Quining qualia.

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I will ignore the ad hominums.
Xx
"We agree what eliminative materialism is about...there is no point in debate."
01001011
You are being disingenuous. As an EM you cannot agree or disagree with anything, especially abstactions such as existentialism and eliminative materialism. Abstractions do not exist for an EM. That was my point that you missed.
Xx
"If I say 1-1=0 I am not saying that the concept 1 has been destroyed."
ME
" How can Frodo destroys the one ring be true, is the one ring is a concept but no concept is destroyed."
01001011
There is a difference between a concept and what it represents. For example, the concept "unicorn" is not an actual physical horse with a horn.
You talk about fictionalism. An EM cannot believe in fictions. I am not saying that an EM believes that every statement is true. I am saying that an EM (if he is consistent in his beliefs) cannot make meaningful statements about things that have no physical existence.

Last edited by wittgenstein on 23 Jun 2013, 11:22 am, edited 7 times in total.

However, as a believer in concepts I can say that something is fictional. For example, I can say that unicorns are fictional because they are not instantiated by an actual physical unicorn.

For a concept to be destroyed means that it has become meaningless. That is why I said that if I say that 1-1=0 I am not saying that the concept 1 was destroyed. The concept "1" is still meaningful.

" Experience people believe they are having."
01001011
So now you are saying that people have beliefs!! ! But beliefs do not exist for an EM.
As I said previously EMs sneak in terms (belief, concepts,propositions, definitions etc) they think are gibberish ( those words are obviously not gibberish. People use the words belief,concept, proposition all the time and they are effective in getting their point across ) in order to speak meaningfully. Therefore, eliminative materialism contradicts itself and is therefore absurd.
How can one think one is saying something meaningful when one thinks that the words he uses are meaningless?
Actually, even the word "meaningful " is gibberish to an honest EM.

He does not deny fictionalism, he simply uses the term subjective in lieu of the term you would chose. EM's attempt to account for functions in much the same way as a normal materialist would. However, they claim that the subjective has no ontological significance. Which, as I have state three times now, is something that needs an affirmative argument in order to be accepted. It is not a default position, even for a strong materialist. EM however, like the hardest forms of Dualism claims that subjective experience cannot be the product physical processes. It is depends on two claims, that a) materialism is correct b) materialism cannot account for the subjective. You have still not given us an argument as to how this is evident or follows logically from investigation. Materialism is reductionist towards the subjective but not eliminative, hence you need an argument in favour of the additional step.

Eliminative materialism starts from the assumption that the folk-psychology should be changed and rejected. However, it is not yet the case that then the staunchest supporters of this view, considered it an incomplete process. Rather, they view eliminative materialism as a work in progress that will help us reshape how we think about the mind. Treating it as a blunt supposition, as you seem to be doing, is not in keeping with how most people would treat the subject.

As a distinction between eliminative materialism and the more common (albeit in my example, a harder form, used for clarity) materialism, the materialist would claim that qualia is just the result of a physical processes and therefor does not need its own word. The eliminative materialist makes the claim that subjective experiences do not exist. While I can see a good argument for a skeptic to embrace the first, the second is the result of an affirmative argument that has yet to be substantiated by its supporters. It therefor cannot be treated as a default position.



Most of the eliminative materialists that I know of treat the subject as a project not a conclusion. They challenge the traditional account of what they see as 'folk-psychology's explanation of the mind'. Even its most ardent adherents in academia treat EM as a work in progress not as a self-contained unit. It is a proposition, one they see as useful but not one that would by any means be considered complete. As a statement is has utility and is an interesting idea, a tool to be used to discover more.



Ad hominem. But as I have stated previously, I am a compatibilist when it comes to free will, which means that I accept materialism and that you should have known that if you have read my previous posts.



A materialist explanation would say that qualia is the result of materialist forces. Some materialists would go so far as to say that therefor there is no need for the word qualia. Arguing that it would not be able to find dualistic qualia and that therefor qualia does not exist, is both playing it tricky with definitions and begging the question. Someone would need to embrace both the qualia of dualism and your so far unmade objections to a materialist account of the functions of qualia for that statement to be credible. I would certainly admit that on materialism there are grounds for ditching some aspects of dualist qualia (most materialists would agree to that) however it does not follow from that that many of the functions of qualia cannot be accounted for through reference to materlist forces and it does not follow from that if those efforts failed, that eliminativism would be the most logical outcome. Sir, you are missing an argument.



No, if my argument works then materialism is the best starting point for a theory of mind. Eliminativism claims that subjective states do not exist. A materialist, which incidentally is also the most popular position, argues that although qualia, in the dualistic sense probably does not exist, the term refers to functions that certainly do exist. The software is a crude way of showing the materialist account, it refers to something, eliminativism states that it refers to nothing.

01001011,
BTW, a concept can imply another concept. It does not have to refer to a particular instance. For example,"mortal" and "man" are concepts. They refer to universals not particular instances.
It is legitamate to say,
1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates was a man.
3. Therefore, Socrates was mortal.
Similarly, "ring" and " destroyed" are universals.
1. Frodo had a ring.
2. Frodo's ring was destroyed.
3. Therefore, Frodo no longer has a ring.
The concept "ring" was not destroyed. "Ring" is still a meaningful term even though in the context of the narrative (story) the ring no longer exists.
Similarly, if I say 1-1=0 I am not saying that the concept "1" was destroyed,even though the concept "1" does not refer to a particular instance of one thing existing. "1" is a universal it can refer to one tiger,one cow, one rock...

And that is the problem with eliminative materialism. Unless an EM sneaks in words unacceptable to eliminative materialism he/she cannot create a syllogism. "Universal " is not a physicalist term. It does not refer to a particular physical object.
As proved in the post 10 from the top of page 10, fictionalism is not an appropriate response for an EM. "Fiction" does not refer to a particular physical object. However, "fiction" is a meaningful word for those that believe in concepts. We define "fiction" as a concept that is not instantiated. A unicorn is fiction because there are no physical unicorns. Unfortunately for the eliminative materialist there are no concepts, universals.

Lets provisionally accept something obviously false, that EMs can use universals without contradicting their position. Even then their position falls apart. For an EM a concept =a particular pattern of neurons firing. Correlation =explanation.
When ice cream sales go up,crime goes up. When ice cream sales decrease, crime decreases. Therefore since correlation =explanation he might make selling ice cream illegal to decrease crime. The consequences of his "correlation =explanation" are absurd. Ice cream sales increase in summer. Crime increases because people are more often outside in the summer making them vulnerable to muggers. Being outside their homes makes their house more vulnerable to burglary.
In a nut shell, eliminative materialism is based on a fallacy. Correlation does not equal explanation. A pattern of neurons firing is not an explanation as to why 1+1=2. If I understood what neurons are firing in Einstein's brain when he is thinking about relativity I am not understanding relativity.
If I know what neurons are firing when Joe is thinking about eliminative materialism I can still have no clue as to what eliminative materialism is.

Is your English so poor or you are just making up more strawmans? 'A ring' =/= 'ring', 'The One Ring' =/= 'ring'. Indeed 'rings' refer to physical objects and 'The One Ring' is not.


Fail. In your theory of meaning it is not possible for a statement to refer to non-existent things.Since 'The One Ring' cannot represent anything other than another concept (what is it?) either some concept is destroyed or the whole 'Fordo destroyed The One Ring' is meaningless.

Scroll back. I believe in concepts so I can say that something does not exist. For example the concept "unicorn" is not instantiated (google "instantiation philosophy") and therefore unicorns are fictional. However, you cannot say that something does not exist because as an EM there are no concepts to instantiate.

I think you are confused because you do not understand the difference between a universal (google"universal,philosophy" )and a particular instance.
For example, I can say "ring" and in the context of what I am saying it is obvious that I mean anything that has ring like properties. Or I can say"Frodo's ring" and be specifically identifying a specific ring.
Considering that "Frodo's ring" is fictional (it was not instantiated by an actual particular physical ring) it is only a concept. Unfortunately, an EM (because he does not believe in concepts) cannot say that "Frodo's ring" does not exist.By the way, an EM also cannot say that it exists. I (as I said previously ) am not saying that an EM is saying that every proposition is true. I am saying that he can say nothing about a fictional proposition.
PS: Your constant ad hominums do not add to your argument.

What 'concept of unicorn'? What is it made of? Anyways since nobody else can ever know whether your 'concept of unicorn' exists or not, your 'unicorn' is just as meaningless nonsense as 'vhidv'.



Why you always quote such old and outdated philosophy? Are you saying the computer message 'file does not exist' because the computer does not have concept of file to instantiate?

What 'EM'? Epiphenomenalism? Or some strawman you made up?



Then exactly how epiphenomenalism explain 1+1=2?

Just your definition. Not the definition used in fictionalism. In other words, your ignorance.

Source please.

Agree.


Then you contraficted what you said above.