William Lane Craig's Teleological Argument

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To be clear, they would vary in assigned values for certain variables/constants. And because the probability of each universe would be 1 (given infinite chances), this one we're in was bound to exist and to lead to our existence.

The "less" or "more fine-tuned" objection would just be a red herring. There is no basis for "more or less fine-tuned". So I am free to reject it, arguing we could only live in one universe version, not any other. So the probability of me and you observing this universe, and not any other, would be 1.

Not true, but you have had that pointed out to you before, you just posting, many times. It is vastly more likely that we should be living in a less fine-tuned universe than what we presently do. I challenged you to discuss a constant that if more heavily tuned would produce a more liveable universe... It was a basic challenge to test if you had any clue about what you are discussing. There are however constants that can be changed that still permit life but are not nearly as comfortable to live in as our, such as smaller universes and one's with suns that burn out much faster. It is even more probable that we should be living in a universe the size of our solar system, fully formed, than it is that we should find ourselves in a universe like this one.

Back to Craig:
"Now a similar problem afflicts the contemporary appeal to the multiverse to explain away fine-tuning. Roger Penrose of Oxford University has calculated that the odds of our universe’s low entropy condition obtaining by chance alone are on the order of 1:1010(123), an inconceivable number. If our universe were but one member of a multiverse of randomly ordered worlds, then it is vastly more probable that we should be observing a much smaller universe. For example, the odds of our solar system’s being formed instantly by the random collision of particles is about 1:1010(60), a vast number, but inconceivably smaller than 1010(123). (Penrose calls it “utter chicken feed” by comparison [The Road to Reality (Knopf, 2005), pp. 762-5]). "

I agree. There is no basis for "more or less fine tuning" as a physical observer of our universe, and you and me have a probability of 1 to physically observe our universe.

However, the hypothesis of the infinite random universes is what creates a metaphysical basis. It is in the brain, human reason component where logical steps take place that a metaphysical basis is created such that given 1 out of infinite random universes, logically there would be different universes with varying levels of "accomodation" for humans.

The disagreement seems to be the physical observer vs the metaphysical observer that one would imagine per the multiverse hypothesis ? You use the probability of the physical observer, and Craig uses the probability of the metaphysical observer.

We couldn't exist in different universes because differences in causes lead to differences in effects.

Craig's assumption can be safely rejected because he's never established that we could somehow still exist as we are despite changes in our causes.

Ok. I finally understand.

You are arguing the "life is tuned to the universe" argument without using those words

"Life tuned to the universe" means the concept of "fined-tuned" is not meaningful, because the observer originates in that universe, so probablistically they could see not any other possible universe.

So you rely on the multiverse to show a random life-permitting universe, and then say per random life-permitting universe that "life is tuned to that universe", and thus, reject Craig's arguments that the universe must be fined-tuned to life on the basis that life originates and is tuned in a universe, so life would not expect to see any other universe.

I am not sure why the multiverse is necessary though, rather than using our single universe to show "life is tuned to the universe "?

Thanks.

The multiverse may, indeed, not be necessary. But remember, this is after all, an attempt to beat theists at their own game.

Because theists come up with all sorts of objections such as "why this universe in particular" and "the universe must be contingent" and "the laws of thermodynamics show that the universe must have had a beginning", the Singularitor is proposed to counter these objections.

In other words, just as God is their easy way out, I propose my own easy way out (the Singularitor) while also demonstrating why their God isn't an easy way out anyway as it raises much more questions than my proposition of the Singularitor does. And whatever issues the Singularitor may suffer from, God suffers just as much (and often even more).