And this, too; https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch6.htm
Quote:
Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
Chapter VI: An Accident Rooted in History.
...
Design Objections
Reaction from Marshall to the early Solid Rocket Motor test results was rapid and totally opposite of Thiokol's. In a September 2, 1977 memorandum, Glenn Eudy, Marshall's Chief Engineer of the Solid Rocket Motor Division, informed Alex McCool, Director of the Structures and Propulsion Laboratory, that the assembly of a developmental motor provided early indications that the Thiokol design:
"Allowed O-ring clearance.... Some people believe this design deficiency must be corrected by some method such as shimming and perhaps design modification to the case joint for hardware which has not been final machined.... I personally believe that our first choice should be to correct the design in a way that eliminates the possibility of O-ring clearance.... Since this is a very critical SRM issue, it is requested that the assignment results be compiled in such a manner as to permit review at the S&E Director's level as well as project manager."
After seeing the data from the September 1977 hydroburst test, Marshall engineer Leon Ray submitted a report entitled "Solid Rocket Motor Joint Leakage Study" dated October 21, 1977. It characterizes "no change" in the Thiokol design as "unacceptable"-"tang can move outboard and cause excessive joint clearance resulting in seal leakage. Eccentric tang/clevis interface can cause O-ring extrusion when case is pressurized." Ray recommended a "redesign of the tang and reduce tolerance on the clevis" as the "best option for a long-term fix." 29
After Ray's 1977 report, John Q. Miller, chief of the Solid Rocket Motor branch at Marshall, signed and sent a memorandum on January 9, 1978 to his superior, Glenn Eudy, describing the problems evident in the Solid Rocket Motor joint seal. "We see no valid reason for not designing to accepted standards," the memo said, and it emphasized that proper sealing of the joint by use of shims to create necessary O-ring pressure was "mandatory to prevent hot gas leaks and resulting catastrophic failure."30
One year later, not having received a response to his 1978 memo, Miller signed and forwarded a second memo strenuously objecting to Thiokol's Solid Rocket Motor joint seal design. This memo, dated January 19, 1979, opened with: "We find the Thiokol position regarding design adequacy of the clevis joint to be completely unacceptable...." 31
_________________
"There are a thousand things that can happen when you go light a rocket engine, and only one of them is good."
Tom Mueller of SpaceX, in Air and Space, Jan. 2011