zarok
Deinonychus
Joined: 4 Sep 2012
Age: 32
Gender: Male
Posts: 327
Location: Greenville South Carolina
28 Jun 2013, 1:05 am
28 Jun 2013, 7:03 am
Exploronaut wrote:
One warning to everyone about teleportation as shown in Star Trek, which means that it should not be used, heisenberg compensator or not:
This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
28 Jun 2013, 8:06 am
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
One warning to everyone about teleportation as shown in Star Trek, which means that it should not be used, heisenberg compensator or not:
This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
Soul is irrelevant here. The point is that the brain is being disintegrated, and what comes out is not the same brain, but just a copy.
28 Jun 2013, 9:05 am
Exploronaut wrote:
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
One warning to everyone about teleportation as shown in Star Trek, which means that it should not be used, heisenberg compensator or not:
This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
Soul is irrelevant here. The point is that the brain is being disintegrated, and what comes out is not the same brain, but just a copy.
And all of the cells in your own brain are replaced in a matter of years. So what? Memory is what's important to define identity, not any sort of cellular temporal continuity. Given the rate at which neurons fire and just the general way things tend to work, I'd be highly surprised if 'consciousness' were truly continuous anyway, and if your consciousness is composed of discrete units (which you wouldn't notice, as in each instant you remember the previous instants), there's really no reason to view one mind with a given set of properties as being any different from any other with the same properties. Just have to figure out which properties are important to preserve when you unmake a mind and put it back together.
UNLESS, of course, there's some sort of immaterial soul which you have no way to reproduce and no way to manipulate in order to ensure that it gets carried over. Hence my earlier comment.
28 Jun 2013, 10:02 am
28 Jun 2013, 10:08 am
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
One warning to everyone about teleportation as shown in Star Trek, which means that it should not be used, heisenberg compensator or not:
This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
Soul is irrelevant here. The point is that the brain is being disintegrated, and what comes out is not the same brain, but just a copy.
And all of the cells in your own brain are replaced in a matter of years. So what? Memory is what's important to define identity, not any sort of cellular temporal continuity. Given the rate at which neurons fire and just the general way things tend to work, I'd be highly surprised if 'consciousness' were truly continuous anyway, and if your consciousness is composed of discrete units (which you wouldn't notice, as in each instant you remember the previous instants), there's really no reason to view one mind with a given set of properties as being any different from any other with the same properties. Just have to figure out which properties are important to preserve when you unmake a mind and put it back together.
UNLESS, of course, there's some sort of immaterial soul which you have no way to reproduce and no way to manipulate in order to ensure that it gets carried over. Hence my earlier comment.
If I had been teleported that way, then the duplicat would have been similar to me, but he would not have been me, just like that Thomas Riker is not William Riker.
Link: Star Trek: The Next Generation Season 6 Episode 24 - Second Chances
28 Jun 2013, 10:08 am
28 Jun 2013, 10:12 am
Exploronaut wrote:
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
One warning to everyone about teleportation as shown in Star Trek, which means that it should not be used, heisenberg compensator or not:
This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
Soul is irrelevant here. The point is that the brain is being disintegrated, and what comes out is not the same brain, but just a copy.
As long as the copy is a good copy and the memories retained are almost the same memories it will work out.
Dr. McCoy was absolutely right for hating to use the transporter.
Damn it, Jim! I don't want my atoms scrambled all over space!
ruveyn
28 Jun 2013, 10:15 am
Exploronaut wrote:
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
One warning to everyone about teleportation as shown in Star Trek, which means that it should not be used, heisenberg compensator or not:
This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
Soul is irrelevant here. The point is that the brain is being disintegrated, and what comes out is not the same brain, but just a copy.
And all of the cells in your own brain are replaced in a matter of years. So what? Memory is what's important to define identity, not any sort of cellular temporal continuity. Given the rate at which neurons fire and just the general way things tend to work, I'd be highly surprised if 'consciousness' were truly continuous anyway, and if your consciousness is composed of discrete units (which you wouldn't notice, as in each instant you remember the previous instants), there's really no reason to view one mind with a given set of properties as being any different from any other with the same properties. Just have to figure out which properties are important to preserve when you unmake a mind and put it back together.
UNLESS, of course, there's some sort of immaterial soul which you have no way to reproduce and no way to manipulate in order to ensure that it gets carried over. Hence my earlier comment.
If I had been teleported that way, then the duplicat would have been similar to me, but he would not have been me, just like that Thomas Riker is not William Riker.
Link: Star Trek: The Next Generation Season 6 Episode 24 - Second Chances
How are you defining 'you'?
28 Jun 2013, 1:03 pm
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
One warning to everyone about teleportation as shown in Star Trek, which means that it should not be used, heisenberg compensator or not:
This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
Soul is irrelevant here. The point is that the brain is being disintegrated, and what comes out is not the same brain, but just a copy.
And all of the cells in your own brain are replaced in a matter of years. So what? Memory is what's important to define identity, not any sort of cellular temporal continuity. Given the rate at which neurons fire and just the general way things tend to work, I'd be highly surprised if 'consciousness' were truly continuous anyway, and if your consciousness is composed of discrete units (which you wouldn't notice, as in each instant you remember the previous instants), there's really no reason to view one mind with a given set of properties as being any different from any other with the same properties. Just have to figure out which properties are important to preserve when you unmake a mind and put it back together.
UNLESS, of course, there's some sort of immaterial soul which you have no way to reproduce and no way to manipulate in order to ensure that it gets carried over. Hence my earlier comment.
If I had been teleported that way, then the duplicat would have been similar to me, but he would not have been me, just like that Thomas Riker is not William Riker.
Link: Star Trek: The Next Generation Season 6 Episode 24 - Second Chances
How are you defining 'you'?
As me.
Or, as an attempt to explain what I mean in a clearer way...
Let's say that you have a candle, and that you blow out the flame, and then ignite the candle again. Is that flame the same flame as the first. No, it is just similar.
If I was transported, then my consciousness would have been destroyd with my body, and a new one would have been created. The new consciousness would have my knowledge, personality and experience, but he would be another entity, another physical object.
It can be compared with that the hologram of a dead person is not the person(links: Red Dwarf: Season 1 Episode 1-The End, Red Dwarf: Season 8 Episode 1-Back in the Red(1)), or that the clone of dr. Carson Beckett is not the exacly same person as the original Carson Beckett (Links: Stargate Atlantis: Season 3 Episode 17-Sunday, Stargate Atlantis: Season 4 Episode 18 - The Kindred (1), Stargate Atlantis: Season 4 Episode 19 - The Kindred (2)), or...or that John Smith is not the same induvidual as The Doctor(Links: Doctor Who (2005): Season 6 Episode 5 - The Rebel Flesh (1), Doctor Who (2005): Season 6 Episode 6 - The Almost People (2)).
John Smith has The Doctor's intelligence, personality, bravery and moral, but they are two different objects.
The only way that I can see that would mean that the person that goes into the transporter would be the same as the one that comes out, would be if it existed something like a soul, and if that was transported over to the new body.
zarok
Deinonychus
Joined: 4 Sep 2012
Age: 32
Gender: Male
Posts: 327
Location: Greenville South Carolina
28 Jun 2013, 1:22 pm
28 Jun 2013, 1:53 pm
28 Jun 2013, 2:57 pm
28 Jun 2013, 4:58 pm
28 Jun 2013, 11:56 pm
Exploronaut wrote:
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
Tiranasta wrote:
Exploronaut wrote:
One warning to everyone about teleportation as shown in Star Trek, which means that it should not be used, heisenberg compensator or not:
This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
Soul is irrelevant here. The point is that the brain is being disintegrated, and what comes out is not the same brain, but just a copy.
And all of the cells in your own brain are replaced in a matter of years. So what? Memory is what's important to define identity, not any sort of cellular temporal continuity. Given the rate at which neurons fire and just the general way things tend to work, I'd be highly surprised if 'consciousness' were truly continuous anyway, and if your consciousness is composed of discrete units (which you wouldn't notice, as in each instant you remember the previous instants), there's really no reason to view one mind with a given set of properties as being any different from any other with the same properties. Just have to figure out which properties are important to preserve when you unmake a mind and put it back together.
UNLESS, of course, there's some sort of immaterial soul which you have no way to reproduce and no way to manipulate in order to ensure that it gets carried over. Hence my earlier comment.
If I had been teleported that way, then the duplicat would have been similar to me, but he would not have been me, just like that Thomas Riker is not William Riker.
Link: Star Trek: The Next Generation Season 6 Episode 24 - Second Chances
How are you defining 'you'?
As me.
Or, as an attempt to explain what I mean in a clearer way...
Let's say that you have a candle, and that you blow out the flame, and then ignite the candle again. Is that flame the same flame as the first. No, it is just similar.
If I was transported, then my consciousness would have been destroyd with my body, and a new one would have been created. The new consciousness would have my knowledge, personality and experience, but he would be another entity, another physical object.
It can be compared with that the hologram of a dead person is not the person(links: Red Dwarf: Season 1 Episode 1-The End, Red Dwarf: Season 8 Episode 1-Back in the Red(1)), or that the clone of dr. Carson Beckett is not the exacly same person as the original Carson Beckett (Links: Stargate Atlantis: Season 3 Episode 17-Sunday, Stargate Atlantis: Season 4 Episode 18 - The Kindred (1), Stargate Atlantis: Season 4 Episode 19 - The Kindred (2)), or...or that John Smith is not the same induvidual as The Doctor(Links: Doctor Who (2005): Season 6 Episode 5 - The Rebel Flesh (1), Doctor Who (2005): Season 6 Episode 6 - The Almost People (2)).
John Smith has The Doctor's intelligence, personality, bravery and moral, but they are two different objects.
The only way that I can see that would mean that the person that goes into the transporter would be the same as the one that comes out, would be if it existed something like a soul, and if that was transported over to the new body.
Why are you viewing consciousness as some sort of singular continuous phenomenon? Unless the soul exists, that seems a rather absurd interpretation. It seems much more probable, as I mentioned in an earlier quoted response, that consciousness exists as a series of discrete 'units'. In which case, your consciousness is ALREADY being 'destroyed' and replaced, moment by moment, and one could even go further as to say that most of the time you're not conscious (but since you're not aware of the time you're not conscious, it seems to you that you're conscious all of the time). There would be nothing fundamentally different between this and what you're describing as happening in a transporter, except that the time gap between one moment of consciousness and the next would be longer.
Essentially, my basic point is that identity as you seem to be defining it is an illusion. As long as the correlates of that illusion are preserved by the transporter, what comes out the other end can still be said to be 'you' by any reasonable perspective and in exactly the same sense as the thing that went in.
29 Jun 2013, 3:41 am
