believing in God and even provide some reasons against. I'd say I'm more of a 6.65/7 when it comes to disbelief in God (I'm 6.90/7 certain that my cereal won't suddenly turn into acid, to give you a relevant point of reference).

Hmm... that close? I mean, the non-transformation of cereal is something confirmed many many many times again and again and again. It is sort of like the sun rising. God's existence is a more speculative metaphysical doctrine though, it's a metaphysical doctrine for which empirical confirmation and/or falsification can be difficult to pull apart. I dunno, I am very uncomfortable with people's confidence in their metaphysics to some extent.



Master_Pedant
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 14 Mar 2009
Age: 33
Gender: Male
Posts: 4,903

02 Apr 2010, 11:37 pm

Awesomelyglorious wrote:
Master_Pedant wrote:
I still think probabilistic, inductive, and abductive arguments against God (when coupled with a coherentist - web of belief - epistemology) pretty much neutralize most reasons for believing in God and even provide some reasons against. I'd say I'm more of a 6.65/7 when it comes to disbelief in God (I'm 6.90/7 certain that my cereal won't suddenly turn into acid, to give you a relevant point of reference).

Hmm... that close? I mean, the non-transformation of cereal is something confirmed many many many times again and again and again. It is sort of like the sun rising. God's existence is a more speculative metaphysical doctrine though, it's a metaphysical doctrine for which empirical confirmation and/or falsification can be difficult to pull apart. I dunno, I am very uncomfortable with people's confidence in their metaphysics to some extent.


The same interwoven empirically justified "strings" of belief on my web of belief that justify believing in the uniformity of nature also undermine theistic Gods.



Awesomelyglorious
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 17 Dec 2005
Gender: Male
Posts: 13,157
Location: Omnipresent

02 Apr 2010, 11:44 pm

Master_Pedant wrote:
The same interwoven empirically justified "strings" of belief on my web of belief that justify believing in the uniformity of nature also undermine theistic Gods.

I don't see how it is the "same string" though. Your notion that your cereal will not be turned into acid is just an invocation of ceteris paribus reasoning. I am sure that you wouldn't also be so confident that an agent that acted upon your cereal would be completely incapable of turning this into acid.

Additionally, the God hypothesis only has a few limited conflicts with the uniformity of nature, and even then it is possible to regard a divine entity as an agent and thus not really in conflict with the uniformity of nature anyway.



Master_Pedant
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 14 Mar 2009
Age: 33
Gender: Male
Posts: 4,903

02 Apr 2010, 11:49 pm

Awesomelyglorious wrote:
Master_Pedant wrote:
The same interwoven empirically justified "strings" of belief on my web of belief that justify believing in the uniformity of nature also undermine theistic Gods.

I don't see how it is the "same string" though. Your notion that your cereal will not be turned into acid is just an invocation of ceteris paribus reasoning. I am sure that you wouldn't also be so confident that an agent that acted upon your cereal would be completely incapable of turning this into acid.

Additionally, the God hypothesis only has a few limited conflicts with the uniformity of nature, and even then it is possible to regard a divine entity as an agent and thus not really in conflict with the uniformity of nature anyway.


Some of the notions that I have anchored my non-transformation of cereal on - the ultimate physicality of causation - are undermined by divine agencies. Also, my understanding of neural phenomena is drastically altered if I accept divine agencies. Henceforth, the web of beliefs would have to be radically re-wired were I to accept any one of thos propositions (souls or Gods).



Awesomelyglorious
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 17 Dec 2005
Gender: Male
Posts: 13,157
Location: Omnipresent

02 Apr 2010, 11:58 pm

Master_Pedant wrote:
Some of the notions that I have anchored my non-transformation of cereal on - the ultimate physicality of causation - are undermined by divine agencies. Also, my understanding of neural phenomena is drastically altered if I accept divine agencies. Henceforth, the web of beliefs would have to be radically re-wired were I to accept any one of thos propositions (souls or Gods).

Well, right, but you don't have evidence to say that all causation must be physical. You just have only observed physical causation. You can't verify it, and you haven't falsified God, so I don't see how this provides a lot of solid evidence.

As for your neural phenomena, there are a few issues:
1) Nobody knows neural causation well enough to say that no ghost in the machine can exist, there is just a presumption in favor of the uniformity of the universe.
2) It is possible that whatever is known as a soul doesn't function as a dualist self. That is to say that an object called a "soul", which maintains selfhood after the destruction of a physical self, has no impact on neurology and thus does not impact it.
3) A God can exist without souls actually existing. For instance, life after death could be the creation of the physical body that died. Or God could have allowed people to exist/be created without having them have souls.



Fuzzy
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 30 Mar 2006
Age: 51
Gender: Male
Posts: 5,223
Location: Alberta Canada

03 Apr 2010, 12:25 am

Awesomelyglorious wrote:
has no impact on neurology and thus does not impact it.


I like this sentence fragment.

I eat cookies and thus I eat them.


_________________
davidred wrote...
I installed Ubuntu once and it completely destroyed my paying relationship with Microsoft.


Master_Pedant
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 14 Mar 2009
Age: 33
Gender: Male
Posts: 4,903

03 Apr 2010, 12:30 am

Awesomelyglorious wrote:
Master_Pedant wrote:
Some of the notions that I have anchored my non-transformation of cereal on - the ultimate physicality of causation - are undermined by divine agencies. Also, my understanding of neural phenomena is drastically altered if I accept divine agencies. Henceforth, the web of beliefs would have to be radically re-wired were I to accept any one of thos propositions (souls or Gods).

Well, right, but you don't have evidence to say that all causation must be physical. You just have only observed physical causation. You can't verify it, and you haven't falsified God, so I don't see how this provides a lot of solid evidence.


I fine divine meddling in natural affairs as problematic as the interaction problem is for dualism.

Awesomelyglorious wrote:
As for your neural phenomena, there are a few issues:
1) Nobody knows neural causation well enough to say that no ghost in the machine can exist, there is just a presumption in favor of the uniformity of the universe.
2) It is possible that whatever is known as a soul doesn't function as a dualist self. That is to say that an object called a "soul", which maintains selfhood after the destruction of a physical self, has no impact on neurology and thus does not impact it.
3) A God can exist without souls actually existing. For instance, life after death could be the creation of the physical body that died. Or God could have allowed people to exist/be created without having them have souls.


As I said above, the interaction problem pretty much disolves all but 3, which has already been taken care of above.



Awesomelyglorious
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 17 Dec 2005
Gender: Male
Posts: 13,157
Location: Omnipresent

03 Apr 2010, 12:34 am

Fuzzy wrote:
Awesomelyglorious wrote:
has no impact on neurology and thus does not impact it.


I like this sentence fragment.

I eat cookies and thus I eat them.

Well hey, it is valid!

I think and thus I exist, right? I mean, logic that presupposes it's own conclusions is brilliant. A revolution in argumentation techniques. Sadly, Christians already got there.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presupposi ... pologetics



Orwell
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 8 Aug 2007
Age: 34
Gender: Male
Posts: 12,518
Location: Room 101

03 Apr 2010, 12:39 am

Awesomelyglorious wrote:
Yeah, I don't really buy into the disproof of omni-God that much.

I mean, most people who are theists only mean by the omnis that God can do all logically possible things. This kind of makes efforts to refute this into a strawman anyway I think. Additionally, even if the actual meaning of the omni-God were refuted, all this means is that theists have to retreat back to the maxi-God who has the maximum capability logically possible. I mean, not even the ontological arguments require omni-Gods and the rest of the theistic proofs don't either, so what's the point?

The most popular lay conceptions of God are self-contradictory, though. I spent a while last night debating a hard-core Calvinist who also tried to uphold free will, and he is better-educated in theology than the typical Christian (ie, he's actually read most all of Jonathon Edwards writings; he's a big fan of "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God").


_________________
WAR IS PEACE
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH


Awesomelyglorious
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 17 Dec 2005
Gender: Male
Posts: 13,157
Location: Omnipresent

03 Apr 2010, 12:39 am

Master_Pedant wrote:
I fine divine meddling in natural affairs as problematic as the interaction problem is for dualism.

I don't find the interaction problem problematic though. It kind of begs the question just as badly as Vic Reppert's argument against materialism.
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2010/ ... ument.html

I mean, that being said, even with a charitable interpretation of it as being a physicalism issue, the issue with physicalism is defining the limits of physics.
http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2009/ ... alist.html

Awesomelyglorious wrote:
As for your neural phenomena, there are a few issues:
1) Nobody knows neural causation well enough to say that no ghost in the machine can exist, there is just a presumption in favor of the uniformity of the universe.
2) It is possible that whatever is known as a soul doesn't function as a dualist self. That is to say that an object called a "soul", which maintains selfhood after the destruction of a physical self, has no impact on neurology and thus does not impact it.
3) A God can exist without souls actually existing. For instance, life after death could be the creation of the physical body that died. Or God could have allowed people to exist/be created without having them have souls.


As I said above, the interaction problem pretty much disolves all but 3, which has already been taken care of above.[/quote]
Well, actually 2 is material causing non-material change. There is nothing saying that this cannot happen, and I don't see how the interaction problem is that relevant either as doesn't it mostly apply to immaterial things causing material change rather than vice versa?



Awesomelyglorious
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 17 Dec 2005
Gender: Male
Posts: 13,157
Location: Omnipresent

03 Apr 2010, 12:48 am

Orwell wrote:
The most popular lay conceptions of God are self-contradictory, though. I spent a while last night debating a hard-core Calvinist who also tried to uphold free will, and he is better-educated in theology than the typical Christian (ie, he's actually read most all of Jonathon Edwards writings; he's a big fan of "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God").

The most popular lay conceptions of anything are self-contradictory.

Actually, I think most Calvinists do try to uphold compatibilist free will, with a few that try to uphold libertarian free will. I don't know how it makes sense though, as our free will intuitions are clearly raped by the notion of a moral agent who can cause all of the actions of human beings. I suppose there are ways... it is just that they aren't compelling. They are just clear attempts to have special pleading on the issue I think, so that way God can still seem just for things that otherwise would seem monstrous.



Orwell
Veteran
Veteran

User avatar

Joined: 8 Aug 2007
Age: 34
Gender: Male
Posts: 12,518
Location: Room 101

03 Apr 2010, 12:55 am

Awesomelyglorious wrote:
Actually, I think most Calvinists do try to uphold compatibilist free will,

But compatibilism is stupid. It makes Platonism look like a stroke of freaking genius.

Quote:
so that way God can still seem just for things that otherwise would seem monstrous.

Eventually I cornered the Calvinist and he went into a very long-winded and repetitive spiel that boiled down to an implicit divine command theory.


_________________
WAR IS PEACE
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH