Autism and Philosophy. Part I

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I have moved this post to a different category so that it may have a different reception. Although the word philosophy is mentioned, this post does not deal exclusively with that but is mainly related to autism.

In this post, even though it mentions the word philosophy, I don’t want to fuel a discussion, I don’t want to fuel a confrontation. I want to focus this act of writing here as an act of sharing. To offer to whoever reads this information a point of view that I would have liked to discuss with someone before in a pleasant conversation.

I’m not looking to assume a particular philosophy author, although some concepts attributable to some of them may be glimpsed. My foundation is a series of reflections about autism in which certain categories addressed in philosophy appear for reflection.

In this first part I want to refer to ethics and truth. Since I know about autism, I have always been struck by its commitment to what is true, to what is real. But this is pigeonholed as cognitive and/or behavioral rigidity. If we look at it from an existential and phenomenological point of view and we focus on the autistic as a subject, there is an ethical choice there: to portray and stick to the world as it is. Isn’t that the (ontologically impossible, according to various modern perspectives) scientific aspiration, to know reality as it really is? Why does the autistic, who clings to the truth of things, receive the social invalidation of his point of view? Because society does not move by truths, or not entirely, but by bonds.

Consider this scheme of anecdotes: if an NT asks an autistic to say their preferred option about something, but the autistic truly weighs that all options are incommensurable or of equal value and tells this to the NT, even with well-chosen words, the NT in many cases is dissatisfied with the answer; that is, the autistic, from the NT point of view, must renounce in their conscience their affections and internal opinions about the options presented to them and say that they prefer one over the others, even if it is not so. How can it be inferred from here that this serves to maintain good bonds? The configuration of a world under this logic, the NT, does it blur the syllogisms or are there premises that are lost in the shadows? Which ones? Sociolinguistic pragmatism?

Postscript: There will be more to share for a next occasion.

Let's say an NT presents an autistic an array of desserts and asks which one the autistic thinks is the best, because the NT is choosing a dessert for a party they intend to host. If the autistic concludes objectively that all the desserts presented are equally palatable and equally suitable for the party, then he is not participating in the social contract of "helping" with the decision-making and sharing in that decision, which does form a kind of bond: they would bond over choosing a dessert. The choosing and the sharing is more important to the NT than the ultimate choice of dessert, precisely because it creates a kind of bond through this shared activity.

I’m not sure OP is as profound as he believes he is.

In OP’s example, if the NT person had asked the same question of another NT person and received the same response, the questioner would have judged the NT respondent the same way he judged the autistic person. The questioner was not judging the person; he was judging the answer.

I think I get what you're talking about.

you're supposed to agree with the person...to bond with them...and with the group...factual truth be damned.

NTs seek out yes people because they like people who are agreeable.