Lisac57 wrote:
In classical/bivalent logic there is a principle known as ex falso quodlibet, which is gobledygook for, I take it, once you allow for one measly contradiction then, demonstrably, anything follows.
Whatever the fundamental truth about consistency might be, there sure seems to be a good bit of contradiction going around. And yet, not everything seems to follow. Although, classically speaking, it should. So what gives?
J
You might want to have a look at so-called
paraconsistent logics, in which the EFQ principle (along with some other basic logical rules) is removed, thus allowing a theory to contain certain contradictions without trivializing. An interesting book about this is:
Graham Priest,
Beyond the Limits of Thought, Cambridge University Press, 1995. Second edition, Oxford University Press, 2002. ISBN 0-19-924421-9.
It should be noted, however, that paraconsistent logics are - as a matter of rule - less expressive than classical logic, i.e., fewer inferences can be made with them. See also:
Wikipedia link. By the way, Priest is one of a very few philosophers who actually believe that some version of paraconsistent logic must be true in the "real world". Even if you don't agree with him, it's very refreshing to read his arguments.
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