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You may have a high opinion of unicorns but I don't think they qualify as maximally great.

Maximally great is a meaningless term.

What you don't believe that things have properties and that such properties exist to a greater or lesser extent?

Specifically, perhaps in some properties. In general, no. There is no general maximality that can be contained in one object. Nothing can be maximum sweet and maximum sour at the same time. I am tempted that the concept of God is maximum stupid but, of course, that is theoretical.

Actually, you did not not prove 1) and 2).

For 2), you only explained why you consider physical necessity or chance bad explanations for fine tuning. However, the real problem is: how does design compares with the other two? Here, I claim that design is no better than the other two.

The design hypothesis asserts the constants are set for a purpose, namely:


The problem with the quote is, if the purpose is just to create life, there are still many possible world for god to choose (for example, the heaven clearly does not follow the laws of physics as we know). So the hypothesis merely pushes the question to whether god decided to create our universe by necessity, chance, or design of a super god.

For 1) having the universe with other constants is just a logical possibility, and in view of 2) the only sensible conclusion is to admit we don't know enough about our universe.

@01001011

The only way you can get through the argument from chance is by putting forward a position that is dependent multiverse theory.

That then falls under the problem put forward by Roger Penrose in his work ‘The Road to Reality’ Pg 762-5 namely; He calculates that it is inconceivably more probable that our solar system should suddenly form by the random collision of particles than that a finely-tuned universe should exist. (Penrose calls it “utter chicken feed” by comparison.) So if our universe were just a random member of a World Ensemble, it is incalculably more probable that we should be observing an orderly universe no larger than our solar system. Or again, if our universe were just a random member of a World

Ensemble, then we ought to be observing highly extraordinary events, like horses’ popping into and out of existence by random collisions, or perpetual motion machines, since such things are vastly more probable than all of nature’s constants and quantities’ falling by chance into the virtually infinitesimal life-permitting range. Observable universes like those are simply much more plenteous in the World Ensemble than worlds like ours and, therefore, we would most likely exist within one of those. We do not have such observations, which strongly disconfirms the multiverse hypothesis or the possibility that our place in such a multiverse is due to random chance.

As to the issue of necessity, not even Richard Dawkins will go anywhere near that. In his book ‘The God Delusion’ he attempts to use the multiverse as an escape hatch into chance (encountering all of the problems I just put forward in the last paragraph; and more). In the same book he also discounts possibility of necessity (Page 144 of the God Delusion).

As to your conclusions. The first is actually part of my argument, other universes based on the same laws are more common and as to the second, sure we don’t know enough to reach an absolute conclusion. That being the case, your argument rests on the possibility that evidence might emerge that undermines the present evidence on display. Essentially as an atheist you would have to have faith that atheism is true.


@Sand

Agreed in relation to sweet and sour, however, there is nothing logically contradictory about a being that is timeless, eternal, omnipotent, morally perfect and omnipresent.

Well, the problem is that the mere possibility of God not existing is sufficient to rebut the ontological argument. Because if it is possible for God not to exist, then he doesn't.

Actually..... it is not illegitimate. Possible worlds are merely logically possible worlds. So, if it is logically possible that God does not exist, then God does not exist in some possible world. If God does not exist in some possible world, and God, if he exists, must exist in all possible worlds, then God must not exist. I think you fail to recognize that this is just turning your modus ponens into a modus tollens.

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Plantinga’s form of divine simplicity is often referred to as being in opposition to the subject. This is not the case when it is viewed from the outside. Plantinga did distinguish between essence and existence but held that the essence is simple but there was no reason to think that the existence must also be such. The classical view of divine simplicity has been attacked by modern Christian philosophy but it has been replaced by the concept of devine personhood or depending on where you read it, as weak divine simplicity.[/quote]
Right, and the concept of simple existence but complex essence is lost on me. I really have a difficult time separating the two concepts in the manner that would legitimize your position.

I think we have reached an impasse in regards to this argument, since I do not expect you to be any less stubborn on the matter than myself. We have both made our case on the matter many times. I am prepared to leave it at this, and stand on my previous statement, that the negative cannot be extrapolated in the way you are suggesting, since it is overridden by the positive.



Well its not so difficult. Take the value of divine moral perfection for example. If we take that God in his nature is as such then we can work from there. For the purpose of this illustration I will discuss the matter as if it is a given. Now suppose God chose to act on that value, he would do so in highly complicated ways, in any given situation the perfect moral response is such that it may require mercy or justice, to varying degrees (this also applies to Sand's statement about contradictory properties). The outcome may be highly complex, Gods actions within the world may be complex. This is what is meant by God's existence being complex in this way. No matter how convoluted the action, the essence remains simple.

The same is true in relation to how God manifests his mind, and through all the divine attributes. Plantinga made a valid point when he conjectured that God should logically exist in this way, since he posited that if God simply was his nature he would simply be a property rather than a being. The problem with being simply a property is that it is essentially non-causal. Mathematics as a concept exists in this way, it is objectively true but cannot cause anything.

Last edited by 91 on 15 Dec 2010, 8:59 am, edited 1 time in total.

Actually, to be fair, I don't. At least, I don't think of "properties" in such an essentialistic manner. So, the scaling of properties up to that extent just seems bizarre. It's the reason why Aquinas's argument from degree makes little sense to me.

That being said, I am not committed to the possibility of maximality in many cases, especially not a combination of all maximal qualities. Don't have time to go into any posting depth at the moment, so I just gave this short one on this issue.

You are simply ignoring my point. What you are saying is just:
1) We can conceive explanation E1 .. En for some observation O
2) E1 .. En-1 are not satisfactory
3) Therefore En must be right, whatever it is.

I demonstrated that your design hypothesis is worse than the other two. There is no need to come up with a good explanation.

Please do so again I may have missed the point of your contention.

Let's see how good the design hypothesis is.

The basic premise of the design hypothesis is that:

God picked a particular universe to create for some purpose P. 91 claims P is 'to create beings capable of free will and worship god'. Here, we run into 2 problems:
1) Why god comes up with P?
2) If there are many ways for god to fulfill P, then why god chooses such a particular implementation? (The hypothesis is clearly true in our context e.g the heaven ).

For 1), the common theist answer is by god's nature. That doesn't work because we can easily conceive different types of gods (more than the types of universes). So the problem just becomes why the nature of god is so fine tuned.

For 2), the common theist answer is along the line of our universe being 'the best'. However, that doesn't make sense unless one can define a measure of the greatness on all universes _god_ can conceive.

These issues point to the major weakness of the design 'hypothesis'. Namely, the hypothesis proposing NOTHING concrete - we don't know HOW god fine tune these parameter, etc., while the multi-universe is expressed in rigorous mathematics and might at least give some testable predictions.

Well we don’t really need to know how God did something in order to see his hand. One need not know how the universe was started in order to establish that it had a beginning point. This sort of logic does not point to a weakness in the hypothesis but only in your own argument: it is called infinite regress. The invocation of infinite regress results in the arguing in circles. For example in order to establish a scientific discovery one needs to presuppose the validity of science asking for the latter to be justified first results in an explanatory circle in which everything must be explained and in which nothing is explained.



Well your presupposing that the teleological argument is not based in rigorous mathematics. This is not the case when one starts to look at the components of the argument. The teleological argument is simply based upon cosmological discoveries relating to the characteristics of our universe. Those cosmological values were not plucked from the sky by a theologian or philosopher but established through the peer review system of scientific journals and now represent the academic consensus of the nature of our universe. The teleological argument's components are fully testable in a mathematic sense and have verified by observation. Multiverse theory on the other hand, still represents a theoretical position and while it may play out in discovery at a later date does not have any impact on the exact variables that have been observed in our universe (they also form the basis of the Anthropic principle).

Now the variables as they exist can only be explained by one of three possibilities; necessity, chance or design. Since a universe can exist with different variables, it is not due to necessity, I have argued previously that it cannot be due to chance (these arguments are available the previous pages of this thread and within the ‘taking the fight to the real issue’ thread) and that therefore it is due to design.



Well this is simply not the case. The basic theist response is that the variables exist in a way that is due to design. One need not establish the design plan in order to prove this. If one removes the other two possibilities all that is left is design and it therefore becomes logical to imply such. Requiring the explanation of the reason and the nature as you do in your post is once again invoking infinite regress and does nothing to discard the evidence that the universe exists in a way that is vastly contrary to that of probability.



I would be cautious on commenting on the way that AG takes on the debate, he has shown a large degree of familiarity with the subject matter. He does not make the mistake of assuming that the other side's contentions are unfounded, he just concludes that they are wrong.

The arguments I am putting forward have been subject to the peer-review process attacking the underlying definitions is a risky proposition since you are assuming they cannot be justified. I once watched a chap from the Jesus seminar be taken down manuscript by manuscript, verse by verse (in the original Greek) in a debate on the resurrection. Never be so uncharitable as to assume the other side's argument has no merit.

i'm still waiting for my maximally great pizza.

i'm sure i ordered it more than 30 minutes ago.

i see no reason why a maximally great pizza delivery man would not be able to deliver a maximally great pizza in 30 minutes (max).

if a maximally great pizza delivery man exists in any universe, he must exist in all universes.

no pizza = no maximally great pizza delivery man.

that, or he got in a maximally great car crash on his way over here.....

if that's the case, i sure hope he's got maximally great insurance.

hmm... maybe i shouldn't have told you guys about this maximally great pizza delivery man who can deliver maximally great pizzas in 30 minutes (max). maybe i should have set up a church of pizzatology and charged members to tell them each level of secret toppings...

Christianity is neither Reiki nor Freemasonry.

@ Waltur

I dealt with the maximally great pizza on page six... whoever thought I would have to say that...

As an extra by Dr Craig:

Obviously, defining X as something like an all-surpassingly great island doesn’t work, since, as you and others rightly point out, islands are, amongst other things, inherently material (and are therefore contingent on the existence of space and time); moreover, it’s far from clear as to what properties make an island great (for some it might involve plenty of palm trees; for others, it might involve no palm trees at all). So defining X in such a way doesn’t seem to work.