William Lane Craig's Teleological Argument

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The Teleological Argument from Fine-tuning goes like this:

William Lane Craig insists that chance alone could not have led to this universe. However, I argued in another thread that, even if God exists, chance alone was still required to bring forth the universe into existence.

See the thread here.

From the same thread, I also argued for a simpler explanation for the existence of this universe: the Singularitor.

Let me copy and paste what I said earlier:



Occam's Razor favors the Singularitor over Craig's God, rendering God's existence unnecessary.

So, with the Singularitor in mind, let's see how this supposedly "fine-tuned" universe could have appeared.

Consider a select few of the universes (say 100) triggered into existence by the Singularitor. What is the probability that at least one of these few is so "finely-tuned" as to allow high diversities of life forms to emerge on at least one planet in it?

Some people would argue that the probability would be quite low, while others would argue otherwise.

But even if the probability would be extremely low, we are still only considering a select few of the infinite number of universes triggered by the Singularitor.

If we were to add one extra random universe to our consideration, the probability would increase, no matter how slightly the increase may be.

If we keep adding more and more random universes to our consideration, the probability would increase even more.

Now, say we keep considering more and more random universes to the point of no end. Eventually, one such universe is going to be bound to be a "finely-tuned" universe that allows for the emergence of various life forms in it.

And it is this universe we happen to be in that ended up being as such. We, as living beings, exist exactly because we emerged in a universe that allows for our existence in it.

So it was certainly possible (and probable) for this universe to have come about by chance provided something like the Singularitor exists.

And because the Singularitor has been shown to logically trump God when it comes to parsimoniousness, the Singularitor (once again) ends up being the better explanation for this universe.

Next thread will be about Craig's Argument from Mathematical Applicability (which I consider to be a cousin of this Teleological Argument).

Appeal to a multiverse does not solve the teleological argument. There are two horns to the argument, both the lack of probability that such a universe could exist and the other is the probability that we should experience such a universe. In debate, Craig attacks with both horns, even if you successfully produce the multiverse within your logical construction and given the state of the argument you are building on, you have not really done that yet, you simply charge straight into the second horn.

I address both objections perfectly in my OP. Feel free to read it again.

Uhh... No you did not. You seem confused between identifying a universe fined tuned for the existence of life and the level of fine tuning we experience in our universe. There are many more universes that could host us and fine tuning that proceeds far beyond that point.

You are essentially reasoning within an anthropic principle objection to the argument, which is not sufficient to engage the second horn. Any universe with observers is poof that one can and does exist but the second horn is not approachable through that sort of an argument. The second horn relates to the probability that we should exist in a fine tuned universe, not the probability that we should exist at all, that is a misreading of Craig on your part. Craig would agree with you that we should expect a multiverse to generate a universe with observers, however, he constructs the second horn upon the probability that we would experience a fine-tuned universe that was significantly less fine tuned than our present one. Hence, my objection that you have not really engaged both aspects of his argument.

Exactly. And we, as in you and I and everyone else here, happen to be in only just one of such universes.



And hence, my response is that you either don't understand probability rules very well or you're not getting my argument at all.

The probability of this particular universe bound to exist among an infinite number of possible universes is 100%, whether it's this universe or that.

And we happen to observe this universe we're in exactly because we are in it.

In another universe that allows for life, there may be other observers there, and they get to observe the universe they're in for the same reason we get to observe the universe we're in.

I don't feel any challenge at all from your objections.

Well saying that we exist in this universe randomly does not refute the teleological argument, it just ignores the argument's second horn. Pretty much the entire point of the argument is that the properties cannot be accounted for on random chance alone, saying its 'random chance' just ignores the primary thrust of the argument. It is not that I do not understand your argument, it is that I am not getting any real sense that you are getting a hold of the argument you are trying to rebut.



Yes but they would not get to observe the fine tuning, which is kind of the point of the argument. If you want to attack the argument, its best to engage it from another angle.

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A word of warning over the use of the term 'infinite', when constructing an argument it is best to make it as airtight as possible. Using the term infinite within your position opens it to attack through the debate over actual or theoretical infinities. Best be cautious when using those sorts of loaded terms and use the term 'potential universes', it makes you much less vulnerable.

On the contrary, it is you who is not getting a hold of the argument you're trying to debunk.

I am arguing that this universe is just one of an infinite number of universes. So random chance alone is sufficient because, considering an infinite number of universes, at least one of them is going to be bound to be a universe like this one.

Stubbornly stating that my argument doesn't work without explaining why is just futile. You need to show why it doesn't work.

If you can't, then the argument stands.



On the contrary, if they can observe the universe they're in, then it's because it's finely tuned enough for them to be able to observe it ...



That doesn't matter. Whether it's an actually infinite number of universes or a potentially infinite number of universes, the argument stands either way.

You have identified the first horn of his argument here.



Yes, sufficient to explain the creating of such a universe (IF we grant your proposition as true and it is not) then it still does not follow that you have rebuked the argument.



I have explained it to you twice and as usual you have not read it or if you have, you have not really gotten a grasp on my point. I urge you to read the literature so we can avoid that horrid debacle that you had identifying what a compatibilist actually stands for in the free will discussion. In terms of probability, the multiverse and the existence of us as observers is equal to 1, if the former is true. The probability of us experiencing the level of fine tuning that we do within a multiverse is NOT 1, it is not even close to 1. Hence the second horn of the argument.

From Craig

"Roger Penrose of Oxford University has calculated that the odds of our universe’s low entropy condition obtaining by chance alone are on the order of 1:1010(123), an inconceivable number. If our universe were but one member of a multiverse of randomly ordered worlds, then it is vastly more probable that we should be observing a much smaller universe. For example, the odds of our solar system’s being formed instantly by the random collision of particles is about 1:1010(60), a vast number, but inconceivably smaller than 1010(123). (Penrose calls it “utter chicken feed” by comparison [The Road to Reality (Knopf, 2005), pp. 762-5]).



From my first post:
The second horn relates to the probability that we should exist in a fine tuned universe, not the probability that we should exist at all, that is a misreading of Craig on your part. Craig would agree with you that we should expect a multiverse to generate a universe with observers, however, he constructs the second horn upon the probability that we would experience a fine-tuned universe that was significantly less fine tuned than our present one. Hence, my objection that you have not really engaged both aspects of his argument.

This objection doesn't apply to my argument because I posit an immaterial entity behind the generating of multiple universes. This entity has the capacity to generate an infinite number of universes. It's an intrinsic function of my posited entity just as it is an intrinsic function of God to create things out of nothing without energy.

I will let other members (if they so wish) to further point out for you what is wrong with your overall objections.

From my last post.

"In terms of probability, the multiverse and the existence of us as observers is equal to 1, if the former is true. The probability of us experiencing the level of fine tuning that we do within a multiverse is NOT 1, it is not even close to 1. Hence the second horn of the argument. "

As I have been pointing out to you since my first post, generating a universe with observers does not explain away the fine tuning argument, it does not even get close. So I can only conclude that you are either hand-waving off a major component of the argument or you do not understand it.

Yes, I saw that. And my argument remains unchallenged because this doesn't really challenge what my argument states. In an infinite number of possible universes, at least one of them is bound to be as such. So the probability is 1, regardless of whether you like it or not.

Again, I'll let other members try to explain to you what is wrong with your objections because it seems I haven't explained it to you well.

The probability of such a universe existing is 1, the probability of us living in it is nowhere near 1, its not even close to one. The number of less fine tuned possible worlds is much higher than the probability of us existing in our own. Saying we are in such a universe because of luck is precisely the point of the teleological argument, proponents of it WANT you to admit to that.

William Lane Craig argues that all the required quantities and such are available by the time the universe is conceived. If the probability of such a universe is 1, then the probability of us eventually emerging in such a universe is 1 because those quantities and constants, according to him, would ensure it so long as they fall within the appropriate range of values.

William Lane Craig argues:

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-new- ... ts-for-god

Ahh not even close. How are you not getting this? Its in the quote above, there is more to the fine-tuning than the anthropic component.

Could be any life form.

According to him, if the quantities are right, then the quantities are right enough to predetermine the existence of what they inevitably lead to.

Or are you arguing that these quantities have a "free will"?

Ok, so you don't understand the non-anthropic nature of much of the fine tuning. The fine tuning relates to the existence of life yes, you have apprehended that correctly however there is more to it. As Craig points out the universe is fine tuned beyond that which is necessary to sustain us as observers, much more heavily tuned, even with life, we should expect to live in a universe with less fine tuning than we do. So by appealing to the multiverse, at best, it only gets you to observers but it does not get you to where we are.

Lets take a step back and go through the concept of horns of an argument. Take the traditional Euthyphro Dilemma, which is quite similar in structure. It sets out two points and if you accept the condition of one, you are attacked by the other. It is much the same here, you can appeal to the Multiverse to get you to the observers but it does not get you past the full extent of the fine tuning. Thus it is important for you to understand this distinction if you are to have any chance of understanding much less responding to the argument put forward by Craig.