Best of all possible worlds and atheism

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Sorry if someone mentioned it before, but I couldn't be bothered to read all 13 pages of this discussion. Isn't there a fifth possibility that God is not good at all (but evil, or more likely merely indifferent)? This seems to me more likely than points 2, 3 or 4. I can see why the definition of God needs omnipotency (otherwise not really God-like enough), but the requirement for goodness seems just like a human need for consolation of their personal tragedies rather than any specific requirement for God. In fact in many religions God is not benevolent at all, so this is not even a requirement.

It is nice to think that every negative experience in life has something positive going for it later on (and therefore that this is 'the best of all possible worlds'), but I've been around long enough now to realise that suffering wears people down in the end rather than making them better people. This is the sort of thing I would have believed as a teenager however, so I don't blame people who still naively think this way.

Anyway, the arguments that God could only make the best possible 'logical' world don't hold much ground. After all, surely an omnipotent God creates logic together with everything else. Just because we see logic as it is doesn't mean that other means of logic couldn't exist, just means that we can't imagine them because they are not logical in this universe.

By the way, I think that 1 is by far the most likely, but the small percentage of me that is still open to some idea of a God tends to think of a disinterested or even inept entity that created us by accident or as a temporary project, long abandoned to its own devices.

Ok. The issue is that my basic argument isn't really self-refuting. The logic holds. All that I am supporting is a premise of this argument, that this is not the best of all possible worlds.

I've presented a large number of reasons:
1) Consistency demands it, as if heaven is logically possible, and none of the goodness of heaven depends upon the existence of earth, then a just-heaven world would be better, if we are to understand heaven as a place of reward, better than this world.
2) By most standards of "better" we can imagine a world better than the current world at some function or another, and certainly by the basic standard of what we consider "better". Given that we have no reason to think that our conceptions are false, and conceivability is a metric by which we can often establish the truth of a logical claim, I see no problem.
3) Our basic emotions often rely upon the notion of "better" and our wishes and regrets both are claims that this world is worse than another possible world.
4) Given a very high probability of a given evil being necessary, the sheer number of evils suggests that at least one unnecessary evil exists.

Your basic rebuttal is focused upon ethical skepticism, but there is no reason why ethical skepticism should be taken seriously in this situation as well. It is ad hoc, especially since most notions of God have a clear ethical idea that relates back to our intuitions.


The premise isn't objectively based. In fact, many past societies have had slavery, and almost every society has the idea of pre-existing obligations.

Kant wasn't an existentialist, period. Believing that Kant was an existentialist is really just ultra-false. Kant was the father of a lot of philosophies unrelated to existentialism.

You haven't shown or even given any real reason to suggest that this world is the one where you can make the best life possible compared to any other world. In fact, given that most of your position is only contingent upon your nature, not the nature of the external reality, there are many many many worlds that could deal with the problem that you are trying to suggest. Given that your argument doesn't really seem to address the matter at hand, I am left thinking that you are kind of confused.

Finally, while you can talk about "selfishness being the highest virtue", the problem is that when this term is applied in the standard format, we find that the outcomes are generally considered highly unethical. This can be seen in our intuitive reaction to the term. This can be seen in our intuitive reaction to the outcomes of selfishness. This can be seen in the fact that almost every other ethical formulation is more intuitive both in roots and fruits. I mean, if you hold that Ayn Rand really upheld her philosophy, than the brainwashed nature of her cult itself is disproof of her philosophy. And the fact of the matter is that some very strong critics of the Rand cult have been pro-individual, pro-markets, and pro-liberty.
http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard23.html
http://www.2think.org/02_2_she.shtml


I don't commit to specific definitions, and I don't need a specific definition for skepticism on the matter anyway. I just need broad notions and the ability to show that something doesn't fit into those broad notions.

In fact, just in doing anything philosophic, committing to a definition is the step that I tend to refuse to take, or take hesitantly, and the reason being that the reality is always outside of the definition, and thus should be approached from a view holding that hesitance in mind. Words are imperfect representatives of our intuitive framings, and our intuitive framings are poor representatives of reality, but it is better to avoid building castles on the sky.


Umm, here's the problems:
1) Given that I am criticizing standard theism, which does not require evil to contextualize good at all, the point isn't that relevant.
2) The existence of something is not contingent upon the existence of an opposite. That is like saying that matter could not exist without spirit, or vice versa. Linguistically, we might need opposing ideas to find the description valid, however, the point you are making doesn't seem important. (we might not though, as distinctions does not need "opposing" something, but rather just "not" being something.)
3) Opposites in reality aren't necessary. For instance, the category of the "logically impossible" does not exist, even though we can reference it, and people can invent ideas that would fall in that category but do not exist in reality.
4) What you "see so simple" doesn't have to be true.


Umm.... ok? And I find the question irrelevant. I don't have to commit to an ethical theory to make the claim that what exists is not justifiable by the known ethical theories. In fact, it is better that I never commit, and instead compare this to existing and/or reasonable ethical theories.

I mentioned it briefly as a possibility on the first page. Most people aren't interested in exploring such an idea though, as theists are only interested in worshiping a good God and atheists aren't interested in worshiping any God. No one is interested in an evil God, and the few who are interested in an indifferent deistic God aren't going to care about this argument anyways.

I showed you it's answerable. Stop acting like a broken record.

Well, I guess I was assuming that we were interested in trying to work out something that might be true, rather than something we wanted to be true. In the latter case everyone is only going to believe what they want to believe anyway, so logical discussion is somewhat irrelevant (to be honest though, I did already know this).

Well, I think a major issue is that with less usual notions of God, we don't have as much emotional tug, so naturalistic explanation of it all makes sense.

Now, it is the case that when just dueling naturalism vs some notion of supernaturalism, more is required than just attacking the notion of God, but attacking the notion of God handles *most* cases of supernatural belief. The remaining cases then have to be dealt with on grounds of miracle claims.

AG wrote:

I don't commit to specific definitions, and I don't need a specific definition for skepticism on the matter anyway. I just need broad notions and the ability to show that something doesn't fit into those broad notions.

In fact, just in doing anything philosophic, committing to a definition is the step that I tend to refuse to take, or take hesitantly, and the reason being that the reality is always outside of the definition, and thus should be approached from a view holding that hesitance in mind. Words are imperfect representatives of our intuitive framings, and our intuitive framings are poor representatives of reality, but it is better to avoid building castles on the sky.



Umm.... ok? And I find the question irrelevant. I don't have to commit to an ethical theory to make the claim that what exists is not justifiable by the known ethical theories. In fact, it is better that I never commit, and instead compare this to existing and/or reasonable ethical theories.[/quote]

Maybe I really did lose one hundred IQ points as I feared on Friday afternoon. Does any of this seem logically contradictory to anyone else?

How can a broad notion prove a specific value? Exactly. It can't. If it's not good enough for Craig to say that nothing come from nothing, therefore since the universe is something it came from something and that something is God - a broad supposition proving a broad supposition attacked as logically inconsistent when applied to the specific question of God - why can you use broad strokes to prove the narrowness of your original premise?

Well? Do you see the hypocrisy and contradiction that is the hallmark of the Post-Modern world you admit you ascribe to?

From memory, you said best for God and for His design. So, I don't understand. Is this therefore the best of all possible worlds when it is His design, and therefore what is best for that world, that led to the world?

Remember, this is the only world on which this discussion is happening. Confine yourself to what is REAL.

Well then, I stand corrected and newbies can believe as they wish on that matter.

Perhaps 91, but not really anybody else.


I don't attack Craig's premise as logically inconsistent. I don't think it is logically inconsistent at all. There is area to doubt speculative cosmological theories of what happened billions of years ago though, especially ones that get extraordinary conclusions, like Craig's does.

How about this logical argument though:
1) No known valid ethical theories or intuitions support a claim, X, but rather it is opposed.
2) One ought to disbelieve anything that is opposed by known ethical theories and intuitions.
3) This claim ought to be disbelieved. (1 and 2)
4) This claim is that the world is the best of all possible worlds.
5) We ought not believe that this world is the best of all possible worlds. (3 and 4)

This is a logically sound argument. The "broad notion" idea is the support of premise 1, as the "broad notions" tend to represent the landscape of viable ethical theories and intuitions, and the claim " it is better that I never commit, and instead compare this to existing and/or reasonable ethical theories" is also more explicitly in support of premise 1.

Premise 2 may be contested on the grounds of "moral language", but the general gist of it is pretty basic in most people's epistemic practices. We do feel that it is proper to disbelieve certain claims if they contradict the entire body of pre-existing knowledge.

So, this is all taken care of.


No. First of all, nothing postmodern is being used. The closest I get to postmodernism is holding the distinction between language and concepts as a big thing, but that's not contradictory. My basic argument here is not postmodern though, but probably a lot closer to pragmatic, as I simply show that for all intents and purposes, we can treat the claim as dead simply because it contradicts the entire body of knowledge we start off with, rather than trying to prove it from "first principles", whatever the hell those are. Working broadly helps when dealing with broad issues.

Well, this is the REAL world in which there's no such thing as free will so don't argue for it.

And no, I said that the best world for God is one that has no sin in it and in which God can have his purpose of creating this world fulfilled with creatures that readily worship him and please him without question. Such creatures don't need the magical free will in order to be happy with God and to appreciate his greatness and love for them.

But the fact that this is the world we're in only shows that your Christian notion of God is unreal and that this world is the best world according to secular perspectives but not Christian ones.

@AG

Your article on Sobel's argument, describes the argument as being a tantamount to a failure. So by all means, keep submitting this sort of evidence in your defense.

As to your argument itself. It was the evidence you used that proved you could not conclude the premise as written. As to postmodernism well it's in your argument, your standard for best possible world is basically that it has to be a perfect world for you, sounds like standard subjective postmodernism to me.

PJW has given you an example of what is called an exceptional benefit. Something that could be easily lost, it might not even be able to exist in a different logical possible world. Most theists would argue that it is the number of saved that acts as the exceptional benefit. PJW has given you a second. So if you want to retread into a logical possible world, you need to offer us one in which these exceptional benefits would not be lost.

I read the Sobel article. I know the criticism, it isn't overwhelmingly strong, as all the author does is proposes that another model of rationality is desirable, however, I agree with the argument by "Ryan" in the comments, and I don't find the idea of reconceptualizing maximal goodness very engaging.

91, you've continued to fail to understand how arguments and premises can work. This is just a continuation of that when dismissing my argument. Everything presented is crystal clear though, and so much philosophy would have to be massively rewritten if your claim was anything close to valid. Nobody holds to the standard "every premise must be shown as absolutely true", and given that Sobel's argument had a similar standard, and the author didn't even contest that standard, finding it very plausible, I am not doing something invalid. This is very clear.

As for "perfect world for me", no, that's never been proposed. I've actually used other standards. As for "standard postmodernism" usually people who say that don't know what the hell they are talking about, and given how little you seem to be aware of the diversity in philosophical approach, I don't think you are likely knowledgeable on this matter either.

As for "might not be able to exist in a different logically possible world", that'd have to be shown to argue that some world is the best. Otherwise, if we can conceive of the benefit in another possible world and one even slightly better in some quality, then his argument fails.

Ok, 91, you're being ridiculous, and your method is clearly in error. The fact that you haven't given up only shows me that either you lack the intellectual virtue to recognize the truth, or you lack the competence to recognize the truth, but there is not a third option after all of the clear examples, and all of the efforts to educate you on the matter.

Much of this discussion is somewhat like what goes through an archeologist's mind when coming upon a featureless large rock and trying to theorize as to what kind of dinosaur might have walked across it millions of years ago and wondering whether it was hungry or tired or had sexual impulses at that event.

So a PHD, two encyclopedias, myself, Dr Craig and PJW all think the sort of argument is making is just bad. But the comments section on a blog says its ok... so therefor AG must be right.

The logical problem of evil fails when it is shown that God is not logically incompatible with evil. If it is admitted to that this is the case (as in the evidential argument), then the logical problem of evil fails. The evidential argument from evil assumes that God and evil are logically compatible. A probability statement from an evidential argument from evil assumes logical consistancy. So using a probability statement to prove the logical problem of evil assumes it has already failed. Therefor, you are self-refuting your own statement when you make an evidentialist claim to support the logical problem of evil.

You need to learn the difference between a metaphysical probability and an epistemic one. When you use a logical possible world claim, you are using a metaphysical probability statement. If you argue a probabilistic or evidential argument from evil you are claiming an epistemic probability. The burden of proof attached to the latter is totally different to the former. It philosophical amateurism to refuse to see a difference between the claims being made.



Wrong. Absolutely wrong, there is not even a logical possible world in the closet in heaven where you could remotely be considered right. The Sobel argument from evil has a caveat of probability attached to it (he indicates in his attachment to the work, that his premises are mere speculations and that he INTENDS this to be a mere concept argument, hence he escapes the charge of self-refutation). A caveat is something I and others have repeatedly told you, you should include. On Pg 444 of his book, Logic and Theism: Arguments for and against Beliefs in God, he admits to the implausibility of Moral Nihilism, considering the Moral Argument for the existence of God, this is tantamount to actually admitting evil can conceivably prove the existence of God (this is the most common response in the last few years to the argument). This is an implication that has been repeatedly made of his work and something he has not yet denied. Dr. Craig has also stated that the argument begs the question, something Sobel has also, not denied. On pg 405, the only reason he cites for the basis of his statements is that God's purpose is to make the world happy. It does not take Plantinga to state that God could have other purposes than this (Pg405).

The argument you have mentioned is known as Sobel's logical argument, it does not contain any probability statements (he put a caveat in anyway, just to be sure). It is an attempt to revive the logical problem from evil, with a much reduced standard of proof. He confines his statements relating to likelihood to his probabilistic argument (something you ought to do), later in his book. He separates these, because, he acknowledged (in his discussion on the probabilistic argument) that evidential arguments from evil cannot be used to support logical arguments from evil.

He even points out in his work that transworld depravity is not a necessary component of the free will defense. He attacks Plantinga for not necessarily using it in his work.



You just love to throw mud around. Your standard of logical possible worlds seems to be, this is better for me, nothing I value would be lost, therefor I must be right. Sounds like post-modernism to me.

@Orwell

He made an evidential argument from evil the moment he mentioned probabilities. Logical problems of evil are compatibility claims not likelihood claims.

Last edited by 91 on 13 Feb 2011, 4:33 am, edited 1 time in total.

This is just pathetic at this point. You still don't even understand the argument that you are attacking. You quite simply don't even know what was said. I've explained it to you probably two dozen times by now, and perhaps I have not communicated clearly enough, but I really think a very significant part of the problem here has to be on your end.

I give up. This is a lost cause. If you need me for something, I will be teaching new tricks to old dogs.