North Korea sinks South Korean navy ship

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Iraq had a very large, capable military, and they were much more experienced in warfare than the North Koreans are (Saddam had spent a decade fighting the Ayatollah, and then he fought us in the Gulf War). We decimated Iraq's military essentially as soon as we showed up. If our goal is to win a war, there is no doubt about whether we can or not.

Kim won't last much longer and the regime would collapse if we could ever get China to enforce tough sanctions. They're not much an existential threat I think if left alone.

We conquered Afghanistan and Iraq in a couple weeks apiece. Iraq had a very large, capable military, and they were much more experienced in warfare than the North Koreans are (Saddam had spent a decade fighting the Ayatollah, and then he fought us in the Gulf War). We decimated Iraq's military essentially as soon as we showed up. If our goal is to win a war, there is no doubt about whether we can or not. America has as much military strength as (perhaps even more than) the rest of the world put together. Any one nation, especially one like North Korea, would simply collapse before the advance of American forces. Now, if we wanted to remain and occupy North Korea, that is a different story. Occupations are harder than wars, as we have seen over the past 8 years in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, I think once N. Korea has been soundly defeated militarily, and their command structure has been destroyed, the South Koreans can finish the task of reunification.

We *DID* conquer Afghanistan and Iraq. You're conflating holding an area and conquering it. America's problem is holding land, which is a much more difficult question than any question of conventional forces, as it isn't a matter of infantry or any other clearcut military force for that matter.

The question being asked is more about conventional warfare as well, given how the person is saying "front on", as an unconventional war, is by definition not front on anyway.

Even further, technological superiority means more and more as time goes on and as technologies become more powerful.

I see a lot of assertions of facts, but I don't see where you are proving this will be the deciding factor. It still seems clear to me that a strategy relying heavily on pounding North Korean troops to death from afar would be very successful and would tend to thin their numbers to a great extent, particularly if this is used to cut supply lines and other similar things. Ground troops are weak if they have to be afraid of standing in the open, if they are grossly undersupplied, and so on and so forth. This isn't to say "South Korea will never need any ground forces", but rather the number of ground forces South Korea has will not likely have to be anywhere similar to the number that North Korea has in order to hold ground and win the conflict.


Ok, but the issue is that

Ok? So determined infantry can hold up tanks. Good for them. Bombers cannot hold ground? Not exactly, their task is to destroy major build-ups of troops and to stop supplies from being sent. Tunnel complexes cannot be entered by drones. True, but tunnels cannot reasonably hold that many soldiers, and bunkers can be busted.

Is it hubris to underestimate the capabilities of so many armed men? Well, that'd be assuming your argument. Is it insane to believe that troops don't matter when one side has tactical superiority? Well, no, tactical superiority is worth a *lot*, and it is better to have tactical superiority over a big army any day. Even further, an open conflict wouldn't be the kind of conflict fought. They might try guerrilla tactics, and developed nations will use push-button tactics. Do I think this is insulting? No, because an argument, if it is correct, isn't an insult, and if it is wrong, is an error. That being said, infantry is probably technically replaceable by advanced enough computers of some sort(probably requiring technology unavailable today). The real issue is just cost.

Where did I say I was proving that it would be a deciding factor? I'm just pointing out that your assertion that ground troops are "irrelevant" is a load of rubbish. Clearly you have little grasp of military tactics, strategy or reality. Tunnels cannot hold "that many soldiers"? You should probably study some of the tricks pulled by the Vietnamese or the Japanese for an idea of how many men you CAN hide in tunnels, bunkers etc. and how hard they are to dig out again.

Interesting. Where did you get the idea that the Iraqi military was "capable" exactly? "Large" yes, "capable" hardly.

And your military maths are wrong and a bit daft. America does not have a larger military strength than the rest of the world put together at all...

America "wins" wars by simply declaring they have won them, which is not the same as actually WINNING them.

Ask the Iranians if the Iraqi military was capable.


America's military spending is close to the amount spent by the rest of the world combined.


We haven't been in an all-out war for a while, but any military force that opposed us has very quickly been annihilated. I don't know what you're even trying to say with this pointless assertion.

As for the "declaration of war-winning", do you not remember Bush on his aircraft carrier claiming that the war was "won"? Just a touch pre-emptive considering the continuing bodycount.

Well, we had won the war. We invaded Iraq and easily overthrew Saddam Hussein. The major failure was in the subsequent occupation, and if you'd read almost any of the comments on this thread you would have noted that occupying a country is much different than winning a war against it.

Well, we had won the war. We invaded Iraq and easily overthrew Saddam Hussein. The major failure was in the subsequent occupation, and if you'd read almost any of the comments on this thread you would have noted that occupying a country is much different than winning a war against it.

They are poorly armed, with outdated technology, and an oppressed army does not make for willing soldiers. The South is our ally, and we would defend them. North Korea has no chance at standing up against American military might.

This is one of the few places where you will see me take a hawkish stance. Europe in WWII, Korea in 1950, Kuwait in 1990, and now once against Korea in 2010. We must defend our allies against dictatorial enemies.

More than a dozen reports by governments, academics and investment banks in recent years have attempted to estimate the cost of Korean unification. At the low end, the Rand Corporation estimates $50 billion. But that assumes only a doubling of Northern incomes from current levels, which would leave incomes in the North at less than 10% of the South.

At the high end, Credit Suisse estimated last year that unification would cost $1.5 trillion, but with North Korean incomes rising to only 60% of those in the South. I estimate that raising Northern incomes to 80% of Southern levels—which would likely be a political necessity—would cost anywhere from $2 trillion to $5 trillion, spread out over 30 years. That would work out to at least $40,000 per capita if distributed solely among South Koreans.

Who would foot such a bill? China is the greatest supporter of the current regime in Pyongyang, with trade, investment and economic assistance worth $3 billion a year. Even if that flow continues, it's only a fraction of the $67 billion a year needed to equal $2 trillion over 30 years. Japan is willing to pay $10 billion in reparations for having colonized the North in the 20th century, but that too would barely make a dent.

Left entirely unanswered by the inquiry panel's report, which was released by the South Korean president's office: why the volatile and antisocial regime of North Korea's ailing "Dear Leader," Kim Jong-il, would have wanted to fire a torpedo at one of its neighbor's ships—a highly provocative move, which by almost any definition, could be considered an act of war. U.S. national-security officials acknowledge that North Korea is one of the most opaque intelligence targets in the world and that very little indeed is known about the inner workings of its leadership, including the erratic thought processes of its seemingly weakened strongman. Two U.S. officials, who asked for anonymity when discussing sensitive information, said that American agencies have no real hard information on what might have prompted North Korean to launch the attack.

However, the officials indicated that one theory that is growing in popularity among U.S. experts is that the March torpedo attack, which North Korea has vehemently denied, might have been some kind of belated tit-for-tat response to an incident last November in which South Korea allegedly fired on—and damaged—a North Korean Navy vessel.

NYTs seems to think Kim Jong-Il was personally authorized the attack and was planned as a response to the previous scuffle as a way to legitimize to succession of his son to take over as leader.

Officials declined to speculate as to whether such a retaliatory act would have had to have been authorized at the highest level of the North Korean government—presumably by Kim Jong-il himself, assuming he is healthy enough to still be in charge—or whether it is conceivable that a military commander at a lower level could have taken it upon himself to pursue vengeance.