91 wrote:
I think the objection from solipsism, argued in some form, most likely works. That said I don't think it is logical to embrace it. World-view requires initial assumptions to work from and in practice we need to make them, if our world-view is to have any explanitory power. I would personally argue that a world-view which increases explanitory power is preferable if one is dealing with empirically equal propositions. For example, the a and b theory of time are empirically equal, so a view in which the passage of time is real is preferable if you want validate your senses as being reliable. Neither choice has a confirm able truth value, so you can pick. Picking one that gives us a reason to doubt that our minds can and do regularly perceive truth, is not really logical if you want to establish your mind as being epistemologically important. Since I have yet to encounter an epistemology with no mind, I am inclined to accept results based choices, in lieu of speific defeaters.
Berkeley gives us a position which requires fewer leaps and which depends on our ideas but gives us reason to doubt the reality of those ideas. As such I would pick the more powerful view, if the question is not resolvable. In a similar way, I perfer a view which gives proper function, validates moral facts and has a basis for establishing free will. Hence why I resist naturalist accounts, since they undermine those three things.
Good to hear your substantial reply. It is very lucid of you to recognise your motivations for not going with idealism. In practice, I don't see how any of us can function day-to-day with a complete belief in idealism. Although, in saying this, I think we are probably all a lot more wrapped up in our heads with regard to how we are perceiving things and in terms of on what we place importance, than it might appear from observation of people performing physical tasks.
How are moral facts and free-will given a basis in the non-idealistic view which you prefer?