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AG, IMO the best way to debate an apologist id to blast the sloppy definition in their arguments. There is no response from 91 my counterargument ...

Well this is proof that you are just debating in circles now AG. I already addressed the issue of a multiverse and the teleological and Kalam arguments. In relation to the teleological I mentioned that even if chance produced enough possible universes to account for the fine tuning of this universe it is far more likely that we would exist in one of the less finely tuned universes. Moreover, every multiverse theory I have ever read frames such universes within a certain number of dimensions. Should multiverse theory be correct then your argument would not be better off, since the new teleological evidence would be why should every possible universe have x number of dimensions.



No but you did criticize my response to the Penrose article.



Need is an interesting thing isn’t it? If you want to remove free will you will probably need more certainty than what you have put forward.

In relation to the existence of free will, I am dogmatic, consider it a choice.



A God that does not exist is not maximally great, so it would not exist in all possible worlds.



I have responded to this question previously. In answer to your question, it has to do with the concept of maximal greatness, being morally perfect is logically such a component of being maximally great. Please note that the opposite of a perfection is not perfection.

That's the essence of PPR though.

First define greatness. Then provide a way to compare greatness. Then prove that being maximal great is logically consistent (as opposed to maximal integer). Then define morally perfect, and prove that under such scale, maximal greatness implies morally perfect.

Well one need not do those things in order to define maximal greatness. In order to actually define maximal greatness one would most likely need to be maximally great. However, for the purposes of practicality it is only necessary to define maximal greatness as the highest possible being that one can conceive of: one that is maximally great in every 'great making' aspect and exists necessarily by its own existence. The argument for the need for God to be good is separate and hold that if objective morality exists then God would need to be moral in order to be maximally great. If objective morality existed and God was not moral then he would not be maximally great.

1) I don't remember seeing that argument about less finely tuned universes.
2) The argument doesn't seem to make sense. If you are arguing that fine tuning is necessary for life, then how could we end up in the less finely tuned universes? Our existence is contingent upon us being in a working universe. Even further, even if we were in a less finely tuned universe, how would we know?
3) I don't have a "multiverse theory". I just know that the idea exists. Heck, some interpretations of modal logic actually require a multiverse theory of some sort, by arguing that possible worlds actually all exist. As it stands, my major tactic in responding is just pointing out that your efforts to eliminate possibilities is not that powerful. (and if you fail to eliminate other possibilities well, then your argument fails, and if your argument fails then dysteleological arguments start having a very very large opening.)


I have personal experiences that all stand in favor of a view of mind that is very unlike what you likely think. That's pretty damn certain for me.


The issue is that existence isn't being taken as a predicate in the argument, 91. Existence as a predicate is a feature in Anselm, not Plantinga. Plantinga tried to avoid that following Kant's rebuttal to it.


Right, and that theology has problems unless one can uphold divine simplicity. The issue with divine simplicity is that it will not brook differences between parts of God, which requires things such as God's mercy being His justice, and if such things are denied, then we have to say that God is not his essence, but rather that God has attributes. Once we say that, all of the moral ideas you have put forward end up collapsing.

Last edited by Awesomelyglorious on 14 Dec 2010, 8:37 am, edited 1 time in total.

Problem:
If God defines morality, then we cannot judge the greatness of God on moral grounds. This gets back into the argument about divine simplicity. If divine simplicity does not work, then the argument about "great-making qualities" also fails, as morality would then be indeterminate as an arbitrary thing if God is the only grounds for it.

Additionally: The direction you appear to go is more Anselmian than Plantingan. Plantinga is arguing from modal logic. Anselm is the one who holds that God exists necessarily due to his being the greatest conceivable being. Anselm, of course, has all of the parodies (Gaunillo's island and onward), as well as the claim that his argument fails as existence is not a predicate.

This is kind of the issue we are dealing with since we have been going at this for such a long time. It is on page six of the threat ‘taking the fight to the real issue’. I have pretty much dealt with most of what you are stating here.



In relation to the first part, the sum of the fine tuning is necessary for the existence of the universe not collapsing on itself. Elements of the argument relate to life, atomic structure and many other factors. Some of the factors relate only to the existence of life, so we could exist in a less finely tuned life and still exist as we do. As to how would we know, we have a fairly good grasp of many of the effects of altering some of the fine tuning elements. Actually a good deal of the work on the subject was done by Penrose, he has been fighting the effects of that research ever since. He stated that if the many worlds hypothesis was correct then it would be far more likely that our universe be one of those universes than the one we exist in.



Page 6 ‘Taking the fight to the real issue’

‘Hawking and Mlodinow also appeal to M-Theory or superstring theory to generate the World Ensemble of universes exhibiting various values for the constants of nature. Such a speculation is problematic in a number of ways which they do not discuss. First, the “cosmic landscape” of 10500 different possible universes consistent with nature’s laws which M-Theory allows are just that: possibilities. They are not real worlds, anymore than are Feynman’s histories. Second, it’s not clear that 10500 possibilities are sufficient to guarantee the existence of finely tuned universes in the landscape. What if the probability of fine tuning is less than 1:10500? This may be especially problematic concerning the arbitrary initial conditions. Finally, does the multiverse itself described by M-Theory exhibit fine-tuning? If it does, then the problem has only been pushed back a notch. It seems that it does, for as Hawking and Mlodinow note, M-Theory requires precisely eleven dimensions if it is to be viable, and yet the theory cannot account for why just that number of dimensions should exist. ‘



I am not using the argument in the way you are thinking. I am paraphrasing the argument of Mark Strasser who defends Plantinga’s argument.

‘If we say "There is no maximally great being" in some possible world, this is not ture obviously if it is true that there can be such a being in some possible world, because if there is than there must be one in all possible words, since that is what Maximal greatness is; necessary being. IF it is possible for God to exist than God must exist! ‘



I have already explained my view of divine simplicity is a bit different than the one your are using. I tend to prefer the newer definition of divine simplicity which states that God’s nature must be simple but not his existence. Justice and Mercy are expressions of God’s existence not his nature as is Gods conciseness. His properties such as moral goodness exist as part of his essence, how God expresses those values need not be simple. The argument against the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity is both as you have put it and as put forward by Plantinga; that if God is just his properties, then he is merely a property.

As to your statement in the second post, I hold to the Plantinga view of divine simplicity.

Your position is simply a restatement of the same dilemma. It can be disprove by simply stating that Objective Morality exists because God is good. Once this is put forward as a reasonable contention then it does not need to be proven, it has already show the dilemma to be false. What makes them good rather than arbitrary when they are part of Gods nature is simply that they are good. It could not be any other way, in any other world and is therefor not arbitrary.

You obviously don't know how to make a rigorous argument.


I cannot conceive any objective measure of greatness that has non trivial maximum (i.e. one doesn't arrive at conclusions like the rock a the front of my house is maximally great). I don't believe you can conceive one despite what you claim. Even if you can, the existence of a maximally great being in your limited subset does not imply the existence of universally maximally great being.


I don't believe objective morality.

That had been debunked in page 6. Your 'condition for life' only refers to life as we know. It is clear that God can make us live in ANY universe.

Well no, you are making the exact opposite error that was made by AG. AG questioned how if the teleological argument relates to the universe itself how can it relate to life at all. I explained that elements of the teleological argument deal with factors that affect life, not just the universe. The mistake you are making is the opposite; stating that the teleological argument deals only with factors that relate to life. Both points ignore the fact that the argument makes both cases.




Actually St. Thomas Aquinas made this his fourth argument for the existence of God. I do not think it is his best though. I have also made more than the argument you are disputing.

Aquinas' Fourth Argument, Properties That Come in Degrees
(1) Objects have properties to greater or lesser extents.
(2) If an object has a property to a lesser extent, then there exists some other object that has the property to the maximum possible degree.
(3) So there is an entity that has all properties to the maximum possible degree.
(4) Hence God exists.



I do not think this is the best case for your world view.

this thread is made 95% of "Curtier's replies".

The more you learn.

Ok, I read, and I didn't see that argument. You stated:
"it is far more likely that we would exist in one of the less finely tuned universes."

However, I wasn't aware that you were admitting to less finely tuned universes that human beings could exist in.


I get what you are saying,


And I don't really find abstract physics credible..... which kind of does nothing. Especially since the abstract physics isn't in relationship to the abstract metaphysics I was referring to by pointing out the example of modal realism. I mean... you're trying to establish an argument for an extraordinary thing by using very poor evidence (cosmological speculation), and even further, it still isn't very convincing because of the ad hocness of a God hypothesis. It only makes sense within a system of thinking, and most characteristics of that system of thinking I've expressed deep and abiding skepticism towards.


I may have misinterpreted your statement "A God that does not exist is not maximally great, so it would not exist in all possible worlds.", as I did leap on the parallel.


If it is possible for God not to exist, then then God must not exist.

You don't seem to realize that the inverse of the argument is true, and that's kind of been my point from the beginning. An atheist and a theist can both start with the (im)possibility of God and arrive at different conclusions. Given that I have no commitment to the internal consistency of God, or anything like that, I really do not feel committed to the argument. Also, given that I tend to see ontological arguments as all vulnerable to parody, I don't buy the category of argument.

After all if we say "There is some maximally great being" in some possible world, this is not true if it is true that there can be no such being in some possible world. Because if there is a maximally great being, then there must be one in all possible worlds. IF it is possible for God not to exist, then God must not exist.

Do you finally understand that basic argument I've been driving at despite your continued point that I had just "misunderstood things"?


In everything I have read, Alvin Plantinga is considered to deny divine simplicity. Instead, he upholds divine personhood, which is unlike simplicity. Christian philosopher Edward Feser addresses the issue here:

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/09 ... heism.html

Plantinga, however, is usually associated with the strongest criticisms of divine simplicity and I have never seen him lumped together with believers of divine simplicity.

You'll also have to explain what you mean by "nature vs existence". I don't know what is meant by an "expression of X's existence" either. Existence is a brute fact, either something exists or it doesn't, it isn't a property which can be expressed.


Well, right, you have to have divine simplicity, I still continue to reject it.

I wish I could agree with you, just to find some middle ground and I think I do see where you are coming from. However the mere possibility of God not existing is not enough to fulfill the ontological argument simply due to the fact that if it is possible for him to exist, then he does. When you run the possibility of God not existing that is a logically legitimate statement. However, when you then make the case that therefore he does not exist in some possible world you break the rules of logic, since if God does exist, he exists in all possible worlds (which is kind of the point of the argument). When dealing with maximal greatness one thing cannot be true in one world and not true in another. When arguing the positive ontological argument this reality is factored into the modal logic, when arguing the negative it becomes a issue that disqualifies the argument.

.

Plantinga’s form of divine simplicity is often referred to as being in opposition to the subject. This is not the case when it is viewed from the outside. Plantinga did distinguish between essence and existence but held that the essence is simple but there was no reason to think that the existence must also be such. The classical view of divine simplicity has been attacked by modern Christian philosophy but it has been replaced by the concept of devine personhood or depending on where you read it, as weak divine simplicity.

Possibility has very little to do with probability. There is nothing impossible for the unicorn to exist but it does not.

A horselike animal with a single horn could probably be genetically designed by gene modification. But a horse with a single horn AND magical powers is impossible.

ruveyn