Best of all possible worlds and atheism

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No dude I didn't say I don't like logic itself. I just said I've come to find the word repulsive cuz of what people associate it with and how they use it. People associate "logic" with the "absolute truth" which is what gets on my nerves. Logic is a format that determines the consistency, completeness, and basic soundness of the premise not the truth of it. Validity is not the same thing as the truth. The truth isn't that cut and dried.

@ Orwell: I agree 100%

I understand. I get the difference between validity and truth--that's basic Intro to Philosophy kind of stuff.

The thing about "logic" and "absolute truth," though, from which the confusion comes is that there are things that can be logically said to be absolutely true. "I am the person who is writing this" would be one such thing.

The laws of logic are absolutely true. It doesn't take long to figure that out.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hfYJsQAhl0[/youtube]

No not really, just point out that the difference between a argument that seeks to show a logical incompatibility cannot be, in relation to the argument of evil, evidenualist. They are separate arguments and for a good reason. The evidenualist argument argument deals with the level of evil and makes a probability statement. If you want to say things are logically incompatible, as AG has stated his intention to be, you need more than probability, you need to demonstrate logical incompatibility. Using evidentualist arguments which support probabilistic statements automatically refutes the claimed logical incompatibility. Since if it can be shown that any logical compatiblity exists, then the claim of incompatibility breaks down (probability statements automatically demonstrate this). This logical incompatibility is very difficult to show hence why the logical argument of evil is considered a solved issue by almost every major philosopher.

Last edited by 91 on 07 Feb 2011, 7:11 pm, edited 1 time in total.

By "can", I really mean that such a being is capable of doing this, not that such a being will do this. For example, we can hold that God being omnipotent, has the actual capability to lie(as in God has the physical capability to construct sentences that are false), but he may possess the moral qualities preventing a desire to lie from ever forming, thus meaning in practice if God's character is set, God will never lie.(note: this can even be arguably phrased as "God can never lie", without sacrificing the notion of omnipotence)


Well, I'd say that your problem is really with premise 1. God does not necessarily have the power to actualize a world with free will that meets certain criterion. This is actually the free will defense, which has partially been debated on this thread already, where I basically deny that the defense works with Molinism, and I deny that free will empirically exists.


Well, right, it is a premise. It is not an invalid premise as most theists will hold God to be the maker of the world.


I think it is reasonably valid. I think 1 holds, and I've spent a lot of time arguing that premise 1 holds. I think 5 is reasonably valid. Ultimately, I think the only kind of theism that can really get out of this conundrum is actually open-theism, as it gives God the least ability to control outcomes.

91, that's ridiculous. Evidential arguments are only claiming that the evidence suggests something to be false in this world. They do not say anything about what is logically possible though. For instance, I can construct an evidentialist argument against square circles on the grounds of an absence of evidence for that shape in geometry textbooks, however, it may still be logically true that square circles are impossible.

Even further, if your point is valid, then the classic syllogism, the one that everybody uses to learn logic, is self-refuting. This syllogism is this:
1) Socrates is a man.
2) All men are mortal
3) Therefore Socrates is mortal.

Now, how do we establish premise 1, or premise 2? Evidentialist arguments! There is no logical incompatibility between being immortal and being a man, but rather the concept of an immortal man exists in all sorts of fictions. Even further, there is no logical incompatibility with Socrates not being a man, as Socrates could really have actually been an alien from another planet. However, this syllogism is a logical argument, and it is a logical argument by definition because it is a freaking syllogism.

I mean, Orwell's right! If you have to require logic to establish the validity of any premise, then you basically are left without much of an ability to argue anything, as the cosmological argument outright FALLS TO THE GROUND without the empirical knowledge we have of causation, as the premise "everything that comes into being needs a cause" is not an a priori finding, and some of the justification of the premise "the universe began to exist" comes from the empirically discovered Big Bang theory.

Are you absolutely insane?

You said this on the second page of this thread:



Here's my response.


So, I am outright confused. I've demonstrated the logical incompatibility of the 4 stated premises.
1) God can actualize any world
2) God must actualize the best world.
3) God actualized this world.
4) This is not the best world.

You disagree with premise 4. I don't have to justify premise 4 with logical arguments, because that's beyond the scope of my logical argument, just like the earlier syllogism on Socrates doesn't have to deductively argue that Socrates wasn't a bear. Nobody can actually deductively argue that Socrates wasn't a bear, but nobody considers that a flaw with the earlier syllogism.


No, they really don't. Probabilistic inference does not entail logical possibility. Probabilistic inference just is a weaker argument than logical incompatibility. So, I can say "It is probably true that all things require a cause", this does not entail that "It is true that all things require a cause is false", instead, all that I am really saying is that as far as I know, things require a cause, but I do not commit to the position that literally everything that exists requires a cause. All that probability presents relative to the logical certainty is a reduction in the strength of the knowledge claim, not a claim to knowledge about the opposite.

^^^^

I have no problem with what you are saying about logical arguments in general. You are trying to be too cleaver by half. The evidential argument refutes the logical argument in the case of the problem of evil. It is a well established philosophical fact. When you say that God could have made a world with less suffering, you are already admitting that suffering and God are to an extent compatible. You cannot then take the argument beyond the claims of the evidential argument, which you have repeatedly done and then attempted to evade being called on. You cannot then conclude the aim of the logical argument, that God and evil are incompatible.

91, if this were a "well-established philosophical fact" then you wouldn't have to just assert it. It is not as if Mackie suddenly converted to theism when his logical argument was shown to fail, but rather, here's what he said:
"Since this defense is formally [that is, logically] possible, and its principle involves no real abandonment of our ordinary view of the opposition between good and evil, we can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another. But whether this offers a real solution of the problem is another question."

Now, either this "well-established philosophical fact" was only relatively recently established in the scheme of things, or it was never established and you made it up.

If I say "God could have made a world with less suffering", I am saying "It is clear that some of this suffering is unnecessary." I am not saying "It is clear that some of this suffering is necessary", though. It is entirely possible that all of the suffering is unnecessary, but I think it especially clear that at least some of it is unnecessary. I am not claiming that an argument that all of it is unnecessary fails, I am just not committing strongly to that claim.

91, you're flat wrong. There is no other way to put it. You are either a grotesque liar, or you simply have no idea what the hell you're talking about.

@AG

So now you and mackie want to argue the evidential argument (which is what you are now doing when you concede the logical consistancy). See my criticism now? When I discuss the logical argument you argue the evidential and then when respond to the logical arguement you cite the evidential. This blatantly academically dishonest, or you are just ignorant of the difference between the arguments, since I have repeatedly explained themm the first is the only option left. So your stubborn inability to concede that your basic argument from logical consistency has put you in the exact same position you were in days ago, now you just look pigheaded and wrong, not just wrong.

@Orwell

Wow, what an argument, your a real brains trust, now go pick up a textbook and study something philosophical rather than playing the man instead of the argument.

No, we don't actually see one as invalidating the other. If something cannot be true, then it is also the case that we are not going to find empirical evidence in favor of it being true, and instead find the opposite.

91, I am not making a distinction between these arguments as all I am holding is that it is plausible that this is not the best possible world. All that is required for plausibility is that either a logical argument works or an evidential argument works. The only thing I can think that you are going wrong with is maybe you are misinterpreting my speculation on evil actions and probability, in which I held that if one holds that it is 99.9% likely that any individual bad action is for the good, then given the large set of bad actions, we are forced to recognize an unnecessary evil as the most likely thing true. That's not actually holding that I believe that the probability of any bad action for the good is 99.9%, that's only arguing that the position that all actions are for the good is deeply unlikely given our evidence, and ultimately that this being the best of all possible worlds is deeply implausible. It can actually be that the idea that 100% of bad actions being for the good is logically impossible, but that's a different argument.(and it can be true that the probability of any bad action being for the good is 99.9% likely, but that not all actions could ever be for the good, as there is no logical tension between the two propositions) Basically, all I did was show that the notion of the best of all possible worlds was absurd if we look at the matter from a probabilistic standpoint.

As for not really seeing the difference between the kinds of arguments... um... if I argue mostly on grounds of plausibility, the only difference I might make is it I explicitly use statistics, otherwise, any time I invoke a premise in a deductive, I tend to mostly mean that it is probably true/most plausible as true. The times I might not are when I am doing a reductio ad absurdum of another person's position. I don't see one kind of argument as necessarily being stronger than another sort, that is to say that I only see logical arguments as stronger in as much as I might see them as making stronger probabilistic claims on a subject, not in that I see logical arguments as necessarily having to be true. Too many logical arguments are later overthrown for me to rest comfortably in an abstract logical argument that doesn't agree with our evidential arguments.

91, given that 64% of the people who looked at this thread thought I was being honest, and only 14% thought I wasn't, I don't think I'm the one who is looking pigheaded here. Even further, most of the people who have spoken up also think you're being kind of stupid on the situation. You just don't know what you are talking about, as my method in arguing is usually shot-gunning a situation with a lot of solid arguments, and hoping that they stick. Please note: many philosophers will use both probabilistic arguments in conjunction with logical arguments, regardless of whether they are Christian or not. Michael Martin was the editor and a contributor to the book "The Improbability of God" along with "The Impossibility of God", and a lot of other major names contributed to BOTH books. If probabilistic arguments cannot be made by people who have logical commitments, then every single one of these PhD philosophers have openly admitted to their incompetence, but the issue is that they obviously haven't. Most people don't have an issue with going either way. Plantinga advanced both the EAAN and the ontological argument, the former is a probabilistic argument against naturalism, but the latter is something you take to be an absolute logical disproof of naturalism. How can Plantinga be honest if he uses a probabilistic argument, reasoning as if something is the case, when he has already formally disproved it? Either you're being ridiculous and have horribly misunderstood a situation, or the entire world of philosophy is INSANE and you alone have discovered the truth.

@AG

Now you are just trying to muddy the water, here is why.

Obviously using the evidential argument to make the case for the logical argument is a silly mistake on your part. So now you have cited, several totally irrelevant cases lets address each of them.

Firstly you are wrong about the reach of the evidential argument. It cannot conclude that God is impossible, only unlikely given the level of evil, though I would dispute this however that is for another time, that the existence of God is unlikely. It cannot reach the same conclusion as the logical problem since, as I have mentioned, repeatedly, that it allows for a level of suffering through the logical consistency.

Your statements relating to plausibility seem an ad hoc attempt to scale back your claim and now start talking about the evidential argument. You have stated that you were arguing the logical problem, with evidential premesis. Now that I have pointed out that the argument is self refuting you have changed your goal to that within the aims of the probabilistic (evidential) argument, Hence my charge of repeated dishonesty.

As to the book by Michael Martin, it is an anthology of arguments, this is just a diversion.

As to Plantinga, yes, he does make arguments from the logical inconsistency of things and from probability. However, the arguments that he uses are not self-refuting. I never said one could not argue both sorts of arguments. I just stated that one could not argue the problem of evil with both the logical and the eventual arguments without self-refuting the logical one. Seriously, this is basic stuff in relation to the problems of evil.

I explained why you're wrong. You apparently didn't get it, but there really can't be any serious dispute about the fact that you are wrong.

I am using evidential arguments to justify the claim that this is not the best of all possible worlds. Using evidential arguments to justify a premise is relevant.


91, I regard value of logical arguments as significantly lower than you do. I've expressed this opinion on multiple occasions. I use logical arguments to illustrate, but premises can usually, if not always, be doubted or used in a manner unimagined. As such, in practice, I don't see a real difference between a logical argument and a good probabilistic argument. In practice, the conclusion is the same, that is that a certain belief ought to be rejected because of the considerations.


Well, no, I've held to notions of plausibility as the real issue for a very long-time now. Not only that, but the way I presented the original post was not as if I was presenting a deductive argument. I said "Now, I don't believe that premise 4 is correct, but rather I think that a better world being logically possible is very basic. I think even a small child can understand why 4 seems unreasonable. However, I don't think that premises 2 or 3 are wrong. This means that I must reject premise 1. I think a lot of people will think similarly about the situation as well." This isn't a hard-nosed logical argument I started off presenting, so the idea that I am aiming and have been aiming at plausibility is not odd.

As for "self-refuting", I don't think anybody agrees with you on this. I think we are all confused as to your meaning, as you seem to hold that the presenter of both an evidential and logical argument for a claim must be refuting themselves, because evidential arguments implicitly hold that logical arguments fail. The issue is that evidential arguments do no such thing.

I haven't actually responded intellectually to your claim about self-refutation because I honestly don't see it, and I don't know what the hell you are talking about. At this point, I think it is more reasonable that you are mistaken on some claim of mine. However, you have not actually shown the formal contradiction, or the contradictory claims, leaving me just to guess feebly at what this online madman is trying to accuse me of dishonesty about. I don't even know what you are talking about at this point.


It is just a guess at what the hell you are talking about. I mentioned two books. One book was probabilistic arguments, the other was arguments for impossibility. If I understand you correctly, you are saying that a person cannot honestly extend both sorts of arguments at the same time, but my point was to argue that if this is the case, then a lot of philosophers are apparently dishonest, which leads us to a few absurd conclusions.


Umm..... you haven't actually presented an argument here. Secondly, your position just doesn't make sense. A person can say "The evidence supports this, as does this deductive rationale". There is no contradiction between the two positions, as evidentialism merely means that one is looking for empirical confirmation of a claim, not that the claim one seeks empirical confirmation for is potentially false. However, the simple, basic fact is that if one is logically correct, then the empirical evidence should bear out one's claims, which means that if a logical argument works then an evidential argument should work, and if the evidential argument does not work, but the logical argument does, then one has reason to think that the reasoning behind the logical argument is false. This is not ridiculous. This is not self-contradictory. This is simply rational, in looking for support in multiple frameworks for a claim, and if I am looking for evidential support, I am not going to be looking for the claim "It is logically necessary that X is true", but rather I am going to look at as "from these facts, it seems very likely that X is true", and if what is likely true agrees with what I argue as logically true by the argument, then both claims support each other. If you disagree with me, I don't know what to say, but I outright agree with Orwell's statement:
"91, you're flat wrong. There is no other way to put it. You are either a grotesque liar, or you simply have no idea what the hell you're talking about."

You seem to believe this is straightforward, but I haven't seen agreement. Mackie, a philosopher of note, as I pointed out, didn't consider the invalidation of his logical argument on evil to be an invalidation of the problem of evil, suggesting that unless you are talking about a new development in religious philosophy, either you're ridiculous or Mackie, the PhD philosopher, doesn't know anything about philosophy. That being said, if Mackie writing in the 80s doesn't know about this development, I am not necessarily dishonest for not recognizing this recent development. That being said, I don't think you're talking about a development, but rather I think that Orwell's statement is RIGHT.

AG

I am using evidential arguments to justify the claim that this is not the best of all possible worlds. Using evidential arguments to justify a premise is relevant.

This is premise three of the classical, logical problem of evil. Essentially it's a rebranding the original formal logical argument has as it's wording, 'if there isa God he prefers a world without suffering', the student you are citing has dipped this premise into the concept of 'possible worlds' in the hope of wiping it clean of the original scrutiny. Considering that in the past you have shown an awareness of the difference between the logical and evidential arguments of evil, I assumed you knew this was essentially one of the original points. Now you have also stated that you are arguing the logical argument of evil. The standard of proof involved in this requires that you demonstrate logical inconsistency. Using the points from the evidential argument is self-refuting. The evidential argument (not ANY evidential argument, THE evidential argument from evil) I have given up counting how many times I have stated this, admits to the logical consistence and offers a probabilistic argument. So if you use the evidential argument to justify a THE (not ANY logical argument) logical argument from evil, you are refuting it through your own evidence.

If you want to argue the best possible world and attempt to demonstrate that is world is logically inconsistent with evil, you cannot use THE (not any, as you continually confuse) the evidential argument to make the claim that God CANNOT have a reason for the level of suffering. The evidential argument allows for the possibility that God COULD have a reason for ANY level of suffering. It is not possible for you to draw a CANNOT conclusion from THE evidential argument.

As to your last paragraph, this is just an inability to tell the difference between THE logical argument and ANY logical argument, when discussing the problems of evil. If you want to argue the logical argument from evil, then find a new premise for it, all the others have been smashed to bits. Trust me, if you can, you will be able to get it published.