Secular basis for morality?

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I think I get the gist of your conversation a bit better (I am very slow) but I think my objection to using Occam's Razor still holds. Occam's Razor, in its strongest form, says to get rid of the explanation for events which is more complicated. But "morality is a transcendent thing" isn't supposed to be an explanation; treating it as such is a misapplication of logical standards. In fact, by there very nature, I can't see as any transcendent thing is supposed to have anything to do with a model of the reality of our senses, by definition. Consequently, if I interpret It correctly, transcendent things can't clutter a model of reality and make it less probable because they aren't part of the model in the first place, right?

Anyway, Occam's Razor's a heuristic based on observations of the physical world, rather than a truth in itself. It seems absurd to be applying it in non-physical situations. The way I see it, secular morality as a transcendent thing is in!

Likewise, the proposition, "morality is anthropocentric" doesn't have any constituent events for which it is meaningful to be talking about their probability. Making any statements about their probability is no better than making statements about what morality is in the first place.

Right, I tend to agree with you more really. Besides, what good is a moral theory outside of a broader theory? I think Occam's razor would dislike a floating disembodied morality a lot more than one that is embodied in something.

I guess the argument comes down to how you define “transcendent”. If it isn’t part of reality than what is it? I don’t even see how to separate ideal entities from reality. If people have the ability to conceive of transcendent entities then these entities are bound to influence peoples’ actions. Thus if transcendent things are knowable they are bound to influence reality and thus become a part of reality, and thus fall under Occam’s razor.



I think Occam’s razor is the foundation of all inductive reasoning. If we can’t apply it to transcendent things then that means transcendent things are not bound by any logic. Yet people apply logic to transcendent things all the time. Selective application of reasoning doesn’t make sense to me. They can’t have their cake and eat it too.



Of course probability doesn’t apply in the strict mathematical sense. I still think there's a heuristic notion of “likeliness” even without constituent events.

I might agree with you on this, but I'd argue that your using a different concept of "reality" than what I'm using. The only "reality" that I can form theories about to be subject to O's R is the collection of senses. Even if transcendent things are knowable and influence people's actions, Occam's razor at best can only tell us that they are a superfluous inclusion in an explanation of their action, not that they are superfluous to believe for us in general.



First, I disagree that O's R is the foundation of inductive reasoning. I interpret it more as a consequence of probability in the physical world, especially in light of Bayes' Theorem.

Second, I think your argument is invalid. Even if it were the foundation of inductive reasoning, most logic isn't inductive, although admittedly being unable to induce facts about a moral system cripples many available systems.



I can't understand how you can have a heuristic for dealing with something that does not correspond to any observations. You're still applying all sorts of properties to something for which their can be no empirical justification. I can start giving morality a color, but this is purely arbitrary.

I don’t quite understand your point here.



I don’t think Bayes’ Theorem has anything to do with the principle I have in mind. You must have an artificially narrow definition of Occam’s razor in mind. Inductive reasoning contains a notion of “likeliness” that has nothing to do with probability theory.


I’ll have to think about this. I think your argument is good here, though I’d also add that no moral system can be deduced inductively. It has to be based on a priori assumptions.

I suppose I have used a misinterpretation of Occam's Razor Even still, it seems like a priori nonsense: it is only useful because it makes explanations more easy to deal with; if a theory contains more than it needs to but is still predictively equal to another theory, the empirical content is identical. Everything else is in our minds.

My clumsy point was that a positive theory might fall victim to the way you included transcendent morality into your "reality", as if you were doing some kind of psychological or sociological description of the behavior of a person. But that is not the only context in which a proposition about morality might occur. "X is just" is independent of empirical observations and therefore is not necessarily a cause of any observations, and therefore does not necessarily cling to the edges of a theory like fat. But I guess this was dependent on my interpretation of Occam's Razor to be relevant.



Well my morality is certainly based on a priori assumptions, but I don' think that's necessary. Suppose God has a book of all the right things to do, and I know "Don't beat your wife", "Don't kick puppies", and "Don't murder". I might conclude that somewhere in the book there is a gloss "Don't hurt living things". Although perhaps I exaggerated how much induction might actually occur in modern systems.

I have picked up the for my own life only possible 'moral', though I believe it isn't even a moral principle at all for a moral principle should take others in consideration first before all else.

What I do to others must be what I accept in silence to endure myself from others just as what others do to me is what others must also accept to happen to them. In essence, whatever I wish or don't wish to happen to me I must not do to anything else.

I like this because it includes killing plants, crushing a beetle as much as bloody murder of a neighbour. I'm not very true on the last part though, I don't do the exact same thing back, I think revenge is a highly uninteresting concept. I rather like to make things even, put a person back a step who did this to me... which is probably very much of a heretic statement as it literally puts myself into one place with God.

I do believe in the existence of a God, of superior beings, of a spiritual concept of two contradicting forces, but I don't usually pray or hail to anyone of these figures. I don't follow rules from another very well.

The origin of this my concept is a simple one - I was shocked to realise that other humans, animals and all things have a being that is very similar to mine and that they have, very much like me, their own worlds to live in. Whatever happens to them has just as much consequences as something that happens to me.
I seriously have trouble following a moral principle that focuses on other people instead of me though, it's hard to get it right, not forgetting about another person's needs and wishes and own mind. They're too different from my own to understand and too invisible to see them with my eyes like neurotypicals are said to be able to by reading non-.verbal clues. When I think of myself first though, take the concept of what I think is a living being or a human being in consideration and connect it to another person -
then I won't forget that another person is also in pain by cutting their finger with a kitchen knife.

(And this was kind of more of an answer to the very first post. I felt like writing this.)

I share similar convictions,although I believe that Science as well shares similar totalitarian spirit with religions,in attempt to define reality.



As for morality,I don't think that morality has objective basis.
Attempt of defining morality through religious dogmas or scientific definitions,is basically anti-Humanistic,since they try to define one of basic human traits through something that is beyond human.

This is my opinion,off course.

If there is nothing objective to morality then what makes morality moral? Who said that morality was the basic human trait, as I have been defining it thus far as something beyond human as that is what it relates to? Are you going to push for a mystical or existential view of morality and how can this view not relate to an objective truth?

To identify PHENOMENA of morality,with something that is 'cause' of it,does not explain phenomena itself.That is naturalistic fallacy:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalistic_fallacy



What makes feeling 'feeling'?

Morality is ONE of basic human traits,because unlike in animal world,Humans are able to be self-aware of their behavior,feelings and consequences of it.
That is not however ONLY human trait.

Except that I am not appealing to the naturalistic fallacy. I am appealing to my perceived definition of morality, not to anything in this world or knowable.

Who said that morality was a feeling? Or even something that can truly be known?

Morality does not need to be invoked in order to explain human moral behavior though. Human moral behavior is done with regards to an objective moral standard, whether or not one exists. I would call the objective moral standard to be morality rather than this guided or misguided behavior, thus making morality NOT a basic human trait, only the regard for morality is.

1.If you appeal to your perceived definition of morality,then I apologize for my misinterpretation.

2.I didn't implied that morality is 'feeling' as such,just that is phenomena by itself,like 'feeling'.

3.If you say:"Morality does not need to be invoked in order to explain human moral behavior though" ...thats strange since,if human behavior is 'moral',then it implies morality.


Do you consider as 'Objective' standard ethical agreement between humans,or some natural or theological principle?
Or better,yet do you consider morality as principle in itself?

P.S

I haven't read this entire thread,so I could have missed some of your points,that you made before.

Right, I clearly don't claim we can determine an "ought" from an "is".


Well, from my view


That is a terminological issue more so than anything else. If I put "moral" in parentheses then my point could perhaps be better understood. I don't think that human behavior implies morality, but all human behavior implies an attempt to appease a higher moral ideal.


The last 2, the first is clearly an "is". The last 2 could provide "ought" through unknown processes or in essence an appeal to the unknown and unknowable as even though Hume's statement disproves man's ability to derive ought, we don't have the ability to know metaphysical truths with such ability as to deny duty.

I figured, I don't mind too much. I'll probably just make them again.

You just reminded me of something I heard, years ago. I just tracked it down in a file I'd kept:

"Religion is an insult to human dignity. With or without it, you'd have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, it takes religion." [Steven Weinberg, physicist, Nobel Laureate. Remarks made April, 1999 at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, D.C.]

Jon

Last edited by jonk on 05 Jan 2008, 2:24 am, edited 1 time in total.

I don't, particularly. I've spent many an hour debating fanatic followers, though -- excessively idealistic folks who subscribe to libertarianism without thinking much for themselves, preferring to allow others to do that for them. I do have a healthy distaste that Rand successfully played upon the mental weaknesses of too many.

Jon

Last edited by jonk on 05 Jan 2008, 2:25 am, edited 1 time in total.

Did you read the book?

Jon