Quining qualia.

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The average materialist does not accept that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Rather they see the process as unfinished but that the hard problem is actually just a series of smaller ones that will eventually account for everything. Qualia in materialism is simply the name that we have for the parts of consciousness we have not solved yet, the experience of subjective reflection being one of them (although we have significant evidence for subjective experience because we can tell by looking at the brain when you think of something thus it is not private). So if you are going to quote him, then you should consider his explanation as he thinks that some properties of materialism account for qualia he is a property dualist. So once again you are just presupposing your own view to be correct, then you cite someone who does not even remotely agree with you (in fact he takes the exact opposite view on the matter of qualia and dualism). Both dualism, eliminative materialism and materialism have ideas about what we can expect from further study. The most extreme view is eliminative materialism, which holds that if materialism is true, then the subjective self cannot. The challenge was to find an affirmative argument as to why that is the case and EM has no such argument to give. Materialism is the view which best fits at the moment, hence why most people who study the subject embrace it in some form. Thus, once again, you have failed to make an affirmative argument.

Going to just leave this here for wittgenstein
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/ ... ve-it.html

What nonsense is 'average materialist'? If one rejects the hard problem, one is an eliminative materialist. You are just taking the EM position, call it something else, and then say it is better than EM. That is intellectual dishonesty.


The source already explains why this is impossible. Feel free to explain why the author is wrong instead of repeating the same baseless assertion.


Your point? The source is authoritive on the definition of the hard problem. I am aware of the objection there, which is not strong.


Ever heard of reductive materialism, non-reductive materialism, neutral monism, idealism?


I already gave an argument. You just uttered something irrelevant and then pretend my argument does not exist.


Appeal to popularity.


The same nonsense again.

Completely untrue. A materialist generally does not hold that the hard problem exists (some however hold that the hard problem is insoluble but explicable or that it is just a name for the unsolved parts of theory of mind and there are others but they generally either regard it as non-existent or solvable). So before you go accusing people of serious things, read the article you posted because Chalmers says as much within it (EM is just one of his type-A materialisms) or conversely use google, the standard tenants of materialism can be easily found (we can go into the deeper types if you like but it won't add much to the argument unless you intend to get significantly more specific in your own position). As an aside, I don't really like the categories that Chalmers uses but I can see who he used them, there is more of a difference between functionalism and the claims of EM. But I certainly am not taking on an EM position, calling it something else and then saying it is better than EM, what you are doing is explicitly failing to understand that there is a difference between them at all.



No it does not. Putting up a source that simply asserts a position gives you no sense of where it sits within the framework of the present argument. Chalmers has been more or less dismissed by the mainstream theory of mind crowd for embracing dualism. Further, his argument is not in favour of your position, in fact is devastatingly critical of it, as are many other philosophers (I posted nice little thing at the bottom of my last post, which you dismissed that shows you why you could not even believe EM if it were true). His arguments against Type-A Materialism apply best to elimitivism, the idea that if his argument in favour of the hard problem exists, then somehow EM is true is not credible.



Actually his objections to type-A materialism apply best to eliminative materialism and he echos an argument I have been making to you for a while and you have been ignoring:

"The obvious problem with type-A materialism is that it appears to deny the manifest. It is an uncontested truth that we have the various functional capacities of access, control, report, and the like, and these phenomena pose uncontested explananda (phenomena in need of explanation) for a science of consciousness. But in addition, it seems to be a further truth that we are conscious, and this phenomenon seems to pose a further explanandum. It is this explanandum that raises the interesting problems of consciousness. To flatly deny the further truth, or to deny without argument that there is a hard problem of consciousness over and above the easy problems, would be to make a highly counterintuitive claim that begs the important questions. This is not to say that highly counterintuitive claims are always false, but they need to be supported by extremely strong arguments."

Standard materialism accepts that our understanding of the cognitive is ever evolving and makes the argument that the best hope for a complete theory of mind is materialism. So far we have not encountered a cognitive function we could not explain and even if a part of the problem is insoluble (which could be the case) it does not mean that it is inexplicable. Dualism presupposes the evidences both in its usual form (of standard dualism) or in its more radical form, eliminative materialism. Neither recognises the developing understanding of the mind without postulating a conclusion which is so radical that it would require radial evidences. Chalmers accurately find how this applies to the EM position but not how his it also applies to his own. In both cases, dualism demands we take on a radical position, in the view of Chalmers, it is basically a naturalistic soul with no mechanism for its existence, in the case of EM it is the demand that we give up our what is intuitively obvious (that we exist and experience the universe). We could embrace either, if the evidence for it were sufficient but standard materialism is clearly the better position to work from.



No it was an Argument from Authority, which you will find I made in a way that was perfectly acceptable because it refers to a proper authority and I used it as part of an inductive argument.



Actually the link is very good. Although the link does not argue in favour of the truth of falsity of EM it makes a convincing argument that it cannot be rendered believable. Dismissing it is just lazy. http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/ ... ve-it.html

Speaking of the same stuff again and again, let me reiterate my original post in this thread. If the hard problem exists, it does not follow that EM exists. At that point, it would be one of many competing answers and probably one of the least good because as the above link shows it could never actually be believed in. As Chalmers points out, EM begs many questions and does not provide property satisfactory answers to them. Rather, it presupposes its own answer and therefor would only appeal to someone who already 'bought in' to its underlying tautology.

From page 10, which kind of hints to me that you might have missed the point or been doing your best to avoid it:

"A strong eliminative materialist position, which you seem to be putting forward, needs to in some way account for this basic experience. Otherwise, their conclusion is not inductively reachable and can never be rationally believed. There are physicalist attempts to explain mental states without eliminating the mind and I would personally embrace one of those. However, eliminative materialism just slams the proposition that the physical exists and the mind cannot together, without making an affirmative argument in favour of the position. " So far all you have done is to fall back onto Dualism whenever it suits you and simply asserted that the hard problem is inexplicable. This is not an argument in favour of your position as even if it were completely true that the hard problem were irresolvable it does not follow that your position is true.

There is still no affirmative argument here for EM, in spite of you rambling on for pages, it still does not exist. You have not produced one because having read the literature I can tell you that there is none. EM is a useful proposition that questions underlying assumptions, it is not a complete position and it has flaws in it's digestibility that mean that it can never be a default position for someone to believe. EM has functions, but not those that you are putting forward, it is an interesting hypothesis that works FROM the assumption that our fundamental understanding might be wrong. Our fundamental understanding might be wrong, but EM thinkers have tried to construct a theory without reference to the basic terms of what they call 'folk-phychology' and combined them with teleological arguments about where we have been wrong in the past. They have not yet demonstrated that we are wrong now. You have lipsticked this pig enough, its time to either make an argument for EM that has never so far been produced, or move on to a better position. Sir, you are still lacking an argument.

You already defeated yourself. Hard problem being non-existent =/= solvable =/= insoluble but explicable. There is not really a 'standard materialist' position.


Chalmers puts both EM and functionalism into type-A because they are largely compatible (EM does not necessarily deny mental function). In any case what Chalmers calls type-B and type-C materialism is more different form the distinction between them. The whole EM vs 'standard' materialism is nothing but your fabrication.


My eliminative materialism is very specific - I reject the ontological existence of qualia, as described in my argument against subjective experience. My definition agrees with Chalmer's hard problem. I do not not reject 'mental functions'.Your objection there holds no water.

Pick your 'deeper' type if you what to argue why 'materialism' is better than EM.


What difference? How does it matter? Accepting the functional aspects of consciousness is not mutually exclusive with rejecting the non-functional qualia.


Source please. Don't just assert 'some mainstream' dismiss him.


Fail. His argument is nothing but asserting type-A materialism is not intutitve. Clearly functinalism is no better. Indeed, EM takes on his argument directly and shows his qualia nonsense.


Read my bold. It is you who is ignoring the center of the debate. We are not talking about explaining the brain's cognitive functions. We are talking about what Chamler calls 'further truth'. Functionalism gives no answer.


It is clear you don't understand what the problem is. Let alone hand waving on a solution.


'Proper authority'? Source please.


I already said many times. EM doesn't need to be believed. It is valid whether one 'believes' it or not.


I already gave one. You disputed it. That is not equal to none.



[/quote] The first premise is untrue, subjective experience is unitary because it is generated within the human brain,[/quote]
The human brain is NOT unitrary. It consists of many atoms.


You are again confusing function with qualia. If you 'have basic experience' of a car and a tree, can you say part of your brain 'have basic experience' of a car?

[/quote]Further, it is not private, since we can see people's thoughts on an EEG. This gives us significant evidence in favour of the standard Materialist account of brain function, it might be reductionist towards the subjective but there is evidence against the eliminative position.[/quote]
Again wrong. There is no problem to conclude EEG correlates with 'qualia'. Saying EEG IS qualia is a different matter. See the inverted color problem.


It is OK since both function and boundary are fictional. On the other hand you claim qualia is not fictional.


There is no such thing as 'computerness'. Think about something simpler, a knife. A knife is just a piece of metal (or plastic or whatever) is some particular shape. When we change the shape of a piece of metal, nothing ontological known as knifeness is added. The upshot is a knife (or a computer) is just a fiction of some objects.

On the other hand, you assert there is some ontological difference between subjects and other objects (the former processes basic experience which is something real). Therefore it makes sense to ask what is the minimal part of a brain to process basic experience. That is a major problem for reductive materialism.

Moreover, does it mean qualia transfers between collections of atoms as the material in the brain changes (but you said qualia is not transferable)?

Firstly I am tiring of you breaking this up so much, please, give me prose, if you cannot convince me that you can write in paragraph form, then I am hardly going to accept your claims to philosophical insight.

I did not place my position within a specific materialist account, rather I am saying that any number of materialist accounts could be correct and that if any of them holds then it would be preferable to eliminative materialism and I have given good reasons for this which are both epistemic and functional. There is a standard materialist/physicalist position, you can find it in any basic textbook on the subject. From the Plato online library:

"The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don't deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don't seem physical — items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature. But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are either physical or supervene on the physical."



I cannot see a good reason for rejecting qualia, Chalmers, like yourself is presupposing the evidence. We do not know what constitutes the mind but all the evidence so far points towards a materialist account being correct. Unless there is some knock down argument that some sort of qualia cannot be true, then it remains preferable for the individual to accept its existence, given its place as a basic component of adopting beliefs.




16. Mind: physicalism 56.5%; non-physicalism 27.1%; other 16.4% from (What Do Philosophers Believe? David Bourget and David J. Chalmers May 15, 2013) pg 12 Only 3.2% reject any account of qualia. The most popular view was representationalism.





Please provide this argument, so far you have just asserted it or put forward arguments that assume some inherent incompatibility. I have no time for such a lack of a position on your part, especially since you seem to be energetically defending a position that has been more or less declared useful (in terms of raising questions) but dead in terms of providing an conclusion.

http://www.unc.edu/~ujanel/ElimWeb.htm



At this point Chalmers is giving us a rather high standard of qualia, it is not the case that one must buy into the position that qualia is an all or nothing thing. The fact that we can see and test through anaesthetic that a person can be rendered unconscious is evidence of an element of qualia being correct. There are hundreds of definitions of representationalism each with varying definitions of qualia all of which could be true and Chalmer's statement correct. Further, even if it were completely true and that rather high bar of qualia were objectionable, then it would not follow that EM was true, rather it would follow that reductionist materialism just as likely to be true. Thus you are not putting forward an argument for your position, it actually applies to many. Interestingly, it is also the case that you seem to be demanding an all or nothing view of qualia, even a rudimentary understanding representationalism would show you that some degree of reductionism is most likely true (representationalism is actually based on that). So you are arguing against a straw man if you think that reductionism is not possible or that my position is dependent on it not being possible.



That would only be the case if there were some sort of solid argument for it, as we have seen repeatedly, in spite of your going around in circles trying to disguise (obviously concurrently hoping that no one even goes as far as to use google to fact check you), there is not such argument. There is no conclusion in the matter of the mind, to go further is to presuppose evidences that do not exist. You are once again dealing in absolutes in a case where they do not apply. In light of the lack of a conclusion one has a choice between options and must pick the view which is most likely to be true. Materialism accounting for consciousness is the consensus preference, it is flexible and broad and can be believed in, where as EM negates such a concept as a belief. I would encourage a reader to view your quote above, since it shows the essence of your evasion, rather than discuss an obvious weakness in your position, you slide off topic, in the hope you wont be drawn back to the main issue for a couple more pages, so you can do it again. Whats more is that not even the strongest professional proponents of EM consider the matter closed, so why should we grant you that supposition?

I shall put the link here again:
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/ ... ve-it.html



True but it does not follow that a collection of atoms cannot be a unitary object in terms of collective function. To insist otherwise would be silly. A star is a series of reactions, it is still a star. A cow is a series of atoms, it is still a cow. The brain of a cow is a series of atoms, it still functions as the brain of a cow. A human mind is a collection of neurons and hemispheres, the evidence of their unitary function is the lack of function when something goes wrong. You are just trying to play tricky with definitions here.



Properties of an object are real in their functions. A blunt piece of metal does not have the function of a knife, hence it does not have the property of being a knife. Please go and learn about objects and properties.




Once again, it is not transferable between objects. It is however produced as part of a process of objects. Those within the system are the components of the object. What makes it nontransferable is that a separate allocation of new but the same objects would not directly transfer the functions, rather they would create a new one. This is basic philosophy mate please google the ship of theseus. Once again an issue over you not understanding basic definitions.

Once again, you do not seem to be showing an appreciation of how unparsimonious your position is. You keep asserting it as if it is obvious and evident, I give you props for the sheer temerity of it but it is still not convincing. In the last three pages, you have not progressed a single inch, the criticism I made in the end of my last post still stands:

"There is still no affirmative argument here for EM, in spite of you rambling on for pages, it still does not exist. You have not produced one because having read the literature I can tell you that there is none. EM is a useful proposition that questions underlying assumptions, it is not a complete position and it has flaws in it's digestibility that mean that it can never be a default position for someone to believe. EM has functions, but not those that you are putting forward, it is an interesting hypothesis that works FROM the assumption that our fundamental understanding might be wrong. Our fundamental understanding might be wrong, but EM thinkers have tried to construct a theory without reference to the basic terms of what they call 'folk-phychology' and combined them with teleological arguments about where we have been wrong in the past. They have not yet demonstrated that we are wrong now. You have lipsticked this pig enough, its time to either make an argument for EM that has never so far been produced, or move on to a better position. Sir, you are still lacking an argument."

http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/ ... ve-it.html

The argument in this blog is nothing but begging the question. Quoting its key point:

In the last paragraph, really the author is just asserting knowledge is impossible without belief in his sense. Indeed, all an EM needs to do is to construct a theory of knowledge that does not involve qualia, say, mental fictionalism. There is no problem saying a computer has some knowledge of the world programmed. Likewise there is no problem saying a EM f-believes there is no belief qualia, where f-believe is some fictionalism construction.

As I already explained to Wittgenstein many times. If someone asserts demon pocession is required for beliefs, then can he use the same argument to prove anyone disagreeing with him self-defeating?

http://www.unc.edu/~ujanel/ElimWeb.htm

The key point of the article is applying a Moorean comparison of plausibility:



It might be fine if one is arguing for naive dualism. However, 91 'prefers' materialism because he accepts the conclusion of science. In more precise terms form the article, he accepts the same 'a priori principles connecting scientific truths to negative ontology' that leads to BOTH, materialism and EM! and is trying to argue for the former while arguing against the later. Really, such 'weaking of plausibility' due to philosophical principle of science is nothing but special pleading for a materialist.

p.s. there exists direct experiments, e.g. the phi experiement, which rules out the possibility of a singular Cartean theater.

What material is a 'function' or 'property' made of? Before you shout reductionism, note that reductionism only explains behavior, nothing else. For example, if I use a magnifying glass to start a fire, does the magnifying glass suddenly have a new function? How can something material come out of nowhere? What about other identical magnifying glasses? This shows the best philosophy of functions that is compatible with materialism is nonmialism. Since functions and properties are not real under nomialism, if a materialist and nomialist says the mind is some function and properties, he is again an eliminative materialist.

At this point, I believe your argument is taking on a significant degree of mendacity. Having argued for the better part of 13 pages now you should at least have enough of a grasp of the subject to know that Eliminative Materialism has so far not managed to construct an account of the mind in a way that could replace the standard accounts, which EM adherents refer to as 'folk-psychology'. What the article I posted does not, is not beg the question, but rather show significant deficiencies in the construction of an account of the mind that does not entail self-refutation on the epistemological level. As I have repeatedly pointed out to you, even the strongest proponents of EM consider the development of the concept to be a work in progress, therefor it is not inappropriate to illustrate areas in which they have so far failed to account for. Critics of EM are not engaging in a process of jamming new evidences and concepts into the subject and presupposing their value, as eliminative materialists engage in their process specifically for the purpose of creating an account of these things. The article I put forward no more begs the question than eliminative materialism does, because both are constructing accounts from the same 'folk-psychology' framework. What the article shows specifically is that taking on mental factionalism rather than reductionism or some other account entails a significant epistemological cost, something proponents of EM are aware of and some of which are working to resolve.

Any significant discussion of Eliminative Materialism must acknowledge the present state of the research. As a concept, I have repeatedly stated that it is a useful expression of skepticism but it does not yet represent a legitimate theory of mind in it's own right. Not even the highest proponents of EM would claim that they have constructed an inductive argument in favour of their position. Rather, they use references to the teleology of science. The point out that in the past significant understandings of subjects have defined our intuition and as such we ought to question them. This last sentence is certainly true, it does not follow from that they have an argument in favour of abandoning what they term to be our intuitive position. They have developed certain concepts like mental fictionalise and attempted to construct accounts of mental function without making reference to the mind but they have not yet succeeded. Hence, why their colleagues have been given their proposition such a cool reception. Since their position is neither intuitive nor complete it is hardly appealing.

However, I must take significant issue with how you are presenting the concept of 'mental fictionalism'. Simply asserting the concept as a complete position is neither credible or in line with the state of the research. Mental fictionalism needs an inductive argument for it's own sake and so far you have no managed to present much of one. Your argument needs to exist in line with the reality that as a concept it is unfinished, not intuitive, certainly not parsimonious and therefor does not recommend itself all that strongly. You might use it, as actual proponents of EM do as a useful expression of criticism and doubt of standard accounts, but saying that it can be asserted to fill the gaps in the research and demanding it be treated as a completed position, is simply not reconcilable with common sense or the present consensus within the wider philosophical community. Rather, when faced with a challenge you have preferred evasion to discussion and thus have not accomplished much. I have given you significant reason to doubt your accounts and so far you have not really engaged with them.



Not necessarily, most philosophers are representationalists and this sort of experiment is completely coherent with the results of this experiment. We have plenty of evidence of the brain 'filling in' information for the viewer in ways that Dennett tells us should not be occurring (Pessoa, L. and De Weerd, P. (2003), "Filling-In: From Perceptual Completion to Cortical Reorganization", Oxford University Press, USA). Essentially this is not the end of the discussion and EM remains a work in progress, not a completed position, so once again I ask you to present your subject in the light in which present community engages with it. Futher, Cartesian Materialism is not a particularly popular form of Materialism. The standard response to this criticism is that it constructs a straw man of materialism that almost no one actually holds to (The Review of Metaphysics Volume 53, Issue 2, December 1999 Page 508)



I am trying to figure out how you could have connected nonmialism with the mind. Since on nonmialism universals only exist in the mind, you are completely misunderstanding how this concept functions within philosophy. By arguing in terms of properties and functions, I have been using them to identify aspects of a concept. You seem to be arguing that something with a property or a function cannot exist, which is just completely crazy. A magnifying glass has the identity of being a magnifying glass but it also has the function of being able to start fires, it does not gain anything you have just discovered its existence through the identification of a function. Which is exactly how we deal with the mind, we find it through its functions and its properties. A Nonmialism might argue that those functions do not exist objectively in and of themselves, but that says nothing of the object under discussion. If the materialist is a nonmialist he is a materialist and a nonmialist, not an eliminative materialist. I actually have no idea how you cooked up this to the point where you could put it forward as, what you think of, as a compelling argument.

." Indeed, all an EM needs to do is to construct a theory of knowledge that does not involve qualia, say, mental fictionalism. There is no problem saying a computer has some knowledge of the world programmed. "
0100110
Any theory an EM creates is a fiction. * That is what fictionalism means. There is a problem saying that a computer has some knowledge of the world programmed. When an EM says that computers have some knowledge, he also winks and says that what he just said is not true (fictional).
* At least according to an EM. (See the Oxford University press site I gave)

0100110,
You do not believe in properties? Google "substance stanford encyclopedia philosophy". So only substance exists! All is one! So you're a mystic! And probably into Zen also! Zen "believes" that all concepts and discourse seperate us from reality.

Huh?

Eliminative materialism likes to pretend that it is scientific. However, it is the opposite. It is mysticism.
Actually, if one looks at extreme physicalism one realizes that it is indistinguishable from mysticism.

Blyth said that Zen is the unsymbolization of reality. Eliminative materialism states that intentionality (that one thing can refer to,represent or symbolize another thing) is NEVER possible. One can even call eliminative materialism an extreme form of Zen!
Eliminative materialism also embraces Zen's sense of humor. An EM will say, "I'm saying such and such and I am not saying such and such. (fictionalism) "

The opposite is true. The fictionalist pretend symbols exist, even if they don't, because symbols are useful.

Epistemology only requires some basic functions for the actors - namely conducting experiments, gathering data, generating and comparing theories. It does not care how these functions are implemented. I pointed out epistemology can be implemented into computers (at least in principle, indeed the former had been heavily done using computers). That is sufficient to prove the article wrong.

Even if EM does not yet provide a complete theory of mind, neither do representationism. However you would not claim 'significant epistemological cost' for the later. You are attacking a strawman.


Mental fictionalism is just a special case of 'instrumentalist fictions' in scientific fictionalism. The later is well developed and there is nothing new in mental fictionalism. More precisely, mental fictionalism simply advocates to treat folk psychology as an ontologically incorrect but useful fiction - similar to Newtonian gravity. What 'inductive argument' do you expect for scientific fictionalism? You are just having a wrong expectation.

Your argument needs to exist in line with the reality that as a concept it is unfinished, not intuitive, certainly not parsimonious and therefor does not recommend itself all that strongly. You might use it, as actual proponents of EM do as a useful expression of criticism and doubt of standard accounts, but saying that it can be asserted to fill the gaps in the research and demanding it be treated as a completed position, is simply not reconcilable with common sense or the present consensus within the wider philosophical community. Rather, when faced with a challenge you have preferred evasion to discussion and thus have not accomplished much. I have given you significant reason to doubt your accounts and so far you have not really engaged with them.



In the last post you said any materialism is better than EM. Now you back peddle and say 'Nobody' holds Cartesian materialism? The Cartesian theater is so central to folk psychology that rejecting its existence is at least a major concenssion to EM. Now what you are doing is doging from one form of 'standard' materialism to another.


I was saying a nonmialist who asserts the mind are functions are EM, because functions are not ontological according to a nonmialist.

You are conflating properties and functions with behavoir. A property is a fiction generated based on its behavoir, not the other way round.

Could you provide some details defending the view you have expressed?

I look to David Hume as a philosopher who has provided a just degree of eliminating mystic nonsense and metaphysics and substituting the material and empirical in their place.

ruveyn