Best of all possible worlds and atheism

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@AG

You are still just attempting to sidestep premise 5 on the third arguement. It is a burden of proof that you cannot sustain. You cannot know that the value of this life is for us to be happy. The existence of heaven (you seem to be referencing Christian theism so I will also) functions as clear cut proof of this. This world does not have to be one in which we are happy and taken care of, it is short in comparison to the next life and it's aims are clearly different.

The reason you are abusing 'best of all possible worlds' is that you are attempting to make it mean 'the best world one can imagine', this is not the case. God can only create a logically possible world, there may be a world where x level of evil leads to y number of people being saved with z level of happiness and comfort. How would you even being to show that you could demonstrate to us a possible world where such a world would improve all three variables? This example excludes any other priority that God might have that is hidden, hence why it is always laughed at in class. Just as your statement about level of murders, can you imagine how an omnipotent being would react to that argument? You think he can be taken out with such blunt tools as this?

Now as to your comparison with the US government, one can reasonably argue that x system provides better representation and responsible government than y government. You are comparing apples with oranges.

Not really.


Right, but unless this world is shown to be necessary, then a better world is already shown to be logically possible, so the problem I pointed out still exists.

"it is instead the responsibility of the theist to show that life on earth, or the fall, are logically necessary"

As I think that the existence of an objectively better world within Christian theology is sufficient.


I don't see this as abuse. If a best world one can imagine is different than this world, and the actual best possible world is better than what one can imagine, then it follows that this is not the best of all possible worlds. In fact, given that I am starting with the negative "this is not the best of all possible worlds", I don't see a problem.



Um, pretty simple, by conceiving of a world in which one or more categories is actually better. If I can conceive of the counter-factual, and judgement of quality based upon counter-factuals is legitimate(which it is in our living behavior) then I can demonstrate this very easily.

As it stands, just the failure of most theodicies is sufficient to make my case. If we cannot imagine a convincing reason why the evils we see are justified, or why the number of people saved is so low, then we are justified in thinking, given pre-existing intuitions on a better world, that there is not sufficient justification. The reason why the problem of evil has haunted religion from the very beginning is because it is so obvious to us that a better world is possible.


Oh, 91, shut up, we both know that the problem of evil in its various formats is taken seriously in philosophy class and by a large percent of the population. To say that it is just laughed at is outright false in most cases. In fact, most atheological arguments are taken with some degree of seriousness and legitimacy, and the vast majority of arguments all feed into that one issue of sub-optimality, so stop giving me bullsh**.

As for an omnipotent being's reaction? I dunno, maybe it would be this:
"Oh s**t! I should take actions to insure that the workings of reality are such that these people don't go around killing each other so much."

Do I think that this idea can be taken out with these blunt tools? Yes, obviously. I've stated that this position that this is not the best of all possible worlds is obvious. If it is obvious, then it doesn't need a very highly developed tool to knock it out. As it stands, most of us are significantly less confident that any individual evil is justified.


Well, maybe it really just SEEMS that the US government does this, but really due to the corruption of corporate influences, and the unknown but bizarre feedback mechanisms in that other nation, that the US really has less representation, and is really less responsible, and that this will play out in the long-run. I mean, certainly you can't say that it isn't logically possible that Egypt isn't actually more representative than the US.

A world identical to the current one, but without HIV and Plasmodium vivax, is logically possible and a significant improvement. And that's a fairly trivial example. Virtually anyone who doesn't have their head completely up their ass could easily list off hundreds of examples off how the world could be better without requiring some sort of logical contradiction.

@AG

You are in serious danger of arguing in circles without having the virtue of getting the point I am repeatedly making. Your argument is one of logical consistency. All I have to do to disprove it is show that the level of suffering is logically possible in combination with God's nature and intentions. If I succeed in that goal your claim that this world is logically incompatible collapses. Now you are attempting to force the reader to offer reasons for the way the world is. I have and they are convincing, the most important one is that you cannot claim to know the variables. This is a pretty merge claim and it is an obviously true one, do your argument is in know way capable of delivering what you say it can.

Secondly I have also offered up a logical argument that shows that suffering and God are not logically incompatible. Your only accurate criticism so far is that I misnumbered the argument. Here it is again

1. God is all powerful and all loving.
i. He can only do what is logically possible.
ii. He can only elect logically possible worlds.
2. God must have a sufficient reason for the level of evil in the world.
i. It is not necessarily true that a created being would know or fully understand the reason(s).
3. Therefor through 1&2 God has a sufficient reason.

This clearly shows at the logical level that your claim is false (to defeat an argument that claims to be necessarily true all that is required is to show logical possibility). It is not begging the question, it is a necessary statement (I have explained the concept of begging the question to you many timed now, your just being dishonest now). In order to dispute it, you have to show premise 2 to be false, this is simply too much (hence why the arguement is laughed at) for an individual to convincingly contend; no matter how awesome or glorious he proclaims himself to be.

Let me explain specifically why the student who put this forward was giggled at. Your argument essentially shows that God and suffering are logically consistent (you are saying God and suffering are compatible in some possible world). You are then following it up with a claim that they are not at all compatible in this world. The argument totally abuses the idea of possible worlds because it is clearly shown, by the original, that they are inherently compatible. So therefor in some world, God could have a reason for this world. Hence the argument is s logically self-refuting statement.

I don't really think you have a point. You're basically trying to make an argument for skeptical theism, but I think the skepticism of skeptical theism is overblown, and I do not think it reasonable to go that far at all. As Orwell stated, any reasonable person can probably list a very long-list of possible improvements to the world. I can believe that maybe a few of these suggestions will fail, but to say that ALL of them will fail? That's not something I find believable, simply because there is a long-list of relatively obvious improvements.


You know, I don't actually think that's the case. That's how YOU'D present an argument, but I generally don't value or see the need for this nearly as much as you do. My case is mostly just starting off with the idea that the best of all possible worlds is implausible. I think this is obvious that it is implausible, and I've stated repeatedly that any individual can probably think of a large set of worlds that seem very clearly better.


I am not really sure that's what is required. Unless you can show that this level is *plausible* then I am not really sure I have any real reason to care, as something ridiculous but strictly consistent just isn't relevant.


Um.... not really, no. If a logically possible claim that I would assess as having a probability of close to 0 is put forward, my argument is not going to budge, nor should it. The difference between thinking that something is 100% and thinking it is 99.999% is nil in practice.


Ok, but... I am not sure that "knowing all of the variables" is really necessary. Nobody ever knows all of the variables. We have beliefs. We have justification for those beliefs. We call those beliefs knowledge. Do I have a belief about whether or not this is the best of all possible worlds? Yes. Do I have justification for this belief? Yes, I can imagine a world better than this world, and I think nearly anybody who seriously engages this can also imagine a better world, and if such a world were impossible, then it is rather ridiculous that we all can come up with very clear improvements.


You know, this new argument isn't actually an argument at all. In fact, you can outright remove premise 1, and get the same "argument".

1 God must have a sufficient reason for the level of evil in the world.
2 Therefore God does.

God being powerful and loving is just window-dressing. Like.... seriously, that's what you just presented, and it is one of the most jaw-droppingly stupid things I have ever read anyone seriously present.

Here's the argument you seem to be trying to present:
1) If God exists, then God has a sufficient reason for the level of evil in the world.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore there is a sufficient reason for the level of evil in the world.

This is a massively begged question though as premise 2 is one of the premises being contested. Therefore, you don't have a good argument.


Ok? I am not even playing the game you think I am, and no, it really doesn't work. If anybody wants to evaluate your argument as well, and discuss it with me, I am willing to do this, but, this is one of the worst arguments I have literally ever seen in my entire life. For all of your talk of "laughing something out of a philosophy classroom", it is clear that you have never been inside of one.


A necessary statement? I suppose if one holds to this as a dogma, then yes, it is really quite necessary. As for explaining something to me, I wouldn't be surprised if you've tried, but you're actually more likely to make an error at this stuff than I am. You've confused the regress argument with a logical fallacy. You've confused an insult with the ad hominem informal fallacy. I don't think you know much about what you are talking about, but rather, you have a cause, and you have access to a university database, and you are willing to throw anything you have to promote your cause.


Well, yes, of course I have to show that premise 2 is false, after all, it is the only premise in the argument. Somehow, I am not intimidated.


HA HA HA HA!! ! Wow.... are you being serious?? My argument does not show that God and suffering are logically consistent, it doesn't even address it, it just says that this world is not the best possible world. It could be that the best possible world lacks all suffering. I am not committing to that stronger claim though. Now can God and a degree of suffering be incompatible? Sure, but that does not mean that God and all suffering are incompatible, only that a degree of suffering is not compatible. This does not entail that a better world requires either the compatibility or incompatibility of suffering though.

I mean.... this is just terrible argumentation. Your version of my position doesn't even *sound* like me.

@AG

Well firstly just because you can identify elements of skeptical theism within an arguement does not mean that the entire arguement is one of skeptical theism. It can be used as a defense of any dirty or logically possible world, since it shows that what man can say about God from the world does not overcome the logical consistency within the defense against the problem of evil.

I think I now have a handle on the big separation between what you are arguing and what you are concluding. You have put forward a evidentialist arguement as if it is a logical arguement. Now when people point out that your logical arguement is flawed you then nove to evidential and when they discuss the evidential and offer a defense of that, you switch to logical. So in broad stokes, you either do not have a clue or you are being pointlessly argumentative or you are being interlectually dishonest.

Now in my last post I argued against the logical arguement. In my first I argued both (hence your shifting feet). So now since you have said that God and some suffering are logically compatible let us discuss the evidential aspect of what you are saying. You many not revert to a logical arguement now, otherwise you will be being dishonest.

Before continuing please google what an internal question is and then understand that when proving God and evil are mentioned in a logical sense (you criticized me for using God to argue against an evidentialist position, and so committed the mistake I mentioned above) it is not begging the question to mention God in a first premise.

Edvidentualist Argument

All evidentialist argiements have two basic points

1. God exists
2. Suffering exists

The obvious question here is why think that these questions are evidentially contradictory. What is very important to note is that it is on the person making this claim to show why they think this is the case. Therefor I will offer no reasons myself on analyze the arguments made by AG.

1. God prefers a the best possible world.

This arguement is basically 'God could have reduced the level of suffering in the world and made it more lime it ought* to be'.

*I used the word ought because if AG is presupposing there is a was things would be morally better (less suffering is certainly based in a moral judgement), then he IS BEGGING THE QUESTION of an objective morality (that would apply to the makeup of a world made up by all of us, so subjectivity is just not enough, he has to ground objective values). This is a hidden premise that he has to far failed to justify. Now he would normally attempt to shift the argument to back onto God by attacking the logical structure of God (he continues to repeate bad arguments about divine simplicity often), however this is not enough, he needs to justify, somehow truely objective moral values (without grounding them in God) otherwise he is just begging the question.

Human Limitations

The key to the evidentialist arguement is the claim that because it looks like God does not have sufficient reasons for the level of suffering that he therefor does not. Now this is quite tricky, since we can all recognize that suffering looks unjustified. We see neither a point, nor necessity. The success of the argument however depends on the question of whether or not we are justified in inferring that because it looks unjustified, that it is unjustified.

As finite persons there is no reason to think that we get a big enough picture for this assertion to be warranted. God sees the end of history from it's beginning and has providentially ordered history though peoples free decisions and actions**. In order to achieve this end, he may have to allow for a great deal of suffering. Two good illustrations that show we cannot really understand how the system works are:

In so called chaos theory, it has been discovered, that many large scale systems (weather or inscet populations for example) are extremely sensitive to the smallest disturbances. We have no idea how the alteration of a seemingly small details can alter the wider whole. The second illustration would be best found in the movies Sliding Doors or Groundhog Day where the entire story shows differences and changes that occur from insignificant and monumental changes. At the end of Sliding Doors, the happy successful option is killed by an accident. AG is essentially claiming that he can know, in all this complexity that hismpoint is valid. It is just an unsuportable claim***.

**When we talk of God creating worlds, we mean that he can create a world but not any world for any aim. For example if we assume that God cannot do the logically impossible. Then there are a great many worlds that simply cannot be acutalisied. If we assume he can, then AG's point is meaningless.

***AG has dismissed this claim as an appeal to mystery. However it is not. Unbelievers make the exact same claim when they discuss utilitarianism (the greatest happiness for the greatest number), the fatal flaw of this doctrine, the reason why it no longer has it's former popularity and recieves only minimal academic attention, is because it contained a view that was essentially unknowable. For example, go watch my favorite Star Trek episode 'City on the Edge of Forever', in it an anti war activist, who is essentially right about war, must die, because the United States must enter World War 2. Utilitarianism fails because the pursuit of the short term good can and often does leed to misery. Once we contemplate the huge compex system of an ordered history it becomes impossible for a limited being to objectively speculate about wheather or not God has a sufficient reason or not for suffering.

There are other points that I should lime to mention but do not have time right now to elaborate on (I am very hungry and am typing all of this on an IPad). Such as evidential scope, disagreement over the main purpose of life and the emotional connotations of AG's argument.

'why expect to go to heaven on a feather bed?'

I agree that the conclusion (4) is false and that premises 2 and 3 are true, which means 1 has to be false; however that does not disprove the existence of a creator being. If a statement is partially true and partially false it evaluates as false, however there could still be elements of it that are true.

If premise 1 was to be restated as: The actual world was created by a perfectly good being, that would make 2 irrelevant, 3 would still be true but what effect would that have on 4?

My problem with the word “omnipotent” is that the way it is usually defined, it not only implies that the creator being has ultimate power but that no other powers exist. I know you don't believe in free will AG, and to a certain extent I don't either for I acknowledge limitations on mine, but do you deny that you have any will at all or any power to exercise it?

Well, ultimately it is a defense of epistemic limitations of the nature that we cannot know why God allows certain things to happen. The issue is that in order for my case to be right, there only has to be ONE unjustified evil in the world. I think most people are willing to accept the existence of multiple unjustified evils, which makes my case relatively conservative compared to the background beliefs of many individuals.


91, I don't really make the same distinction between logical and evidential arguments that you do, period. The reason being that I don't hold that my premises have to be 100% true to use them. Am I using a logical argument in some sense? Yes, but I am taking the fact that this is not the best of all possible worlds as basically true, along with my other premises. What justifies this premise in using the logic of it is just plausibility. I am not a fan of the highly analytical method of determining something to be logically possible as untrue, therefore the argument defeated. It is pointless to me, as I've already made clear. You just.... are strange, as I think the way I am arguing is not horribly unclear or unfair.


I didn't say that God and some suffering must be logically compatible. In fact, I think there is reason to believe that they aren't! However, at the same time, my basic point doesn't need that supposition. In fact, my basic point was NEVER ABOUT THAT, as it has always been about whether this world is the "best possible world" in some very intuitive sense, and the obviousness that this claim is false.


Given that questioning whether God exists on the basis of suffering is an external question to your framework, yes, this is begging the question.


You know, given the limitations of the range of plausible objective moralities, and the fact that most people think that objective morality has to relate in some form or fashion to our moral intuitions, this point is not very relevant. Unless you have a divine command theory God that likes child molestation, this entire point can be dismissed. If one takes the word "good" as it commonly means, or even just substitute it for loving, one still has us in a world with a lot of evils that do not seem necessary, and your counter seems needlessly obtuse.
'
As for your point about "bad arguments on divine simplicity".... right. Because I am obviously the intellectually dishonest one.


I think the answer is an obvious and unqualified yes. We make claims about counter-factuals all of the time, many of which claiming that the current state of affairs is inferior to another possible state of affairs. Unless every single one of these claims is false, a better world exists. The fact that these claims are ubiquitous suggests that the burden of proof is upon the skeptic.


The major problem is that it is not the case that every action appears to have long-standing results beyond the moment it happens. Given that the hypothetical existence of a heaven as a superior world is out there, then I am not sure that quibbling over single events is even warranted. The question of "Why is Earth necessary?" seems legitimate and valid, and it does not get into very many deep epistemological affairs. Either an answer is plausible, or we are without a plausible answer.


Ok, but the problem is that in order to take this seriously, we have to assume EVERY BAD ACTION will lead to an ultimately desirable consequence, the problem is that chaos theory doesn't really justify us that belief. Even if we start off with a very optimistic view of bad events, we still end up having to recognize that the idea that they are all good is not plausible simply due to the sheer number of them.


Right, and the Gettier problem shows that even if one watches a sports game, one is not justified in claiming who the victor was. After all, you could have just seen last-years game and not have known it! Or you could be driving through a territory full of fake barns, and be unaware. Heck, you could be a brain in a vat, and how would you know that? Because of this, your belief that you have physical hands would be false. Finally, you could just be a product of an evil deity, who only exists to confound you, and for that reason, none of your belief-forming processes are reliable. How would you know that this is false? Because you can't prove it to be false, you are not justified in rejecting it!

The problem with this skepticism is that it is ad-hoc skepticism. The possibility of being false always exists in reality. This possibility does not mean we have reason to believe we are probably false. After all, there are a million skeptical hypotheses that are rejected on plausibility grounds, even though they are all logically possible. As it stands, any person who has ever seriously thought that the world would be better if X were the state of affairs has already rejected the idea that this is the best of all possible worlds. Given that this is probably everybody, including the children of the world, it is really not likely a matter of a "strange assertion" to reject the existence of God, but rather just basic consistency. I don't see much reason to have to defend the obvious, because Orwell has already stated:
"Virtually anyone who doesn't have their head completely up their ass could easily list off hundreds of examples off how the world could be better without requiring some sort of logical contradiction."

We are not justified in believing that these massive lists of counter-factuals that seem obviously better to us are all false, especially not if we are justified relying on these counter-factuals in various other assessments of reality. That's that. Now, if you want to continue arguing that the world was created 5 minutes ago, then go right on ahead, however, I think it would not only be false to reject these counter-factuals as valid, but even inconsistent given that I make my personal judgments on counter-factuals about how my behaviors will impact the goodness of the world I perceive.


Right, but the sheer number of possibilities is such, that the claim that none of them is better seems ad-hoc.


Minimal academic attention?
23% of Normative Ethicist philosophers are consequentialist.
27% of Applied Ethical philosophers are consequentialist. (this is actually the largest group in the survey)
27% of Metaethicists are consequentialist (this is actually the largest single group in this survey)
23% of philosophers total are consequentialist.

I am sorry, but this claim is false, and in some areas of relevance, such as decision theory, consequentialism wins outright with 58% of people who respond accepting consequentialism. (and lumping utilitarianism as just consequentialism is not an invalid move because the criticism works equally well with both) That being said, I don't think that any person holds that consequentialism fails because THERE AREN'T better possibilities, but rather because making this the SOLE CRITERION for evaluating an individual's actions is questionable because of the possibility of being false is so great.

http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl


Ok? I think a basis for quibbling is the term "objective" and what that means. If the point is that this isn't mathematical, then fine, but if the point is that it is impossible to have a justified belief on the situation, then that is just ridiculous.


Right, just continue wasting our time with your braindead apologetics.

How about this then:
1) Regret is based upon the notion that this world is less good because of one's actions. (premise)
2) God can actualize a world in which one did not make this decision. (transworld manipulability premise, justified by Dean Zimmerman's critique of Molinism)
3) Regret is justified. (premise)
4) God is not actualizing the best possible world. (1-3)
5) God must actualize the best possible world (premise)
6) God does not exist. (4 and 5)

In order for this to be the best of all possible worlds, regrets have to be false, but regrets are basically understood as valid, and our intuitions about regrets are solid enough.

1) Wishing that things were different is based upon the notion that the world is less good than another possible world. (premise)
2) God can actualize any world wished. (premise)
3) Wishing is a justified desire (premise)
4) God did not actualize the best of all possible worlds. (1-3)
5) God must actualize the best possible world (premise)
6) God does not exist.

Now, in order for this argument to be false, you are trying to argue that every wish that things were different is ill-founded. I think this is absurd. Everybody has wishes and most people go along thinking that these wishes are justified. I mean, I assume that you wish the world didn't have abortion, but if your argument on this being the best of all possible worlds, then every abortion is for the best.

AGG-head, cher confrere:

Please to consider syllogism Biii

SYLLOGISM Biii:

1. The best of all possible worlds must excel all other possible worlds W1,......WN [you will have to imagine the subscripts]

2. I would be happier or more satisfied if this world were different in respect to X.

3. ERGO this is not the best of all possible worlds.

Would you accept that there is a problem here?

Or do you insist that in the best of all possible worlds all sentient inhabitants must be perfectly content at every instant?

Do you know - or rather] because of course I know you must know, because only God could know and if you were God why would you pretend not to believe in yourself unless you are a wee smidge touched], do you assume / postulate /take it on faith that total universal perfect contentment is possible?

@AG

You clearly do not make any distinction between logical and evidential arguments. In my last post I specifically pointed out that whenever I argue a logical defense you put forward an evidential response, then vise versa. This is blatantly intellectually dishonest it does not even address anything I am saying. You are refusing to interact on the subject and are attempting to dishonestly cover a bad argument by arguing, quite purposefully in circles. Once again learn your basic philosophy or get to like intellectual disgrace.

The absolute worst example is when I put forward a counter to the logical argument and you accused me, repeatedly of begging the question. The logical argument deals with God and logical compatibility, it's an internal question, so references to perfect being theology are totally warranted. Therefor I am warranted to use God in my response. I am also warranted to use God's philosophical makeup to defend the logical argument. It is also a necessary statement. So it is covered from begging the question in three separate ways. You should know this.

As to utilitarianism and your survey. Umm, you do know that consiquentialists are not
necessarily utilitarians? It's just a sub-school of the larger whole. This is also intellectually dishonest, once again you disgrace your own faculties.

As to your next argument, it falls smack into the free will defense, it does not even mention
natural evil so it is already totally rebutted. It also totally fails to understand Molinism, the critique you cited has been utterly smashed by both Plantinga and Craig. Also if you want to debate free will create another thread and explain how belief in free will is not epistemologically warranted.

I now require a private retraction for your intellectual dishonesty, otherwise I will no longer
discuss this matter with you.

Well, no, this is an argument against the traditionally conceived notion of God. I mean, I really am unconcerned for the overall set of possible "divine entities" as most of them are still implausible.

Total universal perfect contentment is logically possible. Even further, many theists take the existence of a place with qualities like that, as being possible, such as heaven. Heaven is considered to be the *best place* and significantly better than Earth. So, if Heaven is logically possible, then the only justification for this world being the best, is if this world is necessary for heaven. The problem is that the notion that this world is necessary for heaven seems ad hoc, especially when one admits that the suffering and evils of the world are unnecessary bads due to the fall.

As such, I find most theistic counter-arguments to be rather silly. Theists ALREADY ADMIT to a better world being possible, and arguments against actualization fail for multiple reasons.

I am addressing what you are saying. Everybody knows this. Everybody knows that you are wrong, but too blind to see it. I have basic philosophy down, and I haven't made anything close to the massive gaffes that you have made, such as with the argument:
1 God must have a sufficient reason for the level of evil in the world.
2 Therefore God does.

I am actually telling everybody I know who will listen about this argument because it is literally the worst argument you have seen.


No, 91, this was a horrible argument, period. You didn't even CONSTRUCT IT right. You continually had bad references and irrelevant premises, and yet you have the audacity to accuse me of dishonesty and a lack of knowledge of philosophy? If you presented that to any philosophy instructor, he would be unable to do anything but laugh.

I am not offering an "internal question", but rather I outright don't believe in your God. I don't really care on those defenses, because your "perfect being theology" is another topic altogether. As for it being a necessary statement? You know that's contingent upon the validity of the ontological argument for God, which you know I reject, and you know is outside the scope of the discussion. Your argument was terrible. In its context it was just a massive effort to beg the question. That's clear to literally ANYBODY who tried to read the matter.


I already freaking addressed this:
"and lumping utilitarianism as just consequentialism is not an invalid move because the criticism works equally well with both"

Most consequentialists are utilitarians. Even further, your argument was a general argument against consequentialism. I didn't do anything invalid at all, and I already pre-empted your condemnation. I mean, holy s**t, you are one of, if not *the* most intellectually dishonest human being I have ever encountered.


Yes, but the problem is that as an empirical matter free will doesn't exist. Even further, transworld manipulability is a rebuttal to transworld depravity. Now, you can argue that transworld manipulability was utterly smashed, but that requires either a source or a counter-argument, as otherwise there is no justification for me to believe that what you say is actually true.

As for it "failing to understand Molinism", yeah.... sure. Everything you write reeks of bs.

Well, given that I've made multiple arguments against free will in the past, I don't see this as necessary, but sure, fine, whatever.


f**k you.

Well – I am glad we cleared that up, you are not so much anti-theist as you are anti-religious. So am I.

As for the suffering in the world: let's say you are coming out of a McDonald's with a Big Mac and a large order of fries, and you meet a beggar who informs you that he is starving because he hasn't eaten in three days. You could either give him your Big Mac and fries, and so reduce a little suffering in the world, or tell him to go fornicate with himself adding to his suffering.

What determines what you will do?

What a world topic

The problem or conundrum I have with the above abstraction is how is it possible for anyone to know for sure what is the best choice for a world, if "God" can choose it. How can a person recognize such a world? (Given that the person is theist, which I am not.)