Pseudoskepticism and climate change

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Non‐experts hold a considerable disadvantage with regard to methodological training and experience, but rather than realizing this, pseudoskeptics may take their lack of training as a virtue. A virtue that, or so they may believe, frees them from the traps of professional “groupthink.” For this reason, non‐experts wishing to deny anthropogenic global warming sometimes reference historic figures like Galileo as evidence that a scientific consensus can be wrong. Yet figures like Galileo and other thinkers of his time are responsible for ushering in the modern age of experimental research that has driven the very need for advanced‐level training separating professional researchers from the lay public. It is consistent with the Dunning–Kruger effect that those evoking Galileo and other historic figures do not know enough about science, and its history, to understand the error of their comparison.

Consequently, when we refer to the denial of well‐established scientific consensus as skepticism, we invite confusion. Overgeneralizing and misusing the term skepticism is damaging to informed public discourse in at least two ways: (a) Insofar as many people have a nebulous sense that skepticism is good, pseudoskeptics win a rhetorical advantage by portraying themselves as skeptical in contrast to “mainstream” scientific research, which they portray as dogmatically set against their skeptical challenge. (b) Because reasoned skepticism is a crucial component of the scientific process, misuse of the term skepticism—to mean any form of doubting something, for any reason—chips away at an understanding of how science actually works, which should be regarded as the core of scientific literacy (Holbrook & Rannikmae, 2009). This point is important because in cases of science denial not explained by motivated reasoning or ideological bias, the rejection of settled science may simply involve ignorance of the scientific process and the epistemic significance of consensus in science (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Galesic, Kause, & Gaissmaier, 2016; Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 2016; Joslyn & LeClerc, 2016; Newell et al., 2016; Ranney & Clark, 2016). Thus, one of the dangers of pseudoskepticism is its potential to mislead the uninformed.

In contrast to the cases above, the form of science denialism I wish to explore below is what I refer to as pseudoskepticism. When scientific consensus is rejected by non‐experts who naively consider themselves more scientifically astute than the collective scientific community, it is appropriately labeled pseudoskepticism. Pseudoskepticism, I argue, may be influenced by, though perhaps not exclusively, the following two factors: (a) ignorance of the scientific process and (b) ideologically motivated reasoning (as opposed to the exercise of faith).

It is thus necessary that one be able to recognize appropriate expertise in science when such expertise exists. The philosopher Alvin Goldman has examined some of the criteria of use to non‐experts in their efforts to discern appropriate scientific expertise. The first criterion introduced by Goldman involves straightforwardly assessing the quality of arguments presented by the alleged expert (Goldman, 2001). This, as philosopher Massimo Pigliucci points out, is sometimes possible for an intelligent and informed layperson to assess, but it becomes increasingly difficult as information becomes more technical (Pigliucci, 2010). For this reason, it is important to look for agreement among other experts in the field (Goldman, 2001; Pigliucci, 2010).

This requires that one pay attention to the credentials an alleged expert has, and evidence that they are performing their role as experts in as unbiased a fashion as possible. In addition, researchers who have achieved a strong record of accomplishment in their field, as judged by their peers, deserve to have their opinions weighted more heavily than less accomplished experts (Goldman, 2001; Pigliucci, 2010). There is reason to be cautious if a given expert is employed by a corporation that benefits from that expert's promotion of evidence conducive to the latter's corporate agenda (Pigliucci, 2010). An obvious example is if a scientist, with legitimate expertise, is positing contrarian views regarding anthropogenic climate change while being paid by an oil company for consultation work. Another example is if a scientist receives private funding from corporate entities with an obvious stake in particular findings. This is why it is crucial for scientists to make such conflicts of interest known and it is a serious ethical concern when conflicts of interest are not declared. The possibility always exists that individual experts can be wrong or inappropriately influenced. It is all the more important for the layperson to defer to the consensus opinion of experts, when available, since a community of experts is less vulnerable in the aggregate to inappropriate influence than any one individual.

None of this is epistemically perfect and all of it requires some initial ability to identify relevant matters (like the existence of relevant educational credentials). Despite the legitimate challenges poised for the layperson in assessing expertise, there are some cases where determining expertise is relatively straightforward. In cases like anthropogenic climate change, the existence of an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), organized independently of any one group's agenda, and tasked with sorting through the global body of research related to climate change, makes it easier for the lay person to know where to turn for good information. IPCC reports are widely publicized and available online for easy access to policy makers and the general public.

Climate change is not science, because they don't produce verifiable data.

They don't produce any data at all.

They produce subjective models of data.

This is how their models can vary so much, because of the personal biases of the researcher.

Exhibit A! Everything you’ve said here is wrong.

Which begs the question, is there such a thing as pseudobelief?

In absolute objective thought, it doesn't exist.

Otherwise, you have to make reasonable assumptions about the future.

They are reasonable.

However, they are assumptions.

In middle school, I had a tall 6' 7 teacher, Mr. G.

One day he asked us, "Why did you sit in your chair without checking if it would support your weight"?

We responded something like, "We knew it would".

He warned us, "You couldn't of know that, and one day it will break".

Mr. G probably broke some chairs in his lifetime.

People like him, instead of being called, "critical thinkers", are labeled, "science skeptics".

In middle school, I had a tall 6' 7 teacher, Mr. G.

One day he asked us, "Why did you sit in your chair without checking if it would support your weight"?

We responded something like, "We knew it would".

He warned us, "You couldn't of know that, and one day it will break".

Mr. G probably broke some chairs in his lifetime.

People like him, instead of being called, "critical thinkers", are labeled, "science skeptics".

In middle school, I had a tall 6' 7 teacher, Mr. G.

One day he asked us, "Why did you sit in your chair without checking if it would support your weight"?

We responded something like, "We knew it would".

He warned us, "You couldn't of know that, and one day it will break".

Mr. G probably broke some chairs in his lifetime.

People like him, instead of being called, "critical thinkers", are labeled, "science skeptics".