Best of all possible worlds and atheism

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Ok? I don't think that anybody is being unfair here. The concept "best of all possible worlds" has been scrutinized from the beginning resulting in Voltaire's work Candide mocking the doctrine. Even further, "better world" is broader than "less suffering". It can also mean greater joy. The vagueness of the concept better allows us to think of the set of goods out there, and really start thinking of counter-factual ideas for improvement, period. Improvement does not necessitate a reduction of suffering even though that is the most obvious form of improvement. Technically, anything that is a good increased by a proposed change is better.


Actually, no, I really haven't. Whenever the term "problem of evil" comes up, it is actually your comment. I just admit that the issue is tied together. I've presented a logical argument, and I've presented it on the grounds that there are a few premises, and that I believe that the premise that God exists results in the most plausibility.


The four premises ARE logically inconsistent.
1) God created this world.
2) God can create any possible world
3) God must choose the best choice of his options.
4) This is not the best possible world

You just don't think all of the premises are true and you contest the truth of premise 4. That's a different argument. However, the fact that there is a logical consistency issue is basic. Because God cannot be the creator of a world that is not the best if God must pick the best world, and if God is capable of picking the best.


Well, I am giving an evidential argument for premise 4. As Orwell points out, I have to get my premises from somewhere, and it is not invalid to use evidence to arrive at a premise. Even further, evidential arguments do not presuppose the falsity of logical arguments. Evidential arguments are simply empirical arguments that use probabilistic standards rather than deductive standards in showing their claim, and which usually make weaker claims for satisfying their truth. Given that I don't hold that premises have to be 100% true, (otherwise literally every premise would have to shown a priori, or it would have to be hand-waved off as "properly basic"), this is entirely a valid move. Throughout this entire discourse, and probably numerous other ones, I've held to this same standard on the matter, never really arguing that my premises have to be infallible, but instead willing to provide evidence for their plausibility. Claims to the contrary are mere projection.


I am using an evidential argument to justify a premise. This premise is part of an argument that justifies a logical argument from evil/imperfection. The argument is logical. In fact, a lot of people will outright agree with the claim that this world is not the best possible world, and even find this an obvious statement. In as much as this argument addresses those individuals, it is entirely deductively valid. You contested a premise. I provided data supporting this premise in the form of both evidential and deductive arguments. You now keep on fuming that I am intellectually dishonest because I am not holding myself to standards YOU INVENTED, and then YOU IMPOSED ON ME, when I was reasonably clear on my communication throughout on the matter, and in a world where arguments using premises considered questionable is not unusual. (in fact, most philosophers focus their disagreements on premises because usually logical structure is easy, while premises are the weak point)


I've repeatedly denied the necessity of answering this goddamn standard. I don't have to prove that premise 4 is an infallible premise to use it in an argument. Disagreeing with you on this is not the same as intellectual dishonesty if I have stated this! Now, I have provided arguments under the assumption of plausible reasons, and some of these are pretty deductive in nature. I have also provided evidential arguments that the idea that there is a reason for God to have a reason for all of this suffering is not plausible, which justifies the premise that this is not the best of all possible worlds, which I use in a logical argument. I don't know what the hell your problem is with this. I know this is an AS forum and some people have special issues, but maybe you should take a step back and recognize that in order to argue that I am being intellectually dishonest, I have to actually agree with your interpretations of my procedures, but I don't, and places where you have MASSIVELY misinterpreted people on this forum are not odd, nor are places where you have misunderstood arguments, so, given our background knowledge it seems more plausible to me that you are making a huge mistake, than that I am being intellectually dishonest. Even further, the fact that most people don't think that I am being intellectually dishonest functions as further evidence of this claim. Inferring what another person is thinking and meaning from their words is a inferential. It is evidentialism. This means that in making a claim like intellectual dishonesty, you can possibly be wrong, and you cannot handle this in a deductive manner. I think that as Orwell and myself have put forward, there is a logical chain and this logical chain is valid and used in other places, even the classical syllogism on the mortality of Socrates, which is a deductive proof of his mortality.


The evidential argument does not disprove that God could have a reason. It does not make the POSITIVE CLAIM that logical reasons exist though, it just claims that evidentially the level of evil is implausible given our background knowledge about a God. A person can put forward both arguments without contradiction, and if nearly all premises in an argument are doubtable, then the line between an evidentialist argument and a logical argument become blurred, as both will only speak on the matter of probability. That being said, I am using evidential arguments to justify the premise that this is not the best possible world. Even if God *could* have a reason, I can still construct a deductive argument based upon a premise if I deem accepting this premise as more plausible than not, and I can be justified in doing so.


Umm... 91, you haven't shown my premise implausible. Most people find this premise intuitively plausible. I find no problem referring back to these intuitions as providing justification for considering this claim plausible, especially given how much people reference these intuitions daily and instinctually. I also find no issue in saying that if heaven is logically possible, and heaven is not logically dependent upon the existence of an earthlike state, that heaven being almost by definition a better world, provides proof of my claim. Even further, given the sheer number of evils, unless we set the probability that any particular evil is for the best to be very very very high, we find that we have to set the probability that all evils are necessary to be very low. Now, given that I am arguing plausibility, I am really hitting a walnut with a sledgehammer here.

None of your counter-arguments have actually addressed my point. You've presented possibilities, but no plausible possibilities. You've presented skepticism, but I've rejected this skepticism as ad hoc skepticism. Finally, you've presented question-begging counter-arguments, as you can't argue against an argument that God does not exist with an argument that presupposes the existence of God. Almost every human being knows that this is invalid. As such, you have not given me reason to think my premise, that this world is not the best of all possible worlds, is implausible. If I still find is plausible, than using it in a deductive argument is valid. Now, if you want some massive logical argument from me to show my internal consistency, then fine:
1) Premises are fallible, and can be established using fallible means.
2) It is valid to use premises to construct an argument.
3) "This world is not the best of all possible worlds" is a premise.
4) "This world is not the best of all possible worlds" is fallible. (1 and 3)
5) "This world is not the best of all possible worlds" is valid to use to construct an argument. (2 and 3)
6) "This world is not the best of all possible worlds" is both fallible and valid to use to construct an argument (4 and 5)
7) If "This world is not the best of all possible worlds" is both fallible and valid to use to construct an argument, then objections that the premise is fallible and thus cannot be used to construct an argument are invalid
The objections found in 7) are invalid (6 and 7)

This is a logically consistent argument. Every premise follows to its conclusion. I accept premises 1, 2, and 7. Where is the intellectual dishonesty, 91? I deductively disproved it.

OK, 91, basically AG's argument begins by stating that Leibniz was interpreting theology correctly when he said that Christianity implies this to be the best of all possible worlds. It then claims that this is not, in fact, the best of all possible worlds. The form goes like this:
p implies q
not q
therefore not p
Where p="Christianity is true" and q="This is the best of all possible worlds."

If you have a trouble with the above form, there is something severely wrong with you. Now, !q isn't something that has to be established by some sort of deductive logic. It's an observation, and a pretty f*****g obvious one at that. So the way to still uphold Christianity here is to say either that Leibniz was wrong (that is, p does not imply q), or to redefine "best" in a completely arbitrary, meaningless, and ultimately tautological way such that q is true.

Either way, you simply aren't being honest in your dismissal of AG's point as though he were making an obvious and stupid error. You are very clearly the one who is making elementary errors in this thread. I mean, unless you are willing to say that Leibniz was an idiot who had no idea what he was talking about, then even if you believe AG to be wrong here it is not as though he is making an obvious mistake that would get him "giggled at" in a philosophy classroom.

You state

The four premises ARE logically inconsistent.
1) God created this world.
2) God can create any possible world
3) God must choose the best choice of his options.
4) This is not the best possible world

Reply

This first statement of yours reaches this IS not the best possible world. Your argument does not state this IS MOST LIKELY not the best possible world. Where the logical problem of evil fails is that one can show that this conclusion is not justified. The almost universally accepted response is to reject the fourth premise on the grounds that God only needs a sufficiently good reason reason for the level of suffering. This is why the logical problem is near universally declared as solved by modern philosophers.

You state

I don't have to prove that premise 4 is an infallible premise to use it in an argument.

You do of you want your conclusion to be valid. If you wanted to establish an evidential or probabilistic case against God then you would need to argue MOST LIKELY in your fourth premise, rather than IS NOT. If the fourth premise is fallible in any way, then the conclusion it reaches is does not follow from the preceding premises. The argument from logical inconsistency requires that there is no possible world where it is where the premise is true. Rather like showing a married bachelor or a square circle cannot exist in any world and therefor is logically inconsistent. Your resistance to the obvious logic of this is what makes you dishonest. I have making essentially the same point for two days now.

@Orwell

His conclusion does not follow from his argument, it is a basic flaw.

To say this is not the best of all possible worlds requires that we have access to other worlds for comparison. So where is another world that we can compare this world to?

ruveyn

To say that this is not the best of all possible worlds requires that we can make reliable counter-factual statements. So, for instance, if I said that homo sapiens were poorly designed, it is very likely that I am also claiming that this is not the best possible world, because I am holding that a better design is more apt and would have better outcomes. (If a different design would not be better in practice, then what value is there in saying that it is better) Given that we do make counter-factual statements that we rely upon for our judgements and emotions, saying that these are all unreliable leads us to large behavioral inconsistencies, therefore, to be consistent, we have to say that when I regret something I did, it is because the world in which I made that action is a worse world than the one in which I didn't, because if my actions are all towards the best, then I have no justification to ever feel regret or to wish things were different.

All of this being said, I would have taken you to like the work Candide by Voltaire. Is this not the case?

It's not hard to think of a better possible world, and that's all that is necessary. God is omnipotent, he could easily wipe out, say, leukemia. Better can only be defined in human terms, and I think that leukemia is a pretty awful thing to stick in a perfect world.

@91: I'm not buying it, either. The reason why is I don't accept the truth of the premises to begin with.

Seriously, think about all of them. I have to call into question #1, as in "In what sense did God create this world?" God created the heavens and the earth in the beginning. He is responsible for the medium in which we exist. In that sense, #1 is true. But if we're referring to the state of creation AS IT IS, then no, God did NOT create THIS world. The argument against God falls apart if we can determine that other factors are involved in which the current state of things came to be.

#2 is true because God is omnipotent. God has the ability to create the world AS IT IS. However, God is by nature good. Therefore, any possible world that God (as opposed to anyone else who may not be good by nature) creates will be by nature a good creation. The world in which we live is not good. Therefore, God did not create the world as we understand it right now.

#3 is not necessarily true. Why MUST God make the best choice? It seems to me that if the world is not good as God is good, then God should have simply chosen to wipe it all out and start over. The flood of Noah, in fact, was such a catastrophe for the purpose of wiping the slate clean. But by allowing one righteous family to carry on, God makes a choice based on mercy and not on "choosing the best choice." Apparently God feels that there are things that are best that don't agree with our sensibilities. If He's God, He can do that.

Something else I wonder about: Why is it necessary to think God really has options? #2 only demonstrates what God is able to do, not what He actually does. If God can create any possible world, then He can also create something perfectly and get it right the first time. There's no need to weigh options if God already knows what He's going to do. So if God creates a creature that has the ability to mess up a perfectly good creation, He can also decide that since He did His job right the first time, there is no point in starting over (completely), and rather He can continue with the world created by His creation and work through the actions of that creation to accomplish His design for the world--whether the actions of that creation are intended for good or for evil.

Apparently, if God is having to make choices from a list of options, He finds it more divinely appealing that mercy is demonstrated through a fallen creation. This world may not have been what God chose. But the creation of salvation is the "best choice," all other things considered.

#4 is true. But that doesn't imply that THIS is the world God created.

If THIS world is not the one God created, you can't say that these 4 premises are necessarily true, much less consistent or inconsistent. And certainly, if that is so, they are a poor argument against the existence of God.

And it is more likely that all men are mortal. I don't have to throw in the likelihood notion to use something as a premise. I can use something as a premise simply if I consider it a justifiable belief. As it stands, we know most beliefs probabilistically, but it is not a requirement that we state our knowledge in probabilistic terms, and for this reason, arguing that I should have to state a knowledge claim in probabilistic terms because YOU disagree, is not reasonable. I presented the logical argument. I know that in presenting this logical argument, people can disagree with a premise. I don't have to present a premise I consider obvious in probabilistic terms though, just like I don't have to present everyday knowledge claims in terminology of "I probably saw a man. He probably wore glasses. I probably think that the shirt he was probably wearing looked ugly to me". As such, there is no inconsistency in my part, and people go around using notions they establish probabilistically in deductive arguments all the time.


No, I don't. My conclusion logically follows from the premises. My premises are all very likely valid. So, if my conclusion rests on the validity of the premises, then my conclusion is also likely valid. Do I have to consider a belief to be infallible to consider it justified? No. Do I have to consider a belief to be infallible to consider it true? No. youarenotwhatyouis established this in his agnosticism thread. So, my premise 4, being a belief I consider a justified true belief, is perfectly fine to use in a deductive argument, and that's how most people would do this if they didn't think that the opposite of a premise was plausible.

That being said, you are just deeply confused. "following from preceding premises" has nothing to do with the quality of the premises. I could have used completely false premises and still had a conclusion that followed. For instance:
1) Socrates is a bear
2) Bears are immortal
3) Therefore socrates is immortal.

My conclusion did follow from the premises to argue that Socrates was immortal, it is just that my conclusion that socrates was immortal was wrong, and my premises on bears and immortality were also wrong. So, what you are trying to argue just goes against logic 101. I can present perfectly deductive arguments with even invalid premises without being intellectually dishonest, unless I present my argument as a gospel or seriously try to persuade somebody in a dishonest manner. This is not what I did. Your point that I am being intellectually dishonest is just wrong, period. It is grossly wrong, and Orwell's previous statement: "91, you're flat wrong. There is no other way to put it. You are either a grotesque liar, or you simply have no idea what the hell you're talking about." is actually correct. Your dispute against my argument is really ad hoc, unless you dispute the classical Socrates syllogism:
1) Socrates is a man
2) All men are mortal
3) Therefore Socrates is mortal

And if you dispute the Socrates syllogism, you have bigger fish to fry than myself.

I understand the chaos theory argument, but I don't think that your thinking broadly enough here. Consider this;

1, there is a god
2, he is omnipotent
3, therefore, he determines the laws of physics, and even of logic
4, god can therefore wipe out cause and effect altogether, and sidestep all this utilitarian-type optimization.

Forgive the nitpick, but 3 doesn't hold. I don't think God created logic. I think God by nature is a logical being, that it is a characteristic of God and that the logical order of the universe is less a "creation" of God and more His stamp on it.

4 is only a problem if we assume that just because God has the ability to do something that He necessarily DOES it. It also violates God's nature to do so.

@AG

Your statement:

'No, I don't. My conclusion logically follows from the premises. My premises are all very likely valid.'

From the source meterial

'The logical problem of evil claims that God’s omnipotence, omniscience and supreme goodness would completely rule out the possibility of evil and that the existence of evil would do the same for the existence of a supreme being'
-Internet Encylopadia of Philosophy (The Logical Problem of Evil)

'All that is needed to show the failure of the logical problem of evil is to show that God's can possibly have a reason for the permitting of any suffering. If this is even possibly true, the logical argument fails'
-Blackwell Companion on Natural Theology (The Question of Suffering and the Problems of Evil'

'You see, the atheist presupposes that God cannot have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world.  But this assumption is not necessarily true. So long as it is even possible that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil, it follows that God and evil are logically consistent.  And, certainly, this does seem at least logically possible.  Therefore, I’m very pleased to be able to report that it is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers that the logical problem of evil has been dissolved.  The co-existence of God and evil is logically possible.'
-William Lane Craig (Problem of Evil, ReasonableFaith.org)

So no, you cannot use the evidential argument, it allows for possibility Your argument is self-refuting. As are your own statements about likelihood. Your argument is a failure.

You clearly don't understand basic logic. His conclusion follows from his premises; that is, his logic is valid. You are attempting to dispute a premise. At least acknowledge that basic fact.

I'm starting to be a little puzzled here. Are you really this much of a moron, or are you just irrationally stubborn to the point where you will not concede that you were wrong? These are not difficult concepts. Even schoolhildren should be able to comprehend simple questions like this. I would expect this kind of thickheadedness from someone like Inuyasha, but really not from anyone else.

No matter how often it is aserted you won't make it true. His conclusion CANNOT flow from his argument. I am seriously correct on this, the evidential claim he is making cannot support his claim to a logical inconsistency. Take for instance the case of a square circle. There is an implicit logical contradiction in a square circle.

However, if I were to make a claim that theoretically a circle could be square and then
proceed to make the case from there, I could not justify the conclusion, it would refute itself. In order to disprove a claim of logical inconsistency all you need to do is demonstrate a theoretical contradiction. One cannot actually demonstrate a square circle or a married bachelor in any possible world. One can however demonstrate that God and suffering are not necessarily contradictory. Hence the death of the logical argument from evil. AG has, and continues to, argue an evidentualist case, through his use of probabilities.

Here is what the Internet encyclopedia of philosophy (I can provide more sources if you like) says about the claims of the two.

'[evidential]arguments are not to be confused with logical arguments from evil, which have the more ambitious aim of showing that, in a world in which there is evil, it is logically impossible—and not just unlikely—that God exists.'
(this is from the page on the evidential argument from evil)

Now look again at what AG has said:

'Given that I don't hold that premises have to be 100% true, (otherwise literally every premise would have to shown a priori, or it would have to be hand-waved off as "properly basic"), this is entirely a valid move.'

'I've repeatedly denied the necessity of answering this goddamn standard. I don't have to prove that premise 4 is an infallible premise to use it in an argument. Disagreeing with you on this is not the same as intellectual dishonesty if I have stated this! Now, I have provided arguments under the assumption of plausible reasons, and some of these are pretty deductive in nature.'


'I presented the logical argument. I know that in presenting this logical argument, people
can disagree with a premise. I don't have to present a premise I consider obvious in probabilistic terms though, just like I don't have to present everyday knowledge claims in terminology of "I probably saw a man. He probably wore glasses. I probably think that the shirt he was probably wearing looked ugly to me". As such, there is no inconsistency in my part, and people go around using notions they establish probabilistically in deductive arguments all the time.'

So using an evidential argument in pursuit of the goal of the logical one, is self-refuting. Do you see what I am saying now? Remember what I pointed out in my last post about the failure of the logical argument.

'You see, the atheist presupposes that God cannot have morally sufficient reasons for permitting the evil in the world.  But this assumption is not necessarily true. So long as it is even possible that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil, it follows that God and evil are logically consistent.  And, certainly, this does seem at least logically possible.  Therefore, I’m very pleased to be able to report that it is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers that the logical problem of evil has been dissolved.  The co-existence of God and evil is logically possible.'
-William Lane Craig (Problem of Evil, ReasonableFaith.org)

AG has, in the past, show an awareness of the difference between these arguments. I have repeatedly explained to him why the argument does not work. Hence my assertion that he is being academically dishonest. I personally think that he is so used to people not calling him out on this stuff that has now bet such a large proportion of his ego on the outcome he cannot be seen to be backing down.

'A person can put forward both arguments without contradiction, and if nearly all premises in an argument are doubtable, then the line between an evidentialist argument and a logical argument become blurred, as both will only speak on the matter of probability'
-AG

Another really good example of what I am talking about. This clement is totally contradictory. Please consider this as a part of my last post. Unfortunately editing it is remarkably difficult on the platform I am presently using, so I apologize.

@AngelRho

Your last couple of posts are well argued. I agree with most of what you are saying.

Thanks! Strictly my opinion, of course, but something always struck me as wrong about the argument AG presented. Sometimes the answer to the problem really is the most obvious one, and the premises involved are WAY too limiting.

You guys are getting WAY too deep for me, but it's certainly worth discussing. I actually had a bad dream last night about this thread--which tells me I'm WAY too preoccupied with WP right now. I feel the need to withdraw from it for a while and maybe just read what everyone else has to say. Maybe I'll come back in a couple of weeks--absence from something can work wonders for a sense of clarity!

I personally think the evidentiary direction is an effective strategy in advancing Christianity on an intellectual level. It's certainly the easiest, at least for me, as long as the focus is on content rather than "technique" (i.e. I have no idea what you guys are talking about). Keep in mind the best arguments are by nature logical, though, and I don't think what you're doing is really divorcing evidence from logic. Constantly re-evaluate, though, to be sure that you aren't.

I've also come to the realization that I've studied the Bible enough that merely arguing Biblical points on strictly Biblical content is not enough for me to conversive on more complex topics. I've read one article by William Lane Craig, and I'm thinking maybe some of his "lighter" work might be a good start for me. Variety is, after all, the spice of life; or, as Johnny 5 would say, "need more eenput!"