Best of all possible worlds and atheism

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His conclusion follows from his premises. You can reject his premises, but that becomes another debate, and that is the only place where I saw AG bring up an evidentialist argument.


No, you really aren't, and you're just making yourself look foolish.


The argument in this thread didn't even claim to demonstrate an incompatibility between God and suffering, so this is just a pathetic straw man.

Do you understand the argument AG is making, at all? Try to restate it, in your own words.


No, it really isn't. At all. The logical argument has to do with getting from a set of premises to a conclusion. The premises do not have to be arrived at through deductive logic (and they are not in almost any argument) but are obtained either because they are agreed to be reasonable assumptions, or they are direct observations.


What you are saying is simply wrong. Unless there is a rather extreme miscommunication here, you're just an idiot.


The argument AG put forward doesn't claim to prove the incompatibility of God and evil, though. The claim is that God must actualize the best possible world, and thus clearly senseless and gratuitous evils, especially those that cannot be hand-waved away by blaming "free will" are a problem.


What "morally sufficient reasons?" There really is a lot of completely senseless evil in the world. I really doubt that you can hold to this sort of argument without destroying your own notions of what constitute "good" and "morality." But anyways, let's just go ahead and accept that evil and God are compatible. There is still the issue that, according to Leibniz and plenty of other thinkers, God is bound to create the best possible world, so there is simply no possible way in which our world could be better than it is. Do you believe that this is the best of all possible worlds?


Trust me, that's not the case. You are wrong here, and obviously so.

@Orwell

For the record, this is the traditional, logical problem from evil, recognize anything?

'Mackie and McCloskey can be understood as claiming that it is impossible for all of the following statements to be true at the same time:

(1) God is omnipotent (that is, all-powerful).
(2) God is omniscient (that is, all-knowing).
(3) God is perfectly good.
(4) Evil exists.

Any two or three of them might be true at the same time; but there is no way that all of them could be true. In other words, (1) through (4) form a logically inconsistent set. What does it mean to say that something is logically inconsistent?

(5) A set of statements is logically inconsistent if and only if: (a) that set includes a direct contradiction of the form “p & not-p”; or (b) a direct contradiction can be deduced from that set.'
(From the Internet encyclopedia of philosophy, logical problem of evil)

You say


His conclusion follows from his premises. You can reject his premises, but that becomes another debate, and that is the only place where I saw AG bring up an evidentialist argument.

Response

No the conclusion in his fourth premise states 'is', this requires more than an evidentialist claim. For it to be evidentialist it would need to state 'most likely'. If I can show a logical contradiction, discussion about the best possible world becomes moot, the confusion cannot support that statement either, if there is no inherent contradiction between God and suffering.

You say

The argument in this thread didn't even claim to demonstrate an incompatibility between God and suffering, so this is just a pathetic straw man.

Response

Yes it does. It is arguing that God cannot have a reason for the level of suffering.

From the Internet encyclopedia of philosophy (I can provide more sources if you like).

Statements (6) through (8) jointly imply that if the perfect God of theism really existed, there would not be any evil or suffering. However, as we all know, our world is filled with a staggering amount of evil and suffering. Atheologians claim that, if we reflect upon (6) through (8) in light of the fact of evil and suffering in our world, we should be led to the following conclusions:

(9) If God knows about all of the evil and suffering in the world, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and yet does not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good.
(10) If God knows about all of the evil and suffering, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, wants to prevent it, and yet does not do so, he must not be all- powerful.
(11) If God is powerful enough to prevent all of the evil and suffering, wants to do so, and yet does not, he must not know about all of the suffering or know how to eliminate or prevent it—that is, he must not be all-knowing.
From (9) through (11) we can infer:

(12) If evil and suffering exist, then God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good.'

This is a part of the first argument I posted at the top. The claim that this is not the best of all possible worlds is an attack on the omnipotent nature of God. It is attempting to establish the an omnipotent being could have made a better world, hence that he could not have made this one. This is the attempt to show the logical contradiction.

You say

What "morally sufficient reasons?" There really is a lot of completely senseless evil in the world.

Response

No I can reject this, this is not my burden of proof. All I have to do is show that God can have a possibly, no matter how tiny, have a reason. This destroys the logical claim of inconsistency, there is a reason that this problem is considered dead in modern philosophy.

So the argument is a failure. Do you get it yet?

seriously, 91?

if there's a limitation on how god can create the world, he is limited. claiming a "morally sufficient reason" for evil is for those of us who lack omnipotence and omniscience. supposedly having both, no matter how "morally sufficient" a reason might be, it would still be a limitation.

this shouldn't surprise me. you are willing to assert that god is causeless (by sheer necessity, no less) while maintaining that nothing can be causeless. it follows nicely that you assert that there are limitations on this unlimited being.

Replace (4) by "this is not the best of all possible worlds." There is a meaningful distinction there. You could claim that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God could only actualize logically possible worlds, and thus perhaps there is no way to eliminate all evil. But an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God still has to actualize the best world that is possible for him to actualize. The premise in AG's argument was that this world cannot reasonably be considered the best that an omnipotent God could do.


No, the premise is fine saying "is." The logic issue only deals with going from premises to conclusions, not with the truth of the premises themselves (you do understand this, right?) Now, the evidentialist claims were brought in when you wanted to say that that premise was false. There has been absolutely no fallacy or error made by AG in arguing that (unless I've missed something).


This sentence was completely incoherent. As far as I can tell, it doesn't actually mean anything in the English langauge. As another poster said, I award you no points, and may God have mercy on your soul.


You are equivocating. The argument was one of choosing the optimal of (presumably infinitely many) options. Perhaps every possible world includes suffering and evil, but the claim "this is not the best of all possible worlds" asserts that other possible worlds have less suffering or evil than this world. And that claim is trivially true. This world minus dysentery would have less suffering, and leads to no logical contradiction, so it can be presumed that an omnipotent God limited only by maintaining logical consistency could make a world exactly like this one, but with no dysentery. This implies that God did not in fact create the best world He conceivably could have.


It really seems like more of an attack on the omnibenevolence of God, or at least many of the typical responses to the problem of evil have made it such.


You're ridiculous. It most certainly is your burden of proof. Your only way out is to basically say "God works in mysterious ways" which is a meaningless aphorism used to avoid having to actually answer real questions. What "morally sufficient reasons" are there for ebola and another quadrillion and one horrific facts of our Earthly existence? The only way to justify these evils is to redefine "good" out of existence. The claim that God is omnibenevolent then becomes completely meaningless in any human context.


You are the one who does not get it. You don't understand basic logic. You don't understand what AG is even saying in this thread. You don't understand the distinction between premises and inferences.

OK, here is a repost of my abbreviated form of the argument.

Now, 91, answer this question: is this world the best world that could possibly exist, was Leibniz a complete and utter moron, or are you just wrong somewhere else in the process?

91, my argument wasn't that argument, as such, your restatement fails. I did not argue that the existence of any evil was incompatible with God's existence. In fact, I actually never really made an argument at all, but rather you saw my post, and then you assumed I made an argument by analyzing a prior argument. (For the most part, everybody is willing to go along with this, as what I said could have been restated in a deductive form anyway) But, you tried to argue against my "argument" without me actually presenting an argument against God's existence. I presented an argument that this is the best of all possible worlds and held that the worst premise was God's existence.

"The argument in this thread didn't even claim to demonstrate an incompatibility between God and suffering, so this is just a pathetic straw man.

Response

Yes it does. It is arguing that God cannot have a reason for the level of suffering. "

No, actually Orwell is right. I didn't argue that all suffering was incompatible with the existence of God.

Umm.... but if I am holding that an argument's premises are accepted on grounds of PLAUSIBILITY, then there is no real reason for an implausible reason to be taken seriously at all. As I stated before, the difference between a 100% and 99.999% is practically irrelevant, and that's all that a very implausible reason will give you. As if we look at logical arguments probaiblistically in assessing their truth, then if my argument is originally taken as 100% true, and then you found that one premise was only 99.999% likely, then my argument is just now 99.999% likely to be true, which is not much of a difference at all in practice. After all, by giving a possible reason, you aren't proving that this is the best of all possible worlds, you are just putting doubt on a premise.

That being said, you've ignored my earlier comments comparing my argument to the classic syllogism:
1) Socrates is a man
2) All men are mortal
3) Therefore Socrates is mortal.

This too is a logical argument, but none of the premises are 100% likely to be true. We can't prove that Socrates was a man. We can't prove that all men are mortal. Thus, even though we have a valid logical argument, it is not infallible.

I think you've gone down a crazy path for no real reason. You're projecting. You're making up standards and holding that I have to hold to them, despite my persistent lack of belief that I have to do so. (and one that is coherent with the rest of my philosophical lean)

Finally, as for my ego on the matter? Um.... yeah... no, if I am wrong, and I know I am wrong, but I am not willing to admit that I am wrong, why on earth would I purposefully draw attention to a thread where you are attempting to prove that I am wrong? Such an action doesn't make sense as I am *increasing* the risk to my ego as opposed to letting the thread die, as the longer this thread stays up, and the more attention is drawn to it, the more people there are to read your arguments that I am wrong, and the more people will see how wrong I am and how stubborn I am being, and thus the more damage I do to my reputation. The fact that I am doing this really signals that I don't actually think I am wrong, but rather that I think that you are wrong and obviously so. Your claim on my motives is just irrational, and simply makes no sense.

@Orwell

You state

Replace (4) by "this is not the best of all possible worlds." There is a meaningful distinction there.

Response

No not at all. Within the, now defunct, traditional logical problem of evil, this statement is a sub argument of the fourth premise. AG has actually significantly weakened the traditional argument through this substitution, since the other supporting arguments for the lost premise are missing. In reality, this distinction makes the argument significantly less supported.


You state

No, the premise is fine saying "is." The logic issue only deals with going from premises to conclusions, not with the truth of the premises themselves (you do understand this, right?) Now, the evidentialist claims were brought in when you wanted to say that that premise was false. There has been absolutely no fallacy or error made by AG in arguing that (unless I've missed something).

Response

I understand what you are saying this is true. AG has however held that the argument supporting his premises need only be 'probably' true in order to reach the conclusion in the fourth premise. Hence my statements about the self-refutation of his argument. If the points are only 'probably' true, then the conclusion is false. So if he applied a standard view of the premises, that they must always be true, then I would agree with the statement that they flow from one another. The logic issue does not end with the flow of the premises, it certainly exists there, you are right about that. However it is impossible to support this argument with an evidentialist claim without refuting the whole argument, as it is presently constructed.

You state

You're ridiculous. It most certainly is your burden of proof.

Response

No, it really is not. I only have to prove a theoretical, but logical exception in order to disprove the argument. I am not the one making the argument, this is basic philosophy (he is trying to show an inherent contradiction), this time, I get to be the skeptic. To hold that I have to prove the exception, under the rules of philosophy is illegitimate and and intellectually dishonest.

For AG to be right, he must demonstrate that God CANNOT possibly have a reason. Hence my statements about him putting a huge burden of proof on himself. If he uses a probabilistic argument against this position, he refutes it himself. Like I said, there is a reason this is considered a dead argument. Note, I could use the free will defense to go further, but I don't have to.

@AG

You state

Umm.... but if I am holding that an argument's premises are accepted on grounds of PLAUSIBILITY, then there is no real reason for an implausible reason to be taken seriously at all. As I stated before, the difference between a 100% and 99.999% is practically irrelevant, and that's all that a very implausible reason will give you. As if we look at logical arguments probaiblistically in assessing their truth, then if my argument is originally taken as 100% true, and then you found that one premise was only 99.999% likely, then my argument is just now 99.999% likely to be true, which is not much of a difference at all in practice. After all, by giving a possible reason, you aren't proving that this is the best of all possible worlds, you are just putting doubt on a premise.

Response

Nope. You fail. You utterly fail. You have refuted your own argument. You really need a class in philosophy. The premises for your argument, based on your own choice of wording must be true. Otherwise you need to argue 'most likely'.

As to your statement about your belief I your own correct argument. Sorry, even if you think your right here, you are wrong.

Wow, I have never met anyone this foolish.

Ok, 91, have you actually taken many philosophy classes? Secondly, do you know and or discuss things often with people who have a solid background in philosophy to check the rigor of your thinking. I am just curious, as you continually refer back to philosophy class, but it seems to me very unlikely that you actually have fellows who check your work.

As it stands, you are still wrong, and you are so hopelessly lost that I don't know how to help you. If you want, I can try to find a philosophy professor to examine your point for us, and tell us both who is right and who is wrong on the matter, but I think this is just hitting a walnut with a sledgehammer. However, I am very certain that you are wrong. I've even illustrated this with a very very classic example of an argument, and it is a logical argument with inductive premises, which appears to be the thing that you are objecting to.

@Orwell

For a source on my statement relating to burden of proof

Craig, William, On Guard, the question of suffering
Plantinga, God Freedom and Evil

Put simply, I have stated that God could have a reason. I can show a circumstance where suffering is justified and therefor is logically consistent (like giving a child an immunization). The unbeliever then responses, but God can't. Since it is his argument it is on him to prove that God cannot have a reason. He is trying to sustain that they are logically contradictory, it's back on him. The statement that God cannot have a reason is not necessarily true. If AG agrees with it he needs to argue something that fits with his original argument. A probabilistic statement clearly will not work without refuting the original argument. This is one of the reasons no one really uses the logical argument anymore.

"This is not the best of all possible worlds" is a different statement than "suffering exists," as it is possible that some amount of suffering is a necessary component of any possible world.



Wrong. The truth of the premises is independent of the validity of the inferences.


So... are you acknowledging that his inferences are, in fact, valid? If so, the only thing you can do is to say that one of his premises is false. Once you want to argue against a premise, it is time to bring out the evidence, as premises are not, traditionally, pulled out of one's ass. Logical questions apply only to inferences drawn from the premises, not to the truth or falsehood of the premises themselves.


You are wrong. The validity of the argument has nothing to do with the truth of the premises. If you accept that the inferences are valid, then it becomes a question of whether or not the premises are true, and it is entirely correct to establish the truth of the premises by appealing to evidence.


Wrong again. You are not proving an exception to anything; you are disputing a premise. The premise "this is the best of all possible worlds" can be examined with reference to observed reality. If that premise is the only part of the argument to which you object, and the inferences are valid, then you must accept that the probability of AG's final conclusion being true is exactly equal to the probability of that specific premise being true.

This will not settle this or any other question. That I know. You likely have to be in a certain place - or not in another certain place - even to see it as relevant.

So many define "good / desirable universe" as "universe where I have no problems or pains". I have done it myself - more in my young punk and chuildish days, a little less now, but I admit I still do it whden the second furnace has to be replaced less than a year after the first.

But this is again from Alexander's Timeless Way of Building, and I feel he is weird but wise,with a lot to say that is making me work to process it all into my system. And you get to read it - and / or ignore it. I think it relevant.

So:

After all, the criterion of being good for us could never be a general criterion for patterns - because obviously, there are many patterns, essential to the harmonious ongoing life of the seas, the deserts, the forests - which are not directly good for us at all.

If the only criterion for a good pattern were its goodness for us, we should be forced to judge the ripples in a pond, or the crash of an ocean wave, according to whether we could get nice fish from it, or whether weliked the sound - and this swould be ridiculous.

Certain patterns are simply resolved within themselves, within their proper contrasts - in these contexts they are intrinsically alive - and it is this which makes them good.

And this is as true for the pattern of an ocean wave as it is for the pattern of a courtyard in a house.

------------

Or a universe, suggests Philologos.

@Orwell

You say

"This is not the best of all possible worlds" is a different statement than "suffering exists," as it is possible that some amount of suffering is a necessary component of any possible world.

Response

Exactly. AG cited suffering as the basis of his argument. He has refuted his own conclusion here also. His evidence cannot reach the conclusion that THIS IS NOT the best of all possible worlds. God could have a reason for the world just as it is.

You say

It is entirely correct to establish the truth of the premises by appealing to evidence.

Response

Sure you can. However his evidence refutes his own conclusion. If there is a logical exception to his statement that THIS IS NOT the best of all possible words and there is, his own evidence establishes this, then his argument fails.

You say

So... are you acknowledging that his inferences are, in fact, valid? If so, the only thing you can do is to say that one of his premises is false. Once you want to argue against a premise, it is time to bring out the evidence, as premises are not, traditionally, pulled out of one's ass. Logical questions apply only to inferences drawn from the premises, not to the truth or falsehood of the premises themselves.

Response

They are valid of the conclusion flows from the premises. The argument fails, yes, if one is disputed and shown to be wrong. OR if they are shown to contain a inherent logical contradiction. If were invalid for me to argue that a logical contradiction is inherent in a belief then there would be no such thing as the logical problem of evil at all. Hence why during this argument, I constructed a counter argument that shows his own was a logical contradiction. He accused me of begging the question, it was a necessary statement that involved showing logical consistency between God and something else, so it was not. He accused me of using it to respond to an evidential argument, in which case, it might be begging the question... Hence why I accused him of dishonesty. Whenever I argued the logical case, he cited an evidential one and when I cited an evidential one he cited the logical. Hence dishonest.

Wow... I am done. I am just in shock.

All I have to say:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hfYJsQAhl0&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

I'm done.

Last edited by Awesomelyglorious on 08 Feb 2011, 11:57 pm, edited 1 time in total.

Sure it can. All that is necessary for AG's premise to be true is to demonstrate that there is at least one way in which the world could be better than it is now.


No. You still are failing to grasp the distinction between the truth of a premise and the validity of an inference. Try to explain the difference between the two for me. I want to see how much of a lost cause this is.


VALIDITY != TRUTH DAMMIT!

The argument is valid if the truth of the premises would guarantee truth of the conclusion. The argument would then still be valid even if one or more of the premises were false. This is middle-school level stuff, 91! How is it even possible for a human being to be this monumentally stupid?


You did no such thing. Show the logical contradiction, if you can.


No, the issue here is really that you do not understand how logic works.

@Orwell

You are right about a premise being valid and this having little baring on it's truth. However if it can be shown to be logically contradictory. Then the argument fails.

Take the logical problem from evil. It has an number of underlying assumptions, which must be true for the arguement for succeed. One being, the assumption that God could make a better world and preserve his aims. It failed, in part, due to the burden of proof attached to this assumption

Now AG's premesis are correct, if they are assumed to be true, then the argument flows to its conclusion. However his argument in support of this cited suffering. His argument has as an assumptive premise, that God and a certain level of evil are contradictory. It is at this premise that I have directed most of my attack. This is the exact same way the logical problem of evil was attacked and AG's argument fails for the same reason. It contains an unfrovable assumption. Without this assumption, his argument would fail.

Earlier AG argued that it only took one unjustified evil to disprove God. That is the evidential argument. This cuts both ways, since it concedes that some evil is logically compatible with God. Therefor there is no way his argument can justify it's fourth premise that THIS IS NOT the best of all possible worlds.

You state

No. You still are failing to grasp the distinction between the truth of a premise and the validity of an inference. Try to explain the difference between the two for me. I want to see how much of a lost cause this is.

Response

An argument is valid if the premises flow naturally from one another. An argument can be false, if they do not, if one can be shown to be untrue or if they are logically contradictory.

You state

Sure it can. All that is necessary for AG's premise to be true is to demonstrate that there is at least one way in which the world could be better than it is now.

Sure, he would need to demonstrate at least one way the world could be better than it is now that CANNOT POSSIBLY OR LOGICALLY be explained. If it cannot show this, then the argument cannot conclude with the word 'is not' the most it can reach is 'might not'. He has claimed that this is not the best possible world and has argued through suffering and incompatibility that God cannot have a reason for the level of suffering. This is logically insupportable, hence the failure of the logical argument from evil. His argument needs to be more than possible in order not to fail, as it presently is written.

You State

You did no such thing. Show the logical contradiction, if you can.

Yes I did, a number of times. As to showing the logical contradiction, the evidential argument admits there is one, using it, necessarily admits the same. Look at the stuff I posted on it. I simply do not have to.

My argument was (sorry I cannot copy and past it)

1. God created the world
i God is all loving an all powerful
2. God can actualize only logical possible worlds
3. There is suffering in the world
4. Due to 1-3 God logically Must have a reason for the level of suffering

@ Orwell
Sorry once again for the double post

You can see the assumptive premise within my argument. If they are true, the argument does not fail. AG did not put his within his argument, hence all of the confusion about the nature of the argument. His argument should have had a premise like 'God and suffering are incompatible'. Or he should have changed the conclusion and had an argument with a statement relating to the evidential argument of likelihood and then concluded with a probabilistic premise like 'it is most likely that this is not the best of all possible worlds'