Do moral setences and utterances have meaning?

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Well, this isn't a question of existence, it's a question of meaning. If we define the predicate moral as "killing as many people as possible", then clearly the word has meaning, doesn't it?

Oh, but I wasn't arguing for the meaning of the definition, but the objectivity of it.

And just for the record, I do think moral sentences and utterances have meaning. But that is a belief I have, I must confess.

So not a fan of mathematics, then?


Doesn't it? Utilitarianism makes it more difficult to pass judgment on the morality of a particular action because of the problem of calculating Mill's hypothetical units of happiness (utils), but it still claims objectivity.

I think you are confusing situational ethics with moral relativism.

Well, I for one do not claim that it has existance.

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Well, happiness isn't anything objective, therefore utilitarianism is by default not objective.

Except when done to an enemy in wartime.

Context is everything.

ruveyn

There are no moral facts per se. There are factual statements about this system or morality and that system of morality. Moral assertions indicate attitude, i.e. approval or disapproval.

I have yet to see one moral law derived from the physical nature of the cosmos.

ruveyn

But what you are claiming is that it requires a legal declaration of war or police justification to commit a "good" murder. In other words a society can convert an evil act into a good one. And the individual is therefore always subservient to a social diktat. Since so many social proclamations are obviously motivated by the desires of those in power the definitions of good and evil seem to be extremely and disturbingly and flexible.

A formal declaration of war is so... yesteryear, so retro. Now all that is required is for Congress to cough up the money. Congress signed away its authority over making war during the Eisenhower Administration.

ruveyn

morals are subjective they only have true meaning to that person, morals are thoughts and I don't think any one can explain there thoughts perfectly.. to a degree yes but not perfectly

It is utilitarianism, spliced with some universalizability. When my mind is less exhausted and my mind is much more saturated with ethics, I'll proffer my view in full.

But, if one acted as a Descriptive linguistist, it would be undeniable that many utterances and debates, once the rhetoric and ideology is removed, centre around what facillitates suffering versus what maximizes welfare. All debates over when it is accceptable to compromise virtues like honesty centre upon the maximization of welfare and minimization of suffering. This seems to be the "core" of ordinary language moral discourse.

...

In other words, utilitarianism.

The issue is that not all moral intuitions are utilitarian, and that is a problem. A well known example is that of the brother and sister who have sex without the possibility of conception. People continually consider this wrong, but they do not have an analytical foundation for thinking this and will strain themselves to find one and even continue to hold to this idea even if a foundation cannot be found.

Not only that, but the existence of non-utilitarian intuitions, even stridently non-utilitarian traditions also is an issue, I mean, one can argue that utilitarianism is also a value, but to say that it is the only value worth mentioning seems problematic given that there are even issues of utilitarian actions that do not sit well with our moral intuitions.

In any case, if the foundation of ethics is based upon knowledge of a man's intuition, I don't see where it's validity comes from. Why would intuition necessarily hit upon a mind-independent fact unlike other facts in the universe? Not only that, but why would these intuitions necessarily be systemizable or sensible when systemized? I mean, people are pretty ludicrous, so to say that there is a non-ludicrous level seems ridiculous.

Most of our moral intuition, though, do seem to have a utilitarian bend (or at least, former utiltiarian bend), perhaps owning to their prehistorical invention.

I must admit, I'm a bit hazy and ambigous with my moral philosophy at the moment. I vaguely subscribe to some form of realist, ethical naturalism. I tend to trust many foundational moral intuitions and I find morality something indispensible from decision making (to the point where I'm almost naively idealistic). But I do admit I should resume my interest and study of meta-ethics.

I actually would argue that moral intuitions likely DON'T have a utilitarian bent, but rather a virtue ethics bent, and perhaps a deontological bent, the reason being that human beings emerged from tribal societies that had to be bound together by basic intuitive rules rather than more complex calculations. This seems apparent based upon the understandings of early laws. The early laws weren't put in place because they were utility maximizing, but rather it was thought that these rules always existed and were above the kings. The idea that laws are flexible and created didn't really come into prominence until around the Enlightenment, however a utilitarian stance demands the flexibility of law, as the law is a means to an end under utilitarian understandings. The fact that our early intuitions on law do not match utilitarian theory seems to suggest that utilitarianism is a later development rather than the fundamental intuition.

Not only that, but what was one of the earliest ethical theories? Aristotle's virtue ethics, not Mill's utilitarianism. If utilitarianism were fundamental, a reversal seems more likely to occur. In fact, I would imagine that virtue ethics with perhaps deontological foundations would also be the major thrust in the early Chinese philosophers as well, who emphasized tradition. (utilitarianism is typically neutral if not opposed to tradition, which can be seen in Mill's own stance towards tradition)

Finally, utilitarianism is pretty openly unintuitive, this much can be seen in J. J. C. Smart's own discussions of proper utilitarian behavior in his essay "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism" where lying including praise of bad behavior and scorn towards good behavior are both considered possibly good to promote. (Smart is an advocate of utilitarianism as well)

Well, I do not deny that morality is a necessity for decision making at all, I just deny that it really exists. If human beings are the products of evolution, then there is no reason why they cannot have false intuitions so long as the perception to question them was not going to immediately emerge.(which in a primitive society, was not likely)

You are dead on right. In very few places is the Prudent Predator praised primarily for perspicacity precisely, nor practicality prevail - perhaps.

ruveyn