Will the Right Eventually Openly Dump the Constitution?
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
I would say a charity qualifies as serving the general public.
Read the Act.
Not one title addresses private charities. At most, Title VI could apply IF that charity accepts federal funding....and even then it might be limited to programs that federal funding pays for.
I said, "I would say a charity qualifies as serving the general public" although I suppose I should have said as accommodating the public, see title 2. Although yes title 6 would apply if the charity was taking federal funds, that wasn't the argument I was making.
EDIT: My argument is largely based upon private charities usually operating some kind of day care or community center as well as other operations that could be interpreted as 'public accommodations'
Again, read the act.
Title II only applies to stuff serving the general public if it is in the stream of interstate commerce. A day care is not. Now, there's nothing saying a state law could not impose legal duties on a charity, but that would only be so within a state.
I did it applies to any organization engaging in interstate commerce that also serves the general public, which most large charities do. The services themselves do not have to cross state borders for the organization(and the services) to fall under the act.(Although if they import any equipment from out of state they would fall under the act by virtue of that as well.)
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You also need to recognize that when I endorse a charity "discriminating" I'm talking about the power to say yea/nay on giving benefits on purely subjective judgment rather than needing to "prove" someone isn't eligible for help...letting the case manager follow their gut instinct if someone asking for help is scamming the charity versus having legitimate needs. Government-run charities aren't allowed to do this, and scammers can exploit it.
They can, no private organization is required to prove anything to deny charity to someone, if the person takes them to court they may have to defend themselves but they aren't likely to suffer if no evidence of illegal discrimination is present. When you say government run charities are you referring to welfare or subsidized private charities?
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As a rule, most private charities do not discriminate on the basis of race/color/creed, but legally they are allowed to give aid to whomever they wish, even if it's exclusive to a given race, nationality, color, gender, etc.
See the above.
ikorack wrote:
I did it applies to any organization engaging in interstate commerce that also serves the general public, which most large charities do. The services themselves do not have to cross state borders for the organization(and the services) to fall under the act.(Although if they import any equipment from out of state they would fall under the act by virtue of that as well.)
That is a way overbroad interpretation of the commerce clause.
A charity MUST PROVIDE SERVICE ACROSS STATE LINES.
The Red Cross might have to worry about Title II if it acts on a national level with a charity program. If a local charity is Red Cross affiliated but gets local funding, Title II may not apply because they have only a national affiliation, not national funding.
A local charity DOES NOT fall under the commerce clause purely because they obtain goods or services for administrative operations across state lines. A local charity may fall under the commerce clause if they render aid to people outside their own state.
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
I did it applies to any organization engaging in interstate commerce that also serves the general public, which most large charities do. The services themselves do not have to cross state borders for the organization(and the services) to fall under the act.(Although if they import any equipment from out of state they would fall under the act by virtue of that as well.)
That is a way overbroad interpretation of the commerce clause.
A charity MUST PROVIDE SERVICE ACROSS STATE LINES.
No my interpretation is fine, title two never states that it must provide services across state lines, it simply says it must engage in interstate commerce and qualify as a public accommodation they are two separate conditions and can be met seperately, this would also include taking donations from out of state citizens.
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The Red Cross might have to worry about Title II if it acts on a national level with a charity program. If a local charity is Red Cross affiliated but gets local funding, Title II may not apply because they have only a national affiliation, not national funding.
A national affiliation would be enough, assuming the mix themselves economically with their affiliates(which is a safe bet).
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A local charity DOES NOT fall under the commerce clause purely because they obtain goods or services for administrative operations across state lines. A local charity may fall under the commerce clause if they render aid to people outside their own state.
If they buy from out of state they have engaged in interstate commerce and thus fall under the second title to claim otherwise is silly. The act makes no distinction between doling out money and making a purchase, it says commerce, buying or selling anything(or taking donations from) across state lines would put an organization under the second title.
ikorack wrote:
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
I did it applies to any organization engaging in interstate commerce that also serves the general public, which most large charities do. The services themselves do not have to cross state borders for the organization(and the services) to fall under the act.(Although if they import any equipment from out of state they would fall under the act by virtue of that as well.)
That is a way overbroad interpretation of the commerce clause.
A charity MUST PROVIDE SERVICE ACROSS STATE LINES.
No my interpretation is fine, title two never states that it must provide services across state lines, it simply says it must engage in interstate commerce and qualify as a public accommodation they are two separate conditions and can be met seperately, this would also include taking donations from out of state citizens.
Go to law school for 3 years and get back to me on this.
Perhaps accepting donations from outside a state MIGHT make an argument, but International Shoe really places the burden of "interstate commerce" on a person or business acting across state lines.
The level to which you want "interstate commerce" to apply here is pretty much unconsitutional. Buying something on the internet does not subject me to federal laws regarding interstate commerce, but it does subject the shipper. The burden is on the merchant, not the customer.
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
I did it applies to any organization engaging in interstate commerce that also serves the general public, which most large charities do. The services themselves do not have to cross state borders for the organization(and the services) to fall under the act.(Although if they import any equipment from out of state they would fall under the act by virtue of that as well.)
That is a way overbroad interpretation of the commerce clause.
A charity MUST PROVIDE SERVICE ACROSS STATE LINES.
No my interpretation is fine, title two never states that it must provide services across state lines, it simply says it must engage in interstate commerce and qualify as a public accommodation they are two separate conditions and can be met seperately, this would also include taking donations from out of state citizens.
Go to law school for 3 years and get back to me on this.
Perhaps accepting donations from outside a state MIGHT make an argument, but International Shoe really places the burden of "interstate commerce" on a person or business acting across state lines.
The level to which you want "interstate commerce" to apply here is pretty much unconsitutional. Buying something on the internet does not subject me to federal laws regarding interstate commerce, but it does subject the shipper. The burden is on the merchant, not the customer.
Oh because your a law professor? You have no right to complain about my credentials unless you possess relevant credentials yourself. Buying from out of state is participating in interstate commerce, your resources go to a different state and you receive product from out of state, how is that overreaching? And why would the customer be immune to interstate law, it usually takes more than one party to participate in commerce. If most regulations only apply to the merchant that is the federal governments self imposed limit, its perfectly within their rights. Also this doesn't really have anything to do with the constitution, assuming this law is constitutional, my claims fit.
ikorack wrote:
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
I did it applies to any organization engaging in interstate commerce that also serves the general public, which most large charities do. The services themselves do not have to cross state borders for the organization(and the services) to fall under the act.(Although if they import any equipment from out of state they would fall under the act by virtue of that as well.)
That is a way overbroad interpretation of the commerce clause.
A charity MUST PROVIDE SERVICE ACROSS STATE LINES.
No my interpretation is fine, title two never states that it must provide services across state lines, it simply says it must engage in interstate commerce and qualify as a public accommodation they are two separate conditions and can be met seperately, this would also include taking donations from out of state citizens.
Go to law school for 3 years and get back to me on this.
Perhaps accepting donations from outside a state MIGHT make an argument, but International Shoe really places the burden of "interstate commerce" on a person or business acting across state lines.
The level to which you want "interstate commerce" to apply here is pretty much unconsitutional. Buying something on the internet does not subject me to federal laws regarding interstate commerce, but it does subject the shipper. The burden is on the merchant, not the customer.
Oh because your a law professor? You have no right to complain about my credentials unless you possess relevant credentials yourself. Buying from out of state is participating in interstate commerce, your resources go to a different state and you receive product from out of state, how is that overreaching? And why would the customer be immune to interstate law, it usually takes more than one party to participate in commerce. If most regulations only apply to the merchant that is the federal governments self imposed limit, its perfectly within their rights. Also this doesn't really have anything to do with the constitution, assuming this law is constitutional, my claims fit.
There is a vast difference between participating in interstate commerce and INJECTING yourself into it.
A merchant INJECTS. The merchant want's a broader customer base and therefore goes across state lines to find more customers. Most every regulatory matter the government has based on the commerce clause is impacted on the merchant, not the customer. The customer, at most, is effected by some items not being allowed for sale across state lines or perhaps subject to a tax matter, but all of that is handled by the MERCHANT, not the customer. The customer only sends money and a delivery address.
Simply buying something from another state does not subject me directly to government regulation under the commerce clause.
ikorack wrote:
Yes it does, participation is all that is required for the commerce clause to apply, your separation of the activities under the term 'injects' is meaningless semantics your argument has no support in any law or court, wheres mine is based on all apparent definitions.
Have you been to law school?
Do you practice law?
You're making a broad assertion about things that defy the de facto practice in America. You're arguing theory, not practice or application.
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
Yes it does, participation is all that is required for the commerce clause to apply, your separation of the activities under the term 'injects' is meaningless semantics your argument has no support in any law or court, wheres mine is based on all apparent definitions.
Have you been to law school?
Do you practice law?
You're making a broad assertion about things that defy the de facto practice in America. You're arguing theory, not practice or application.
You should also ask which are of law did he go into, because even lawyers are specialized in certain areas.
Anyways, I took a Constitutional History Class and really Obamacare is the first situation that the Commerce Clause has been extended to this level.
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
Yes it does, participation is all that is required for the commerce clause to apply, your separation of the activities under the term 'injects' is meaningless semantics your argument has no support in any law or court, wheres mine is based on all apparent definitions.
Have you been to law school?
Do you practice law?
You're making a broad assertion about things that defy the de facto practice in America. You're arguing theory, not practice or application.
Have you been to law school?
Do you practice law? You have no right to question my credentials if you possess none yourself.
Just because it has been practiced in one way does not mean it is explicitly limited in said way, there is no wording in the commerce clause that would imply customers do not fall under it's statements. The assertion may be broad but the only thing that could arguably contradict it isn't a matter of what the law says but a matter of how it has been applied. The only arguments you have made towards this argument are my credentials which you have no authority to question as you do not know law yourself(If it bothers you that much I'm sure we have a lawyer somewhere around here, go PM them and ask them to chime in) and that it has only been applied in one way, which does not negate any powers arguably given by the law.
Inuyasha wrote:
zer0netgain wrote:
ikorack wrote:
Yes it does, participation is all that is required for the commerce clause to apply, your separation of the activities under the term 'injects' is meaningless semantics your argument has no support in any law or court, wheres mine is based on all apparent definitions.
Have you been to law school?
Do you practice law?
You're making a broad assertion about things that defy the de facto practice in America. You're arguing theory, not practice or application.
You should also ask which are of law did he go into, because even lawyers are specialized in certain areas.
Anyways, I took a Constitutional History Class and really Obamacare is the first situation that the Commerce Clause has been extended to this level.
Idiocy, His extension is based on inactivity mine is not.
ikorack wrote:
Have you been to law school?
Do you practice law? You have no right to question my credentials if you possess none yourself.
Just because it has been practiced in one way does not mean it is explicitly limited in said way, there is no wording in the commerce clause that would imply customers do not fall under it's statements. The assertion may be broad but the only thing that could arguably contradict it isn't a matter of what the law says but a matter of how it has been applied. The only arguments you have made towards this argument are my credentials which you have no authority to question as you do not know law yourself(If it bothers you that much I'm sure we have a lawyer somewhere around here, go PM them and ask them to chime in) and that it has only been applied in one way, which does not negate any powers arguably given by the law.
Do you practice law? You have no right to question my credentials if you possess none yourself.
Just because it has been practiced in one way does not mean it is explicitly limited in said way, there is no wording in the commerce clause that would imply customers do not fall under it's statements. The assertion may be broad but the only thing that could arguably contradict it isn't a matter of what the law says but a matter of how it has been applied. The only arguments you have made towards this argument are my credentials which you have no authority to question as you do not know law yourself(If it bothers you that much I'm sure we have a lawyer somewhere around here, go PM them and ask them to chime in) and that it has only been applied in one way, which does not negate any powers arguably given by the law.
I was wrong to presume you follow enough threads on WP to know this about me.
YES. I graduated from law school.
NO. I chose not to practice law.
I can tell you that the purpose of the commerce clause and the concept of "interstate commerce" does not extend as far as you wish to extend it purely based on what appears to be theoretical interpretation of the language itself.
The courts have consistently defined how far the commerce clause can be pushed, and we are seeing that boundary being challenged yet again with "Obamacare."
The government wants to say that your choosing NOT to buy a product affects interstate commerce and can be regulated (as was the rationalization with Wickard v. Filburn...a farmer grew more than his allotted allowance of wheat for his own consumption, and the federal government argued that by taking himself out of the stream of commerce via self-sufficiency, he was impacting interstate commerce and therefore could be regulated by federal law). Many legal scholars criticize this ruling by the US Supreme Court as a grossly over broad interpretation of the commerce clause and it has been the crux for a massive expansion in federal government power and intervention/interference in everyday lives of people and entities not overtly acting in interstate commerce.
The International Shoe Co. v. Washington case of 1945 is the benchmark of a foreign entity being subject to the local jurisdiction of a state court via "minimum contacts." International Shoe Co. was a Delaware corporation with its principle place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. It had no offices in the state of Washington and made no contracts for sale there. It did not keep merchandise in Washington and did not make deliveries of goods in intrastate commerce originating from the state. It did employ 11-13 salesmen for three years who resided in Washington, and their commissions each year totaled more than $31,000 without accounting for reimbursed expenses. Prices, terms, and acceptance or rejection of footwear orders were established through St. Louis as salesmen did not have authority to make contracts or collections.
International Shoe was sued to recover unpaid contributions to the unemployment compensation fund. The courts ruled that the activities carried on by the corporation in Washington (through it's salesmen) were systematic and continuous rather than irregular or casual. They got the benefits and protection of the laws of the state and therefore is subject to the state's jurisdiction.
I.S. determines "minimum contacts" for personal jurisdiction to local courts. Wickard says choosing NOT to buy something from the marketplace is in and of itself impacting interstate commerce. These rulings are fundamentally opposed.
Just as Plessy v. Ferguson of 1896 established legal segregation and "separate but equal"/Jim Crow Laws, a later court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954 (58 years later) reversed that ruling with the argument that "separate is inherently unequal."
Wickard is not rock-solid rule of law. It is an aberration that goes against the plain understanding and intent backing the wording of the Constitution as a whole document and the Commerce Clause in particular.
Now, you want to say that mere national affiliation or the purchase of goods and services from a vendor across state lines constitutes the authority to force a charity to submit to federal regulation under the Civil Rights Act. I disagree.
Under International Shoe, you do not have anything that constitutes "minimum contacts." Indeed, I don't know of any case where the CUSTOMER was pulled into the jurisdiction of a foreign court for having made a purchase in a state...at least, not in any regulatory or civil matter. Passing a bad check would get you a criminal charge in a foreign state with the danger of domestic arrest and extradition, but if you want to sue a CUSTOMER over a civil dispute, you must go to their state of legal residence. In contrast, if you as a MERCHANT sell to someone in another state, you have to concern yourself about meeting "minimum contacts" and being force to appear in that state to defend against the claim. Likewise, with sufficient minimum contacts, you could have to concern yourself with applicable state regulations on business/transactions conducted within that state.
All the case history I know of puts the burden of regulatory compliance on the merchant, not the customer...absent having to pay any fees/taxes/etc. related to the purchase of the item/service that adds to the listed sale price.
More so, charities aren't in the stream of commerce. That they might buy a service or good for distribution to the needy isn't the same as what Wickard concerned. Additionally, providing service across state lines does not mean you are in the stream of commerce, although once a charity provides service in more than one state, they are careful to consider what federal law implications that may mean. Hence, a private charity that does not serve everyone on a basis such as race (e.g., The College Fund) might be compartmentalized into an association of local state entities operating within their own budget within their state but organized and regulated by a national committee.
Wickard dealt with quotas the government imposed on wheat production based on acreage owned by a farmer in order to drive up wheat prices during the Great Depression. The farmer was growing more than the limits permitted, and the government ordered him to destroy his crops and pay a fine, even though the excess production was for his own use and had no intention of selling it. The Court ruled that by his not buying wheat on the market, he was affecting interstate commerce and hence could be regulated....reasoning that if EVERYONE started doing it, the impact would be significant enough that government had a vested interest in stopping it from happening.
Again, many legal scholars find this line of reasoning to be sloppy at best. Clearly the political agenda of government fixing the supply/demand curve of a commodity by placing quotas on what one could grow was the real issue. You could grow X and sell it all but have to buy wheat back from the market at the market rate or grow X and sell only part of it so you get your wheat at cost. To fix prices, they had to deny people exceeding the quota. This was a farmer. Would Wickard apply to a person using 5 acres to grow fruits and vegetables for personal consumption/trading with neighbors? I highly doubt it, although in a post-Wickard era, the government could make such an argument that taking yourself out of the normal stream of commerce is, in and of itself, to affect interstate commerce, but that is a stretch of what Wickard addressed.
Hence why "Obamacare" will go to the US Supreme Court sooner or later. The issue of the government mandating that you buy something you do not want by virtue of your purely being alive strikes at the root of individual liberty. All prior government mandates run to the exercise of a choice you can choose to abstain from.
@ zer0netgain
Thanks for typing that up in detail.
@ ikorack
To summarize all the instances zer0netgain is bringing up involved or arguably involved voluntary acts that arguably affected interstate commerce.
The difference between those and Obamacare is that Obamacare penalizes someone for choosing not to participate in commerce to begin with, which an entirely different animal.
Inuyasha wrote:
The difference between those and Obamacare is that Obamacare penalizes someone for choosing not to participate in commerce to begin with, which an entirely different animal.
So what? People who don't donate to charities have to pay more in taxes. It is just a tax.
pandabear wrote:
Inuyasha wrote:
The difference between those and Obamacare is that Obamacare penalizes someone for choosing not to participate in commerce to begin with, which an entirely different animal.
So what? People who don't donate to charities have to pay more in taxes. It is just a tax.
Not according to the statute. Which is why the federal courts have decided that portion of the law is not constitutional. Since the democrats did not see fit to put a severance clause into the law, if any part of the law is unconstitutional, all of the law is constitutional. The final showdown will be in the Supreme Court.
ruveyn
pandabear wrote:
Inuyasha wrote:
The difference between those and Obamacare is that Obamacare penalizes someone for choosing not to participate in commerce to begin with, which an entirely different animal.
So what? People who don't donate to charities have to pay more in taxes. It is just a tax.
Indeed, the Obama minions tried to reason that in court, and it was fodder for the pundits. Obama promised it would not be a tax, and as such, to claim it as such in court goes against everything they said when selling the idea to Congress and the people. Which is ironic because if they said they would just tax people to pay for it (and it passed in that form), it would be constitutional...just even more unpopular.
Since the law says it's a "penalty," it becomes a commerce clause issue, not a taxation issue. Using the IRS to enforce a "penalty" is not convert a penalty into a tax.
I would like to point out this thread was recently dealing with charities being subject to federal regulation via the commerce clause, not Obamacare....just in case my last post muddied the water some.
