Faster Than Light conundrum Help appreciated
Besides, seeing "Why Teleportation is Evil" once is often enough.
Back to topic everybody, please? I'm trying to recruit the OP into playing Traveller ...

zarok
Deinonychus

Joined: 4 Sep 2012
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I said i am fine with this current debate. I thought i had said that.
In my opinion teleporting is fine. If your brain was assembled the exact same way you would have all the same memory's and thus your soul. a soul is something people have but not a physical thing. if you are a human then you have one. So teleporting would bring your soul with you.
I am looking to write a books not play a game though.
In my opinion teleporting is fine. If your brain was assembled the exact same way you would have all the same memory's and thus your soul. a soul is something people have but not a physical thing. if you are a human then you have one. So teleporting would bring your soul with you.
I am looking to write a books not play a game though.
I can only speak for myself when I say that pretty much any science fiction which states that souls exist earns an immediate black mark in my book (since more than other genre I like science fiction to represent a plausible (though not necessarily probable) real world future). This can be overcome, but only if it's REALLY good in other areas.

This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
Soul is irrelevant here. The point is that the brain is being disintegrated, and what comes out is not the same brain, but just a copy.
And all of the cells in your own brain are replaced in a matter of years. So what? Memory is what's important to define identity, not any sort of cellular temporal continuity. Given the rate at which neurons fire and just the general way things tend to work, I'd be highly surprised if 'consciousness' were truly continuous anyway, and if your consciousness is composed of discrete units (which you wouldn't notice, as in each instant you remember the previous instants), there's really no reason to view one mind with a given set of properties as being any different from any other with the same properties. Just have to figure out which properties are important to preserve when you unmake a mind and put it back together.
UNLESS, of course, there's some sort of immaterial soul which you have no way to reproduce and no way to manipulate in order to ensure that it gets carried over. Hence my earlier comment.
If I had been teleported that way, then the duplicat would have been similar to me, but he would not have been me, just like that Thomas Riker is not William Riker.
Link: Star Trek: The Next Generation Season 6 Episode 24 - Second Chances
How are you defining 'you'?
As me.
Or, as an attempt to explain what I mean in a clearer way...
Let's say that you have a candle, and that you blow out the flame, and then ignite the candle again. Is that flame the same flame as the first. No, it is just similar.
If I was transported, then my consciousness would have been destroyd with my body, and a new one would have been created. The new consciousness would have my knowledge, personality and experience, but he would be another entity, another physical object.
It can be compared with that the hologram of a dead person is not the person(links: Red Dwarf: Season 1 Episode 1-The End, Red Dwarf: Season 8 Episode 1-Back in the Red(1)), or that the clone of dr. Carson Beckett is not the exacly same person as the original Carson Beckett (Links: Stargate Atlantis: Season 3 Episode 17-Sunday, Stargate Atlantis: Season 4 Episode 18 - The Kindred (1), Stargate Atlantis: Season 4 Episode 19 - The Kindred (2)), or...or that John Smith is not the same induvidual as The Doctor(Links: Doctor Who (2005): Season 6 Episode 5 - The Rebel Flesh (1), Doctor Who (2005): Season 6 Episode 6 - The Almost People (2)).
John Smith has The Doctor's intelligence, personality, bravery and moral, but they are two different objects.
The only way that I can see that would mean that the person that goes into the transporter would be the same as the one that comes out, would be if it existed something like a soul, and if that was transported over to the new body.
Why are you viewing consciousness as some sort of singular continuous phenomenon? Unless the soul exists, that seems a rather absurd interpretation. It seems much more probable, as I mentioned in an earlier quoted response, that consciousness exists as a series of discrete 'units'. In which case, your consciousness is ALREADY being 'destroyed' and replaced, moment by moment, and one could even go further as to say that most of the time you're not conscious (but since you're not aware of the time you're not conscious, it seems to you that you're conscious all of the time). There would be nothing fundamentally different between this and what you're describing as happening in a transporter, except that the time gap between one moment of consciousness and the next would be longer.
Essentially, my basic point is that identity as you seem to be defining it is an illusion. As long as the correlates of that illusion are preserved by the transporter, what comes out the other end can still be said to be 'you' by any reasonable perspective and in exactly the same sense as the thing that went in.

One interesting thought:
My point is that the prosess of reducing someone into information in the transporter by deconstructing them down to the atoms they are made of is basicly the same as to vaporaze them with, lets say a phaser, just that a copy is being reconstructed aferwards. But if it doesn't matter wether it is a copy or not as long as the one that comes out is completely similar to the one that was destroyed(which would imply that, if the transported person were not destroyed, that he or she and the copy would both be the same individual), then the same principle can be used to bring someone back to life if they die or are being killed. You only need to have information about their "pattern" stored somewhere.
Why did no one think of that when lt. Tasha Yar died(Link: Star Trek: The Next Generation [TNG]: Season 1 Episode 23 - Skin Of Evil)

_________________
Reality is an illusion.
[Image removed because it was getting annoying]
This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
Soul is irrelevant here. The point is that the brain is being disintegrated, and what comes out is not the same brain, but just a copy.
And all of the cells in your own brain are replaced in a matter of years. So what? Memory is what's important to define identity, not any sort of cellular temporal continuity. Given the rate at which neurons fire and just the general way things tend to work, I'd be highly surprised if 'consciousness' were truly continuous anyway, and if your consciousness is composed of discrete units (which you wouldn't notice, as in each instant you remember the previous instants), there's really no reason to view one mind with a given set of properties as being any different from any other with the same properties. Just have to figure out which properties are important to preserve when you unmake a mind and put it back together.
UNLESS, of course, there's some sort of immaterial soul which you have no way to reproduce and no way to manipulate in order to ensure that it gets carried over. Hence my earlier comment.
If I had been teleported that way, then the duplicat would have been similar to me, but he would not have been me, just like that Thomas Riker is not William Riker.
Link: Star Trek: The Next Generation Season 6 Episode 24 - Second Chances
How are you defining 'you'?
As me.
Or, as an attempt to explain what I mean in a clearer way...
Let's say that you have a candle, and that you blow out the flame, and then ignite the candle again. Is that flame the same flame as the first. No, it is just similar.
If I was transported, then my consciousness would have been destroyd with my body, and a new one would have been created. The new consciousness would have my knowledge, personality and experience, but he would be another entity, another physical object.
It can be compared with that the hologram of a dead person is not the person(links: Red Dwarf: Season 1 Episode 1-The End, Red Dwarf: Season 8 Episode 1-Back in the Red(1)), or that the clone of dr. Carson Beckett is not the exacly same person as the original Carson Beckett (Links: Stargate Atlantis: Season 3 Episode 17-Sunday, Stargate Atlantis: Season 4 Episode 18 - The Kindred (1), Stargate Atlantis: Season 4 Episode 19 - The Kindred (2)), or...or that John Smith is not the same induvidual as The Doctor(Links: Doctor Who (2005): Season 6 Episode 5 - The Rebel Flesh (1), Doctor Who (2005): Season 6 Episode 6 - The Almost People (2)).
John Smith has The Doctor's intelligence, personality, bravery and moral, but they are two different objects.
The only way that I can see that would mean that the person that goes into the transporter would be the same as the one that comes out, would be if it existed something like a soul, and if that was transported over to the new body.
Why are you viewing consciousness as some sort of singular continuous phenomenon? Unless the soul exists, that seems a rather absurd interpretation. It seems much more probable, as I mentioned in an earlier quoted response, that consciousness exists as a series of discrete 'units'. In which case, your consciousness is ALREADY being 'destroyed' and replaced, moment by moment, and one could even go further as to say that most of the time you're not conscious (but since you're not aware of the time you're not conscious, it seems to you that you're conscious all of the time). There would be nothing fundamentally different between this and what you're describing as happening in a transporter, except that the time gap between one moment of consciousness and the next would be longer.
Essentially, my basic point is that identity as you seem to be defining it is an illusion. As long as the correlates of that illusion are preserved by the transporter, what comes out the other end can still be said to be 'you' by any reasonable perspective and in exactly the same sense as the thing that went in.

One interesting thought:
My point is that the prosess of reducing someone into information in the transporter by deconstructing them down to the atoms they are made of is basicly the same as to vaporaze them with, lets say a phaser, just that a copy is being reconstructed aferwards. But if it doesn't matter wether it is a copy or not as long as the one that comes out is completely similar to the one that was destroyed(which would imply that, if the transported person were not destroyed, that he or she and the copy would both be the same individual), then the same principle can be used to bring someone back to life if they die or are being killed. You only need to have information about their "pattern" stored somewhere.
Why did no one think of that when lt. Tasha Yar died(Link: Star Trek: The Next Generation [TNG]: Season 1 Episode 23 - Skin Of Evil)

I think Star Trek is rife with examples of technology having its potential wasted, ignored or forgotten about.

[Image removed because it was getting annoying]
This argument only works if you assume that there is some sort of 'soul' that is lost in the process. Personally, I think it's rubbish.
Soul is irrelevant here. The point is that the brain is being disintegrated, and what comes out is not the same brain, but just a copy.
And all of the cells in your own brain are replaced in a matter of years. So what? Memory is what's important to define identity, not any sort of cellular temporal continuity. Given the rate at which neurons fire and just the general way things tend to work, I'd be highly surprised if 'consciousness' were truly continuous anyway, and if your consciousness is composed of discrete units (which you wouldn't notice, as in each instant you remember the previous instants), there's really no reason to view one mind with a given set of properties as being any different from any other with the same properties. Just have to figure out which properties are important to preserve when you unmake a mind and put it back together.
UNLESS, of course, there's some sort of immaterial soul which you have no way to reproduce and no way to manipulate in order to ensure that it gets carried over. Hence my earlier comment.
If I had been teleported that way, then the duplicat would have been similar to me, but he would not have been me, just like that Thomas Riker is not William Riker.
Link: Star Trek: The Next Generation Season 6 Episode 24 - Second Chances
How are you defining 'you'?
As me.
Or, as an attempt to explain what I mean in a clearer way...
Let's say that you have a candle, and that you blow out the flame, and then ignite the candle again. Is that flame the same flame as the first. No, it is just similar.
If I was transported, then my consciousness would have been destroyd with my body, and a new one would have been created. The new consciousness would have my knowledge, personality and experience, but he would be another entity, another physical object.
It can be compared with that the hologram of a dead person is not the person(links: Red Dwarf: Season 1 Episode 1-The End, Red Dwarf: Season 8 Episode 1-Back in the Red(1)), or that the clone of dr. Carson Beckett is not the exacly same person as the original Carson Beckett (Links: Stargate Atlantis: Season 3 Episode 17-Sunday, Stargate Atlantis: Season 4 Episode 18 - The Kindred (1), Stargate Atlantis: Season 4 Episode 19 - The Kindred (2)), or...or that John Smith is not the same induvidual as The Doctor(Links: Doctor Who (2005): Season 6 Episode 5 - The Rebel Flesh (1), Doctor Who (2005): Season 6 Episode 6 - The Almost People (2)).
John Smith has The Doctor's intelligence, personality, bravery and moral, but they are two different objects.
The only way that I can see that would mean that the person that goes into the transporter would be the same as the one that comes out, would be if it existed something like a soul, and if that was transported over to the new body.
Why are you viewing consciousness as some sort of singular continuous phenomenon? Unless the soul exists, that seems a rather absurd interpretation. It seems much more probable, as I mentioned in an earlier quoted response, that consciousness exists as a series of discrete 'units'. In which case, your consciousness is ALREADY being 'destroyed' and replaced, moment by moment, and one could even go further as to say that most of the time you're not conscious (but since you're not aware of the time you're not conscious, it seems to you that you're conscious all of the time). There would be nothing fundamentally different between this and what you're describing as happening in a transporter, except that the time gap between one moment of consciousness and the next would be longer.
Essentially, my basic point is that identity as you seem to be defining it is an illusion. As long as the correlates of that illusion are preserved by the transporter, what comes out the other end can still be said to be 'you' by any reasonable perspective and in exactly the same sense as the thing that went in.

One interesting thought:
My point is that the prosess of reducing someone into information in the transporter by deconstructing them down to the atoms they are made of is basicly the same as to vaporaze them with, lets say a phaser, just that a copy is being reconstructed aferwards. But if it doesn't matter wether it is a copy or not as long as the one that comes out is completely similar to the one that was destroyed(which would imply that, if the transported person were not destroyed, that he or she and the copy would both be the same individual), then the same principle can be used to bring someone back to life if they die or are being killed. You only need to have information about their "pattern" stored somewhere.
Why did no one think of that when lt. Tasha Yar died(Link: Star Trek: The Next Generation [TNG]: Season 1 Episode 23 - Skin Of Evil)

I think Star Trek is rife with examples of technology having its potential wasted, ignored or forgotten about.

I agree.
I mentioned earlier in this thread that a real warpdrive(aka Alcubierre drive) would have the potential of destroying an entire starsystem. If it had been an evil version of me in the Star Trek universe, then the Borg and the Romulans would have been the last thing the Federation would have to worry about.
_________________
Reality is an illusion.
Perhaps your faster aliens have found other solutions - Alcubierre's drive works at 10c. That means that if Gliese 667c does indeed host life-bearing planets in its Goldilocks zone, it would still take 2.2 years to get there. The faster aliens might have a drive that goes faster, similar to the difference in Niven's Known Space stories between the standard FTL drive (three days per lightyear, no more, no less) and the Quantum II drive developed by the puppeteers (one lightyear every hour and fifteen minutes - the puppeteers themselves never flew it, because they're, ah, famously prudent).
Alcubierres's work is speculation based on what is mathematically possible. There is not a gram of real physical evidence that supports it.
ruveyn
^ This.
People can talk speculation all that they want, but even maths are pointless without a proper demonstration of what they model.
That's why NASA has built a testbed to see if they can use the negative energy generated by the Casimir effect to create a microscopic Alcubierre-White warp. If that can be done, then the math describes something real. If not, then it doesn't.
For the purposes of the story in the OP, though, we can safely assume that one of the FTL methods is based on Alcubierre and White having been correct.
As for the transporter "destruction" concept, I quote Mr. Spock (on another matter, but still applicable, I think): "A difference that makes no difference is no difference."
_________________
Sodium is a metal that reacts explosively when exposed to water. Chlorine is a gas that'll kill you dead in moments. Together they make my fries taste good.